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Populism and Collective Memory
Right-wing populism is a global phenomenon that challenges several pillars of 
liberal democracy, and it is often described as a dangerous political ideology 
because it resonates with the fascist idea of power in terms of anti-pluralism 
and lack of minorities’ protection. In Western Europe, many political actors are 
exploiting the fears and insecurities linked to globalization, economic crisis, and 
mass migrations to attract voters. However, while right-wing populist discourses 
are mainstream in certain countries, they are almost completely taboo in others. 
Why is right-wing populism so successful in Italy, Austria, and France while in 
Germany it is marginal and socially unacceptable? It is because each country 
developed a certain collective memory of the fascist past, which stigmatizes that 
past to different levels. For this reason, right-wing populism can find favorable 
conditions to thrive in certain countries, while in others it is considered as an 
illegitimate and dangerous idea of power. Through a comparative study of eight 
European countries, this book shows that short-term factors linked to levels of 
corruption, economic situation, and quality of democracy interact with long-term 
cultural elements and collective memories in determining the social acceptability 
of right-wing populist discourses.
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Giving a definition of democracy is not a trivial task, while fascism is a complex 
mixture of right- and left-wing ideas. Alas, populism is much worse. Like a Fata 
Morgana, populism appears to be everywhere because the term has become a 
passe-partout, a keyword supposed to explain every development of contempo-
rary politics.1 This is far from true, but studying the links between populism, 
democracy, and fascism allows us to better grasp what is going on in Western 
Europe and why many commentators and scholars evoke the 1930s, the Great 
Depression, and a certain fascist Zeitgeist. The impression is that while lib-
eral democracy lost its appeal, a populist idea of democracy has been gaining 
momentum.
However, this phenomenon is not taking place in every country with the same 
intensity. Populism, in fact, is not equally accepted in every public debate across 
Western Europe, and while it is safe to claim that its relevance and electoral suc-
cess are steadily increasing, it would be premature to celebrate the funeral of lib-
eral democracy. Populism is testing the limits and strengths of liberal democracy, 
and by challenging certain ideological pillars, it shows what politics could become 
in the future. For this reason, understanding under which conditions populism 
thrives or fails is a crucial task.
The aim of this book consists precisely in understanding why populism blooms 
in certain countries while it remains a taboo in others. The current wave of pop-
ulism in Western Europe is generating a lot of confusion because short-term eco-
nomic and political factors often fail to explain the social acceptability of populist 
discourses across countries. While the vast majority of studies point to contingent 
demand- and supply-side factors that are supposed to explain the electoral success 
of populist discourses, this study shows the importance of considering populism 
from a long-term, historical perspective in order to understand its social accepta-
bility. The populist idea of power circulates in every public debate across Europe, 
but its social acceptability is strongly determined by the collective re-elaboration 
of the European fascist past.
Losing sight of the historical dimension of populism and – in particular – of its 
resonance with the authoritarian turn that Europe experienced in the 1920s and 
1930s, one would fail to explain why populism is socially acceptable in certain 
countries while it is highly stigmatized in others. The presence of high levels of 
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corruption combined with poor economic performance and growing inequali-
ties, for example, might not automatically lead to a populist triumph. Similarly, 
populist actors might thrive in a country characterized by a growing economy 
and a responsive political system. This can only be explained by adopting a long-
term perspective that focuses on the stigma generated by different collective 
memories of the fascist past.
Naturally, long-term legacies that determine the Salonfähigkeit (social accept-
ability) of populism always interact with short-term socio-economic and political-
institutional factors. It is impossible to ignore that, in Western Europe, populist 
movements, parties, and leaders often settle the political debate and obtain 
remarkable electoral results. Populist discourses have become mainstream in lib-
eral democracies to the point that the political climate characterizing the last two 
decades has been described as populist Zeitgeist.2 When the political system is out 
of touch and isolated in its ivory tower, and those in power do not deliver on their 
promises, citizens want to be heard and to hold their representatives accountable. 
If the media add fuel to the fire of supranational integration and the refugee cri-
sis, the perfect Molotov cocktail is served, and populism becomes a very effective 
way to mobilize resentment by offering redemption from the old politics and by 
exploiting the fears of constituencies disoriented by modernization.
In 1922, Antonio Gramsci was witnessing the rise of fascism in Italy, and he 
perfectly understood the social climate of the time: dense of fears, resentment, 
and anti-politics feelings. In his words, “fascism presented itself as the anti-party, 
opened the doors to every candidate and – with its promised impunity – allowed 
a motley multitude to cover with a fresh paint of vague and nebulous political 
ideas the wild flood of passions, hatreds, and desires.”3 A century later, populist 
parties tap into popular resentments and insecurities, exploit the shortcomings of 
established political parties, and take advantage of disillusioned voters through 
an anti-elitist rhetoric that promise to give back the power to the confused mul-
titudes that Gramsci was describing.
In times of protracted economic crisis and deterioration of the credibility of 
political parties and institutions, the growing political weight of populist actors 
should not come as a surprise. Populism gains traction when the gap between 
representatives and represented grows to a critical point, which is why it can be 
considered as a potential “barometer” of the health of representative politics (Tag-
gart 2002, 71); high levels of populism might indicate the malfunctioning of lib-
eral and constitutional democratic mechanisms. Moreover, by observing previous 
waves of populism, one can see that socio-economic turbulence and political trans-
formations have always been key factors for the success of populism. If one consid-
ers that the last three decades in Western Europe have been marked by the Great 
Recession, a process of supranational integration, and a flow of migrants from the 
Middle East and Northern Africa, the boisterous success of populism seems to be 
the obvious ending of a well-known story rather than a flash in the pan.
When trying to understand the mechanisms determining the social acceptabil-
ity of populist discourses across countries, one must constantly bear in mind that 
populism is increasingly successful in elections and often accepted in the political 
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debate. Indeed, the data examined in this work confirm a growing presence of 
populist discourses in West European party manifestos. This indicates that short-
term supply- and demand-side conditions are favourable for populism to thrive. 
Socio-economic and political-institutional factors, however, are only part of the 
explanation, and they must be considered in interaction with the national politi-
cal culture of each country, which can either prevent or foster the  Salonfähigkeit 
of populism. Indeed, it is remarkable to observe that the social acceptability of 
populist discourses greatly varies across countries which are experiencing the 
same transformations and turbulences across a similar timescale. This suggests 
that, in some countries, populism thrives despite unfavourable conditions, and 
vice versa. While certain countries can be considered as ‘populist paradises’ (e.g. 
Italy, Switzerland, Austria), in other countries populist discourses do not have 
sufficient legitimacy to leave the periphery of the public debate and become a 
credible alternative (e.g. Sweden, Germany, Portugal). Why is that the case?
To understand the cross-country variation of populism’s social acceptability, 
one must observe how short-term social, economic, and political factors interact 
with cultural elements. In particular, different collective memories of the fascist 
past can open up or, conversely, close down windows of opportunity for the 
social acceptability of populist discourses. By observing different re-elaborations 
of that past, it is possible to determine the degree of stigma attached to it and 
therefore determine the Salonfähigkeit of populist discourses in a given society. 
This explains why populist discourses are widespread and electorally successful in 
countries where short-term factors seem unfavourable, and vice versa.
Four different types of collective re-elaboration determine the degree of stig-
matization of the fascist past: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and vic-
timization. In countries characterized by victimization – producing a very low 
degree of stigma of the fascist past – populism is particularly acceptable. By con-
trast, in countries characterized by culpabilization – producing a very high degree 
of stigma – populism is taboo and therefore socially unacceptable, at the margins 
of the public debate.
It is not surprising to observe that, in particular, it is the social acceptability of 
right-wing populism that proves to be linked very strongly to the levels of stigma 
of the fascist past. Indeed, the authoritarian past in Western Europe is represented 
by the fascist regimes in power in Italy and Germany between 1922 and 1945.4 
Countries which did not deal with the fascist past in a profound and responsible 
manner are therefore supposed to constitute a fertile ground for right-wing pop-
ulism to thrive. For example, while Germany took responsibility for its past and 
admitted its guilt (a process called Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit or Vergangen-
heitsbewältigung), Austria shifted the blame and refused to critically deal with its 
past (Art 2006). These two opposite types of collective memory produce, respec-
tively, a very high and a very low degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements. 
Given the fact that the two countries have similar levels of economic development 
or accountability and responsiveness of the political system, one can hypothesize 
that their different types of collective memories about the fascist past either trig-
ger or block the social acceptability of populism.
4 Introduction
A key element of this argument is represented by the elective affinities between 
populism and fascism. On the one hand, the two are extremely different phe-
nomena, and the aim is not to collapse the two concepts into each other to the 
point of making them undistinguishable.5 On the other hand, what matters here 
is the fact that the populist idea of power is often portrayed as a dangerous politi-
cal ideology vis-à-vis liberal and constitutional ideas of power precisely because 
of its illiberal elements, which strongly resonate with certain traits of the fascist 
idea of power, in contrast to liberal and constitutional democracy. This negative 
characterization of populism is very much present in the European collective 
imagination. Politicians accused of being populist are often implicitly linked to 
the cumbersome legacy of the twentieth century and hence to the absence of 
democracy.6
Indeed, the term populist is often evoked in European politics in order to label 
someone as an anti-democratic demagogue, and populism is ultimately seen as 
a proto-totalitarian and illiberal ideology because the populist idea of power is 
at odds with the liberal and constitutional types of democracies which became 
dominant in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II.7 The tension 
between liberal and populist ideas of power is the expression of opposite types 
of democratic qualities: rule of law versus majoritarianism; checks and balances 
versus unmediated exercise of power; constitutionalism versus unconstrained will 
of the people; and division versus concentration of powers.8 The fascist past reso-
nates as soon as politicians articulate one of these points and criticize representa-
tive politics.
This study does not constitute the first attempt to explain cross-country and 
longitudinal variations in the presence of populism. Nonetheless, it displays 
three innovative elements concerning the measurement of populist messages, 
the amplitude of the data used for the analysis, and the introduction of a novel 
condition linked to the presence of populism. First, the discursive dimension of 
populism is considered. This means that the phenomenon to be explained is the 
Salonfähigkeit of populist discourses, measured as the combination of levels of 
populism in party manifestos, the parties’ degree of radicalism, and their electoral 
performance. Second, the presence of populist discourses is measured in eight 
West European countries since the 1970s through an extensive content analysis 
of 173 party manifestos.9 Third, this study introduces the idea that collective 
memories are connected to the social acceptability of populism and starts from 
the assumption that socio-economic and political-institutional factors are com-
plementary to cultural opportunity structures in explaining different levels of 
populist discourses.
Structure of the book
This work follows several steps in order to test whether the levels of stigma of 
the fascist past – in interaction with traditional demand- and supply-side factors – 
can explain the social acceptability of populism. The first task consists of illus-
trating the theoretical framework used in order to operationalize and measure 
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populism, as well as the link between the populist idea of power, fascism, and lib-
eral democracy (Chapter 1). Once it is clarified how populism is understood and 
conceptualized, Chapter 2 presents the existing literature about the conditions 
that are supposed to explain the electoral success of radical right-wing parties. 
This literature, however, focuses on a mono-dimensional idea of populism as a 
right-wing and often extremist political ideology. Moreover, short-term supply- 
and demand-side factors appear to leave unexplained part of the cross-country 
variation in terms of populism’s social acceptability. Hence, the idea that different 
collective memories determine different degrees of stigmatization or acceptation 
of populism, and therefore play a role in triggering or blocking the social accept-
ability of populist discourses, is introduced (Chapter 3).
The research design is presented in Chapter 4. This provides all the details con-
cerning the operationalization and measurement of populist discourses in party 
manifestos, a discussion of the case selection, and a brief description of the meth-
odology implemented. Chapter 5 presents the results of the content analysis and 
offers an overview of the presence of populism. The percentage of populist state-
ments in party manifestos is weighted by the vote share and degree of radicalism 
of each party, thus providing a measure for the social acceptability of populism 
across countries and over time. Chapter 6 presents the relevant literature about 
each country’s type of re-elaboration in order to establish, for each case, the over-
all level of stigmatization of the fascist past.
Chapter 7 tests the role of several conditions usually associated with the electoral 
success of populism. Derived from the literature review presented in Chapter 2, 
these supply- and demand-side factors are supposed to trigger the social accept-
ability of populism. The analysis assesses the presence of sufficient and necessary 
conditions for the social acceptability of populist messages in eight West European 
countries over the last three decades. Finally, Chapter 8 tests the impact of the 
degree of stigma associated with the fascist past. It shows to what extent long-
term cultural factors are essential in explaining the social acceptability of populist 
discourses. The Conclusions aim at proposing directions for future research, as 
well as assessing the generalizability of the findings outside Western Europe.
Notes
1 “The word evokes the long-simmering resentments of the everyman, brought to 
a boil by charismatic politicians hawking impossible promises. Often as not, pop-
ulism sounds like something from a horror film: an alien bacteria [sic] that has 
somehow slipped through democracy’s defences – aided, perhaps, by Steve Bannon 
or some other wily agent of mass manipulation – and is now poisoning political 
life, creating new ranks of populist voters among ‘us.’ ” The Guardian, “ ‘We the 
people’: the battle to define populism,” by Peter Baker, January 10, 2019, available 
online (consulted in March 2019): www.theguardian.com/news/2019/jan/10/
we-the-people-the-battle-to-define-populism.
2 This idea has been introduced by Mudde (2004), and it has remained at the centre 
of the debate on populism ever since.
3 Translation of the author. The article was published by L’Ordine Nuovo, April 26, 
1921. Published in Gramsci (1966).
6 Introduction
4 In Portugal, António Salazar’s regime remained in power until 1974 and Francisco 
Franco in Spain until 1975. Given the different timing and length, the memories of 
these two regimes after 1945 follow a different trajectory compared to the one rele-
vant for the present study. These issues are discussed in more detail in the Conclusions.
5 For example, contrary to populism, fascism also includes para-militarism, corporat-
ism, and imperialism. Similarities and differences between populism and fascism are 
thoroughly discussed by Eatwell (2017). Among other things, the author argues 
that, unlike fascism, populism is a form of democracy, albeit not liberal democracy.
6 In 2012, then EU President Herman van Rompuy and then European Commis-
sion President Barroso warned against the danger for democracy represented by 
populism, followed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Prime Minister 
Matteo Renzi, and Prime Minister of Norway Erna Solberg.
7 As will become evident in Chapter 1, whether or not populism is a threat depends 
on the normative idea of democracy used as a yardstick for comparison.
8 Slater speaks of a “tension between democratic inclusivity and democratic con-
straints”, and a “friction between vertical and horizontal accountability” to describe 
the relationship between different ideas of democracy based on different levels of 
liberalism (2013, 732).
9 Such an extensive content analysis has been possible thanks to the NCCR Democ-
racy programme: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century (Module 2: Populism 
in the Context of Globalization and Mediatization).
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This chapter clarifies the object of this study; since we are dealing with populism, 
this task is anything but obvious. It is essential to situate the chosen approach to 
populism within the burgeoning literature on the topic, which originates from 
different disciplines and relies on different concepts. What is populism, and how 
can its presence be measured in party manifestos? How is it possible to understand 
the relationship between populism and democracy, and how does this impact the 
possible explanatory models for its social acceptability?
Christoph Blocher in Switzerland, Luigi Di Maio in Italy, Nigel Farage in the 
United Kingdom, as well as Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France – despite being errati-
cally positioned along the right – left and authoritarian – libertarian (or GAL – 
TAN) axes – share a common element: they articulate populist discourses. They 
express an ideology, a vision of the world, which on the one hand celebrates the 
common people as the only legitimate source of power and on the other hand rep-
resents the economic, cultural, and political elites as the enemy, a cancer of society, 
a clique of intrigues and corruption that must leave the stage to the vox populi. This 
logic entails that only the truly populist leaders and parties may redeem the com-
mon people and implement radical, direct, or simply legitimate forms of democracy.
Given the gargantuan variety of approaches to populism, however, the popular 
use of the term is often inaccurate or misleading: the misuse and abuse of the 
term have contributed to increase its aura as an elusive concept.1 Even inside aca-
demia there has been much tug-of-war around definitions and applications, and 
the impression is that since the seminal work of Ionescu and Gellner (1969), the 
fuzziness has done nothing but increase. Populism seemed to be like the Teumes-
sian fox of Greek mythology, destined never to be caught. Since the 1960s, schol-
ars have been baffled by the “chameleonic” nature and “conceptual slipperiness” 
of populism (Taggart 2000). Isaiah Berlin argued that studies about populism 
suffer from a “Cinderella complex”:
There exists a shoe – the word “populism” – for which somewhere exists 
a foot. There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be 
trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering about 
with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits a limb called pure 
populism.2
1  Taxonomy of a chameleon
The populist idea of power
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 The concept of populism has become increasingly present in the public 
debate also because of its slipperiness and adaptability to several contexts. It 
is erroneously used as a synonym for nationalism, anti-elitism, and chauvin-
ism but also to denote simplistic or even vulgar political positions. Duncan 
McDonnell and Ben Stanley have coined the term “schmopulism” to describe 
the fact that “populism” has become a popular buzzword in media and aca-
demia alike. 
 Figure 1.1 shows how scholars and journalists are talking about populism more 
than ever before. 3 In newspaper articles (plot on the left), the term started gain-
ing popularity in the 1990s, then it grew steadily; in just one year (between 
2015 and 2016), the term became literally ubiquitous, with a jump from around 
34,000 articles mentioning the term to more than 65,000 articles. The develop-
ment in academic peer-reviewed journals is similar, although the term populism 
already appears in a signifi cant number of articles since the 1970s. From the 
2000s, the growth is considerable: from 57 articles in 1999 to 446 in 2016. This 
is just a rough measure that contributes to understanding the extent to which 
populism has become one of the most discussed topics both inside and outside 
academia in Western Europe. 
 Figure 1.1 Populism in Newspaper Articles and Academic Journals 
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To avoid any conceptual slipperiness, and in order to adopt a clear theoretical 
framework, this study situates itself in a precise strand of literature which con-
siders populism as an ideology – or a worldview – articulated discursively. This 
conceptualization has provided a theoretical and analytical toolbox which finally 
allows the study of populism in a consistent and comparative way. The next sec-
tions expose the extreme variability of populist discourses in order to grasp pop-
ulism’s ideological essence and eventually propose a minimal definition, which 
will constitute the base for the operationalization and measurement of populism 
in Chapter 4. Next, the relationship between populism and liberal democracy, 
and which elements of the populist idea of power resonate with the fascist past, 
are clarified.
Populism in historical perspective
From a populist perspective, true democracy – the rule (krátos) of the people 
(demos) – exists only when the will of the common people is respected as sover-
eign.4 It follows that populism becomes successful especially because it promises 
to introduce (or restore) accountability and responsiveness by involving the peo-
ple in the decision-making process, thus reviving the idea of direct democracy 
introduced in Ancient Athens 25 centuries ago.5 However, political structures 
such as the Greek poleis do not exist anymore, and direct democracy in the con-
text of nation-states is not at stake (Dahl 1989).6
Several historical manifestations of modern populism across the world show 
that the centrality of the people is constantly evoked in times of rapid socio-
economic and political developments which leave large portions of the popu-
lation without a credible representation of their interests. Globalization and 
modernization constitute the two main triggers for the formation of a breeding 
ground for populism not only in the twenty-first century but throughout his-
tory. For example, both agrarian populism and anti-Catholic nativism in the 
nineteenth-century United States developed in times of socio-economic turmoil 
as a response to the profound socio-economic and cultural challenges of the 
time (Swank and Betz 2003). The Russian Narodniki7 – around the 1860s and 
1870s – originated from similar socio-economic conditions: a group of intel-
lectuals tried to convince the peasantry to fight an egalitarian struggle aiming at 
land redistribution, believing in the peasants’ inherent socialism (Pedler 1927).8
Völkish movements9 – which developed in nineteenth-century Germany as a 
mix of populism, Romantic Nationalism, and German folklore (Trägårdh 2002; 
Olsen 1999) – were the expression of an anti-modernity reaction to the Industrial 
Revolution. Kurlander (2002, 36) argues that, in order to survive, liberalism in 
Germany had to become völkish and eventually created the space for the emer-
gence of National Socialism.10 Similarly, in Austria and France, at the end of the 
nineteenth century, right-wing populist actors such as Karl Lueger and Georges 
Ernest Boulanger became very popular.
Since the 1970s, populism has resurfaced in Europe in its right-wing, nativ-
ist form as a reaction to the New Left and to the de-industrialization process, 
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focusing on issues positioned on the cultural axis of competition, such as immi-
gration, crime, and nationalism. Parties such as the Front National in France, 
the Danish People’s Party, and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium mobilized disil-
lusioned constituencies in opposition to the mainstream parties and the politi-
cal, economic, and cultural elites while proposing an ethnocentric vision of the 
people. In the following years, many other populist parties with similar agendas 
emerged all over Europe, such as the Sweden Democrats, the United Kingdom 
Independence Party, and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. This is the 
most studied and best-documented wave of populism, and it generated such tre-
mendous attention that it often overshadowed every other historical populist 
manifestation.11 As a result, extreme and radical right-wing populism became a 
(wrong and misleading) synonym for populism tout court.
More recently, increasing attention has been devoted also to left-wing popu-
list movements and parties, such as Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece 
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014), or the Occupy movements (Pickerill 2015). 
These political experiences gained traction in the context of a protracted and 
generalized economic crisis by proposing to fight inequalities and corruption 
and to restore the sovereignty of the people vis-à-vis supranational economic 
institutions.
This far from exhaustive historical overview – which focuses mainly on Europe 
while ignoring many other populist manifestations in Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa – clarifies how heterogeneous populism can be and in how many differ-
ent organizational and ideological ways it can be declined. The purpose was to 
illustrate the extreme variability of parties and movements articulating populist 
discourses in order to understand which is the lowest common denominator and 
therefore propose a minimal definition of populism which allows study of the 
phenomenon in a comparative and longitudinal way (Rooduijn 2014b).
Populism: its ideological dimension and  
a minimal definition
This study, in order to analyze the presence of populism in several countries over 
time, adopts the ideational approach proposed by Mudde (2004). This represents 
the best way to grasp the essence of a political phenomenon that varies so heavily 
over time and across countries. If the last section illustrated the populist phenom-
enon by exposing some of its manifold empirical manifestations, this section aims 
at re-composing the idea of populism by following the fil rouge which allows the 
identification of its ideological core.
Every populist manifestation in first place shares the same idea of power. Only 
at the second stage does it matter whether a particular manifestation of populism 
follows a right- or left-wing agenda, whether it is a bottom-up movement or a 
top-down project, whether it relies on a charismatic leader or not, whether it 
opposes or proposes certain policies, whether it stands in government or in oppo-
sition. The aim of this study is to understand the conditions triggering the social 
acceptability of populist discourses across eight West European countries, and for 
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this purpose it is essential to identify a set of common elements that characterize 
every empirical and, in particular, discursive manifestation of populism.12
For this purpose, the ideational approach appears to be the most suitable and 
convincing.13 It defines populism as a particular ideology or worldview based on 
a Manichean distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite. Since it 
entails a very narrow set of ideas, populism is often described as a thin-centred ide-
ology.14 In order to gain political depth, thin-centred ideologies such as populism 
are most commonly combined with more developed political ideologies such 
as socialism, nativism, or liberalism, depending upon the specific socio-political 
context and the type of actor articulating them.15 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2012, 12) claim that “in practice, populism is almost always combined with one 
or more other ideological features.” This study adopts the ideational approach 
and therefore identifies populism as a combination of people-centrism and anti-
elitism. This leads to the following definition (Wirth et al. 2016, 15):16
Populism is a thin-centered ideology, which considers – in a Manichean out-
look – society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antag-
onistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and postulates 
unrestricted sovereignty of the people.
The ideational approach, compared to the other existing ones, presents a main 
advantage: since it conceives of populism as a set of ideas, it become possible to 
clearly assess whether an actor is articulating a populist discourse.17 Indeed, the 
populist ideology becomes measurable as soon as an actor articulates it discur-
sively.18 It also overcomes the typical dichotomous classification of political actors 
and journalists as either populist or not. In fact, it reflects the spectrum of dif-
ferent levels and varieties of populist discourses (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 
2009; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014).
Moreover, the ideational approach makes it possible for scholars to study both 
the demand- and supply-side of populist ideas. Conceptually, if populism is con-
sidered only as a style, as a type of party organization, or as a type of mobilization, 
it is difficult to understand which factors determine its dynamics of demand-and-
offer on the political arena. It might allow us to know that citizens prefer grass-
roots organizations or flamboyant personalities (two traits that do not necessarily 
correlate with populism) but not why they vote for political actors articulating 
populist discourses. Similarly, it would not be possible to understand why politi-
cal actors with populist ideas are able to find their place on political arenas already 
populated by many different actors with different ideologies.
Consistently with the ideational approach, populism is here presented as a type 
of discourse available to every political actor, who can employ “populism as a 
flexible mode of persuasion to redefine the people and their adversaries” (Panizza 
2005, 8). This does not imply that every actor should be labelled as populist; at 
the empirical level, researchers can draw a distinction between populist or non-
populist actors by establishing how often a certain actor has to articulate anti-
elitist and people-centric messages in ordered to be labelled as a populist. On the 
12 Taxonomy of a chameleon
other hand, it becomes possible to establish that an actor is more populist than 
others and that their discourses are populist in different ways because they use 
different rhetoric strategies and are attached to different full ideologies. In this 
study, the aim is to establish when a certain country – at a certain time in point – 
displays a high social acceptability of populism.19
After having defined populism as a thin-centred ideology that can be articu-
lated discursively, a definition that encompasses all the historical manifestations 
of populism, it is essential to describe the populist idea of power and how this is 
in tension with liberal and constitutional ideas of power. Hence, the next sections 
present the relationship between the elite and the people as antagonistic elements 
of society in the populist ideology, as well as the substantial differences between 
the populist idea of power and liberal democracy. These aspects must be discussed 
for two reasons. First, they are central to the development of the argument pre-
sented in Chapter 3 because they clarify the link between populism and illiberal 
ideas of power, and therefore the link between the fascist past and the present 
social acceptability of populism. Second, they clarify the operationalization of 
populism presented in Chapter 4.
The people and the elite
By adopting the ideational approach and therefore defining populism as a thin-
centred ideology, it follows that the categories of ‘people’ and ‘elite’ can assume 
different connotations over time and across cases or to say that à la Laclau, the 
elite and the people remain “floating signifiers” (2005). In other words, the full 
ideology attached to populism defines how the social cleavage between the pure 
people and the corrupt elite is declined. While the cleavage is a constant element 
of the populist ideology, it can be interpreted in many different ways by differ-
ent actors by excluding different portions of the demos and targeting different 
kinds of elites. The Manichean opposition between good and evil remains, but the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusions vary.
At the center of the populist worldview, there is the idea of demos and conse-
quently demoticism (closeness to the ordinary people).20 The people are charac-
terized as a homogeneous entity expressing a common will, or volonté générale. 
Moreover, the people are often portrayed as a virtuous and inherently good 
group, with their will constituting the only source of legitimacy and authentic 
democracy (March 2011; Stanley 2008; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Kriesi 
2014; Taggart 2000). The duty of populist politicians is to embody and imple-
ment the vox populi in the most direct and faithful way. Indeed, only populist 
politicians are supposed to instinctively know what the people want and be able 
to voice their needs. As Pasquino noted, “populist leaders do not represent the 
people, rather they consider themselves – and succeed in being considered – an 
integral part of the people. They are of the people” (2007, 21–22).
When the thin populist ideology is associated with a full ideology, usually it 
becomes explicit who belongs to the demos and who does not: a more or less 
neat division line is established between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In general, it is possible 
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to identify three different conceptions of the people which refer to three differ-
ent social dimensions: political, cultural, and economic.21 In empirical terms, the 
three conceptions of the people are not necessarily distinguished. In fact, they 
might be combined in a single populist discourse, and potentially they can even 
be present all at the same time.
Politically, populism identifies the people as sovereign. Therefore, there is a 
perfect overlap between the people and the demos: all of the people are included.22 
This is generally the most inclusive articulation of populism, although its concep-
tualization greatly varies across countries and over time. The cultural conception 
considers the people in an ethnic sense: in fact, the people is not understood as 
demos but rather as ethnos, and the dividing line excludes part of the national com-
munity such as migrants and other minorities, considered as aliens or outsiders. 
This is normally the most exclusionary articulation of the boundary of the demos, 
as it is typically interpreted by extreme right-wing populist parties. The economic 
conception describes the people as a class and distinguishes between ‘ordinary 
people’ and the rich ones (or the ‘one percent’) – in other words, it draws the line 
between the privileged and the common ones. Similar to the political conception, 
it is rather inclusive, but the dividing line here is articulated on the economic axis, 
and it is particularly common among – but not exclusive to – left-wing populist 
parties. As illustrated by the historical excursus presented above, different con-
ceptions of the people are articulated by different actors according to different 
social-political contexts, but the opposition of ‘people vs elite’ remains constant.
As in every ‘good and evil’ dichotomy, while the people are the collective hero, 
there must be a (collective) villain of the story: in this case, the elite. Indeed, 
its members are often portrayed as corrupt or conspiring, as well as unaccount-
able and incompetent (Jansen 2011; Hawkins 2009; Rooduijn 2014b). Mudde 
(2004, 544), incisively defined the populist interpretation of the elite as the 
people’s nemesis. Similar to the concept of the people, the concept of the elite 
can also be declined in different ways. It can refer to a political dimension, thus 
including the government as well as mainstream parties and other national and 
international actors (at the moment, the EU is the main target). It can refer to a 
cultural dimension, targeting in this case the mass media system, as well as writ-
ers and more generally the intelligentsia. Moreover, the elite can be defined in 
economic terms and refer to bankers, managers, and, generally speaking, national 
and international economic institutions. As illustrated by the historical excursus 
presented above, different elites are targeted according to different social- political 
contexts. Once again, however, they are always portrayed as having interests and 
values opposed to those of the common people.
Populism and democracy
Based on the definition of populism provided above, it is now possible to high-
light the differences between the populist idea of democracy compared to the 
liberal (or constitutional) one. It is important to notice that these considerations 
concern the thin ideology of populism, meaning that these characteristics are 
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present in both right- and left-wing declinations of populism, no matter what 
full ideology is attached to the populist nucleus. For this reason, in the following 
chapters, the analysis will concern the overall levels of populism before testing the 
same conditions for right- and left-wing populism separately.
First of all, the two counterparts of populism must be identified: elitism and 
pluralism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Caramani 2017). Like populism, 
elitism splits society into two homogenous parts but operates a symmetrical divi-
sion; it praises the elite and considers the people as incapable of making informed 
decisions. Pluralism, on the other hand, opposes the Manichean perspective pre-
sent in populism and considers diversity of opinions and compromises as a value.
The lack of pluralism in the populist idea of power has lead several authors to 
conclude that populism can threaten (or be disadvantageous for) democracy, thus 
constituting a “syndrome” or a “pathology” (Taggart 2002; Rosanvallon 2008). 
Others, on the contrary, have argued that the presence of anti-elitism entails a 
watchdog-type of relationship between those in power and the opposition, and 
for this reason populism should rather be considered as a corrective or at least an 
intrinsic part of democracy, thus being its “shadow” or “mirror” (Tännsjö 1992; 
Canovan 1999; Arditi 2004; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005).
This long-lasting academic controversy is particularly slippery because the 
debate is framed in the wrong way. The point is not whether populism constitutes 
a threat or a corrective for democracy but rather to what extent different types of 
populism can have a positive or negative impact on different forms of democracy. 
For this reason it is advisable to follow Rovira Kaltwasser’s argument about the 
necessity of a minimal approach: populism represents a threat from a liberal per-
spective on democracy and a corrective from a radical perspective (2012). Conse-
quently, different ideas about the relationship between democracy and populism 
are too strongly based on normative assumptions about democracy itself.
This study, however, is not purely theoretical. Since it focuses on the presence 
of populism in Western Europe from the 1970s until today, the debate focuses 
mainly on the potential threat that populism can represent for liberal democracy. 
As Dahl pointed out, a populist democracy differs from a liberal “Madisonian” 
democracy in its disregard of constitutionalist elements such as the rule of law, 
the division of power, and respect for the rights of minorities (1956). In a similar 
vein, Abts and Rummens (2007) observed that the populist demand for unre-
stricted power of the people distinguishes the populist idea of democracy from 
constitutional and liberal logics of democracy. Also, Mény and Surel (2002, 10) 
highlighted the fact that populism is against counterweights to the unbalanced 
supremacy of the people, including “enforceable human rights, constitutional 
courts, the territorial and functional division of powers, and the autonomy of the 
central banks.” These positions are effectively summarized by Pappas (2014), 
who defined populism as “democratic illiberalism” (although populism is not 
necessarily combined with democratic features).
Figure 1.2 summarizes the traits of the populist idea of power that are inher-
ently illiberal and that therefore are in contrast with a liberal and constitutional 
idea of power. The link between the populist and the fascist idea of power rests 
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upon the illiberal elements they have in common, and for this reason it is possible 
to hypothesize that the present social acceptability of populism is linked to the 
collective re-elaboration of the fascist past. This does not imply that populism is a 
threat for democracy per se, but since it is inherently based on illiberal elements, 
it strongly challenges the only form of democracy present in Western Europe 
since 1945: liberal and constitutional democracy.
It is important to stress once again that populism and fascism are not the 
same but that populism embodies illiberal and authoritarian tendencies. In other 
words, it is possible to say that all fascists may be populists, but not all populists 
are fascist. This reflects the dispute summarized by Stavrakakis and Jäger (2017). 
Populism per se is not the synecdoche of all kinds of political evil, as Müller 
(2016) seems to imply. Populism is not a threat when it reduces inequalities or 
increases political participation. Moreover, populism is not the only ideology that 
relies on moralistic categories or that proclaims the moral superiority of a seg-
ment over the rest of the electorate. In fact, advocates of liberal democracy can be 
moralistic as well, and they often are when taking anti-populist positions.
Ideological Core Idea of Power
Possible 
Implementation
Anti-Elitism
&
People-Centrism
Unrestricted Popular 
Sovereignty
&
People Filling the Locus of 
Power
A) Bottom-up, 
participative, direct 
democracy 
(participation)
B) Leader/Party 
embodies the volonté 
générale by osmosis 
(delegation)
 No pluralism
 No minority rights
 No division of powers
Link to the illiberal and 
authoritarian idea of 
power embodied by 
fascism
Figure 1.2 Populist Democracy and Its Illiberal Elements
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In a similar vein, liberal democracy per se is not a solution or the only legiti-
mate form of power. On the one hand, the liberal-democratic state is continu-
ously struggling to balance (capitalist) accumulation and legitimacy. On the other 
hand, it is definitely advisable when it fights authoritarian tendencies, racism, and 
sexism or when it protects checks and balances, press freedom, and civil liberties. 
On this aspect (as in many others), it is advisable to keep in mind the lesson of 
Margaret Canovan (1999, 9–10). Despite the tensions between ‘the politics of 
faith’ and ‘the politics of skepticism,’ the two styles are inseparable in modern 
politics to the point that “the two faces of democracy are a pair of squabbling 
Siamese twins, inescapably linked, so that it is an illusion to suppose that we can 
have one without the other.”
In other words, it is interesting to observe the relationship between populism 
and liberal democracy given that they are deeply in tension: for example, pop-
ulism constitutes an effective critique of liberal democracy because it highlights 
some of its shortcomings, pitfalls, and paradoxes, such as lack of direct democracy 
or the process of cartelization of political parties and their corruption. This is 
possible because populism opposes two pillars of liberal democracy: the rule of 
law and the protection of individual and minority rights (Plattner 2010).23 The 
implementation of the populist idea of power would solve the tension inher-
ent to liberal democracy, but it would also foster a model where the protection 
of minority rights is replaced by the indisputable decision of the majority and 
potential conflicts are solved through a purely majoritarian approach targeting 
the ‘common good’ as final goal.24
If there are any lessons that European politicians should have assimilated 
from the tragic events that led to World War II, respect for minority rights and 
the importance of the rule of law are two of the most important ones. For this 
reason, institutions and political actors often reject the populist idea of power 
because it is perceived as a dangerous ideology that might threaten some of the 
key Western values developed as a reaction to the barbarism of World War II 
and the Holocaust. Müller (2016) argues that European political systems were 
built on a distrust of popular sovereignty fueled by the experience of fascism. 
Hence, he maintains that politicians and the media should address the issues 
raised by populists not by ignoring or excluding them but by challenging their 
framing – in other words, by taking the liberal and democratic principles more 
seriously.
In conclusion, modern democracies should not simply dismiss populism as a 
threat but rather incorporate its critiques in a political context characterized by 
checks and balances, press freedom, and civil liberties while keeping in mind that 
liberal democracy is not the only possible way to translate the will of the people. 
The tension between different ideas of power is what keeps democracy alive, and 
we should not reduce every conflictual and dissenting voice to a threat. At the 
same time, we cannot underestimate the potential consequences of the erosion of 
liberal traits of democracy, as well as the emergence of nationalist and authoritar-
ian regimes across the globe.
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Notes
 1 For an interesting study concerning the use of the term in the British media, 
see Bale, van Kessel, and Taggart (2011). A telling statement form Moffitt and 
Tormey (2014, 382) reads as follows: “It is an axiomatic feature of literature on 
the topic to acknowledge the contested nature of populism. . ., and more recently 
the literature has reached a whole new level of meta-reflexivity, where it is posited 
that it has become common to acknowledge the acknowledgment of this fact.”
 2 This quote was found in Margaret Canovan’s book Populism (Canovan 1981, 7).
 3 Both plots show the number of articles mentioning populism or related terms 
(populis* or populist* or populism*) in six languages (English, German, French, 
Italian, Swedish, and Dutch) between 1969 and 2016. On the left, through Fac-
tiva, the major newspapers are included (the pre-1985 levels are particularly low 
also because only a few newspaper articles are available, but what matters most is 
the increase after 2010). On the right, through Web of Science, the major academic 
peer-reviewed journals are considered.
 4 Themistocles, Athenian politician and general, is sometimes described as a paleo-
populist since he decided to move to Keramikos, a down-market part of Athens, 
in order to be perceived as a man of the people. According to Plutarch, his role 
of attorney and arbitrator gained him further popularity among the hoi polloi (the 
many, the majority).
 5 The negative connotation of the word Idios (the Greek term for ‘private person’), 
speaks volumes about the political role of the citizens in Ancient Athens. However, 
‘direct’ does not mean ‘inclusive.’ In fact, it was a very restrictive idea of democracy. 
It excluded women, slaves, and those who did not have the Athenian citizenship.
 6 Jordan Bardella, spokesperson of the Rassamblement National (former Front 
National) and leader of the youth organization of the party (Génération nation), 
in a meeting with other movements of the European far right recently declared 
(translation of the author): “Europe is the Athenian democracy, not Brussels’ 
technocracy. Europe is imperial Rome, not the Treaty of Rome. Europe is Le Pen 
and Salvini, not Juncker and Moscovici.” Internazionale, “L’incontro dei giovani 
sovranisti a Roma non è andato come previsto”, by Giada Zampano, April 2, 
2019, available online (consulted in April 2019): www.internazionale.it/notizie/
giada-zampano/2019/04/02/giovani-sovranisti-roma
 7 Narodniki comes from the Russian word narod, translatable as “people” or “folk.”
 8 The Narodniki is one of the rare examples of exclusively top-down populist 
movements.
 9 From the German word Volk, again translatable as “people.”
 10 “[I]n so far as German liberalism was universalist and inclusive, it was ultimately 
rejected by a völkish constituency. Conversely, in so far as the liberals assimilated 
and promoted certain tenets of the völkish Weltanschauung, German liberalism 
clearly helped to pave the way for Hitler and National Socialism.”
 11 To mention just a few studies, among others one could list: Betz (1994); Kitschelt and 
McGann (1995); Kazin (1995); Taggart (1995); Rydgren (2005); Mudde (2007).
 12 The framework of analysis must be at the same time precise enough and flexible 
enough to include every instance of populism while excluding other types of dis-
courses, this avoiding both type I and type II errors.
 13 On this point, there seems to be quite a large consensus among scholars: Jagers 
and Walgrave (2007); Stanley (2008); Hawkins (2009, 2010); Pauwles (2011); 
Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug (2014); to mention just a few.
 14 The term was introduced by Michael Freeden (1998). However, the same author 
is uncertain about the applicability of the concept to populism. See: Freeden 
(2017).
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 15 The combination of a thin (populist) ideology with a thick (or full) one describes 
the vast majority of populist manifestations. Indeed, it is very rare to find pop-
ulism in its purely thin form. The case of the Italian Five Star Movement could 
go in this direction, since the party refuses to be labeled as right- or left-wing, 
and indeed seems to rely on a vague post-ideological approach. On this topic: 
Manucci and Amsler (2018).
 16 This definition of populism, used by the whole module on Populism in the Context 
of Globalization and Mediatization of the NCCR Democracy program, is mainly 
derived from Mudde (2004), and Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008).
 17 Other approaches, for example, define populism in stylistic terms (Kazin 1995), 
according to its organizational features (Weyland 2001), or as a type of mobiliza-
tion (Jansen 2011).
 18 This can happen, among other ways, through speeches (Hawkins 2009), party 
manifestos (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), newspaper articles (Rooduijn 2014), 
and also interviews and parliamentary discussions. Moreover, different types of 
actors can articulate populist discourses: while politicians and journalists play a 
crucial role in circulating populism in the public debate, also common people 
as well as celebrities and representatives of NGOs and famous brands or other 
organizations, can articulate populist discourses.
 19 The methodological aspects concerning calibration are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4 and in Chapter 7.
 20 About demoticism and populism, see March (2017).
 21 In the historical manifestations of populism presented in section Populism in his-
torical perspective, it is possible to identify each of the main conceptions of demos 
presented here.
 22 Here it is important to introduce a caveat: all the people belonging to a cer-
tain territory (generally a country but also existing and even imaginary regions, 
like Padania in Italy) are included. Moffitt (2017) wrote about how populists 
construct “the people” above the national level. De Cleen (2017) argues that 
in nationalism concepts such as state, democracy, and culture acquire meaning 
in relation to the nation, while for populism this is not necessarily true. Moreo-
ver, while nationalism constructs the nation as an organic community that all 
members of the nation are part of, populism often divides the nation inter-
nally between people and elites. Indeed, populism divides society on a vertical, 
down/up axis and does not necessarily construct ‘the people’ as nation. Moreo-
ver, while nationalism is intrinsically national, populism can be a transnational 
phenomenon. Examples in this sense are the Occupy movement as well as Yannis 
Varoufakis’ Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM 25). While several 
populist radical right parties stand united in presenting themselves as defenders 
of European identity and civilisation against immigration and ‘Islamisation,’ this 
is an example of an international rather than transnational phenomenon. Finally, 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017, 72) argue that “for the European populist 
radical right ethnicity is not part of the populist distinction between the people 
and the elite, who are part of the same ethnic group, but rather of the nativ-
ist distinction between ‘natives’ and ‘aliens’. . . . In the case of Latin American 
ethnopopulism, on the other hand, the nation is defined as a multicultural unit, 
within which the people and elite are divided by both morality and ethnicity.”
 23 It might seem counterintuitive to link left-wing populism to the lack of minority 
protection, while it might seem more obvious for right-wing populism. However, 
in principle, both left- and right-wing populism rely on a majoritarian and anti-
pluralistic approach, therefore it is possible to claim that populism per se is a threat 
to minority rights.
 24 The paradox is based on the coexistence of a democratic pillar and a liberal pillar. 
This implies that even if every person belonging to the demos has equal rights 
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(liberal pillar), on the other hand it must be established who belongs to the 
demos and who does not (democratic pillar), and this inevitably triggers inequal-
ity. “What cannot be contestable in a liberal democracy is based on the idea that 
it is legitimate to establish limits to popular sovereignty in the name of liberty. 
Hence its paradoxical nature” (Mouffe 2000, 4). Moreover, as Abts and Rum-
mens argued, “populist resentments arise when constitutional democracy is per-
ceived to be out of balance in favour of the constitutional pillar” (2007, 410).
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Explaining why populist discourses are more socially acceptable in certain coun-
tries than in others is certainly no easy task. What makes it even more compli-
cated is the fact that – for decades – scholars have directed their efforts in other 
directions. In particular, only a part of the story that this book tries to tell has 
been extensively investigated: first, because rather than dealing with the social 
acceptability of populism, countless articles and books have tried to make sense of 
the electoral performance of populist parties; second, because the focus has been 
almost exclusively on a sub-type of populist parties: radical and extreme right 
ones. As a result, virtually no literature on populism goes beyond its electoral 
dimension, while (so far) few studies include populist parties from the centre or 
the left of the political spectrum.
This means that the phenomenon to explain here is substantially different (but 
for certain aspects similar) to the object of a vast literature. As Chapter 4 will 
clarify, the social acceptability of populism is in fact a combination of three factors. 
First, the percentage of populist statements in a manifesto (discursive dimension); 
second, the degree of radicalism of the party author of the manifesto (political 
and ideological dimension); and third, the vote share of the party at the elections 
for which the manifesto was written (electoral dimension). Naturally, the type of 
phenomenon to explain has consequences on the types of conditions that – on a 
theoretical and empirical base – it makes sense to test. It follows that the selection 
of the relevant conditions is inspired by a certain scholar tradition but inevitably 
transcends it. For this reason, it is necessary to introduce two caveats for the 
selection of conditions to be tested.
First, while most research on Europe focuses on radical right populist parties, 
this study aims at identifying the factors that can explain the presence of populism 
as a thin ideology, independently from the full ideology attached to it. Several var-
iables analyzed in the literature refer to the success of far-right or extreme right-
wing parties, but they will not be included unless they are supposed to explain 
the acceptability of populism as a thin ideology. Second, while most studies focus 
on the international dimension of populism understood as a global phenomenon 
manifesting itself in virtually every democracy, this study aims at explaining why 
populism thrives in certain countries but not in others. Therefore, factors that mani-
fest themselves in each country with a similar timing will not be included.
2  The natural habitat  
of populism
Favourable conditions  
and triggers
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Finally, the choice of conditions to be tested is further restricted by meth-
odological issues as well as by data availability. Methodologically, since the cases 
included in the study are 23, it is not advisable to use more than five total condi-
tions.1 Considering that one condition will be the level of stigma of the fascist 
past (long-term factor), four conditions (short-term factors) can be extrapolated 
by the relevant literature.2 Concerning the availability of the data, the analysis 
includes eight West European countries from the 1990s to now; hence, a condi-
tion can be tested only in case the data are consistently available. Bearing in mind 
these premises, the chapter is structured as follows.
The first section illustrates the theoretical framework linking the presence of 
populism to large-scale processes such as modernization and globalization. The 
second section illustrates and discusses the results produced by the empirical 
research testing the factors linked to the above-mentioned processes. The third 
section presents the conditions that are relevant for the present study and there-
fore selected for the analytical section. The aim is to produce an explanatory 
model able to keep together socio-economic and political-institutional factors 
that might explain the social acceptability of populism. Finally, a formal hypoth-
esis is formulated.
Populism as a by-product of modernization  
and globalization
The growing presence of populism in Europe is often considered as the result 
of two interconnected transformations: first, the shift from materialist to post-
materialist values that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, as symbolized by 
the protests of 1968, and second, the transition from industrial to post-industrial 
societies that took place during the 1980s and 1990s. In the first case, the ‘New 
Left’ mobilized a young electorate which shared post-materialist and cosmopoli-
tan values revolving around civil rights, gay rights, abortion, environmentalism, 
and gender roles; in the second case, radical right-wing populist parties were able 
to counter-mobilize the so-called losers of globalization along the new cultural 
cleavage. The two phases are connected to each other, and they are supposed to 
constitute the transmission chain that has made right-wing populism so wide-
spread since the 1990s.
The process of electorate de-alignment and re-alignment along new dividing 
lines has been labelled as a ‘silent revolution’ in its first – mainly left-wing – phase 
(Inglehart 1977) and a ‘silent counter-revolution’ in its subsequent – mainly 
right-wing – articulation (Ignazi 1992). This shows that populism becomes a 
successful political resource as soon as the traditional class and religious cleavages 
fail to structure the political struggle within society.
In more detail, during the 1960s and 1970s, European societies witnessed the 
end of the stability of the traditional cleavage structure, and a generational and 
educational revolution brought to the fore values such as pacifism, feminism, 
civil rights, and environmentalism. New generations without major concerns for 
material subsistence started attributing greater importance to post-materialist 
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values based on autonomy and self-expression, and this produced the fading of 
established partisan loyalties of the electorate. The re-alignment occurred along 
new lines of conflict (cosmopolitan vs communitarian, or libertarian vs authori-
tarian) together with the old redistributive axis of conflict (Kitschelt 1994). The 
new cleavage structure favoured left-wing movements and political experiences 
able to mobilize a new constituency that could not find any representation in the 
previous cleavage structure, while norms and values opposed to the libertarian 
movements emerged only later on.3
Indeed, the political mobilization of traditional and authoritarian values 
became widespread only after a second transformation occurred. During the 
1980s and 1990s, the decline of the secondary sector, the privatization of public 
sector enterprises, the cross-border mobility of workers, and the delocalization of 
the production processes marked the transition from industrial to post-industrial 
societies. These transformations, rooted in processes such as modernization, glo-
balization, and de-industrialization, produced a dividing line between the so-
called winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kupchan 2012).
In particular, the latter felt that higher unemployment, growing inequalities, 
and decreased social services threatened their style of life and social status (Cox 
and Sinclair 1999; Zimmerling 2005). Moreover, the perceived threat origi-
nated also in the weakening protection of the traditional national boundaries, 
thus engendering a reaction that invoked protectionist measures and national 
independence (Cerny 1999). By fighting the universalistic values mobilized by 
the ‘New Left’ and by articulating new discourses and issues related to nativism 
on the cultural axis (Betz and Johnson 2004), right-wing populist parties have 
become increasingly successful since the 1980s.
Concerning the mechanisms behind this transformation, while for Kitschelt 
and McGann (1995) the impact of post-industrial societies triggered prefer-
ences for ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, a complementary approach based 
on emotions (such as resentment, anxiety, and hostility) has been proposed by 
Betz (1993, 415). He identified the success of right-wing populist parties as 
being inherent in their “ability to mobilize resentment and protest and their 
capability to offer a future-oriented program that confronts the challenge posed 
by the economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced West European 
democracies.”
The point of convergence is the strong link between socio-economic and cul-
tural transformations and the loss of credibility and accountability of the elite. As 
Kitschelt and McGann observed, “the rise of radical right-wing populist parties 
has coincided with a marked increase in public disaffection and disenchantment 
with the established political parties, the political class, and the political system in 
general” (1995, 169). In particular, the transformations of the traditional cleav-
age structure created the political opportunity structures for populist parties who 
mobilized electoral constituencies traditionally linked to social-democratic parties 
(Kitschelt 1994).
Bornschier (2010a) found that while the traditional cleavage based on class 
conflict gradually lost its salience, the cultural divide increasingly structures 
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the political competition. In particular, the salience of the opposition between 
 libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values is a central ele-
ment for the success of the populist right, linking it to the transformation that 
took place starting from the 1960s.
Although there is consensus in the literature about the salience of the cultural 
cleavage in explaining the success of right-wing populist parties, this does not 
imply that economic issues are not relevant anymore. In fact, following the Great 
Recession that characterized the period 2008–2012, the constituency identifiable 
as ‘losers of globalization’ has expanded considerably. It started to include an 
increasingly wider portion of the middle-class, and this allowed left-wing populist 
parties to obtain remarkable electoral performances. The effects of the economic 
crisis could explain the success of left-wing populist parties such as SYRIZA in 
Greece and Podemos in Spain, although this link has not been yet confirmed 
empirically (Kriesi and Pappas 2015).
Besides the profound socio-economic and cultural transformation that pro-
voked the de-alignment and re-alignment of the European electorates along 
a new interpretation of the cultural cleavage, two additional factors have been 
recently associated with the breakthrough of populist parties: supranational inte-
gration and the mediatization of politics. These factors characterized virtually 
every European country, and they are supposed to trigger the electoral success 
and persistence of populist parties. They do not offer an alternative explanation 
compared to the traditional cleavage model but rather reinforce the effects pro-
duced by the mass values change and the de-industrialization process.
European elites and institutions have been described as too distant from the peo-
ple, and this, in turn, has reinforced the lack of a fully developed European identity. 
Given the fact that it has not been possible to identify a unified European demos, 
some authors have proposed the concept of European “demoicracy” (Cheneval 
and Schimmelfennig 2013), while the democratic deficit of the European institu-
tions has become a widespread refrain among politicians and commentators.4
Unsurprisingly, the critique of supranational institutions has been a distinc-
tive mark of both right and left populist parties (Gifford 2006; Benedetto and 
Quaglia 2007). Indeed, they consider multilevel governance as an element fur-
ther fraying the accountability chain and creating a dimension of contestation 
between supranational integration and national independence (Marks and  Wilson 
2000). Hence, the process of supranational integration – combined with the 
effects of the Great Recession – is supposed to have long-term effects on the 
tension between the responsibility and the responsiveness of the political parties 
(Mair 2013; Bardi, Bartolini, and Trechsel 2014).
On the one hand, the elite must act responsively towards international markets 
and supranational institutions; on the other hand, this diminishes their respon-
siveness towards the voting public (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In other 
words, since the process of European integration entails the creation of suprana-
tional institutions and the implementation of models of multilevel governance, 
this can pose problems of democratic inclusion, accountability, responsiveness, 
and transparency (Papadopoulos 2010; Lavenex 2013).
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Last but not least, the so-called process of mediatization of politics has been 
identified as a relevant factor linked to the growing alienation of the voters from 
the traditional political process and therefore as a trigger for populism.5 Commer-
cial media are supposed to lend more visibility to populist actors because of their 
flamboyant style of communication (Mazzoleni 2003, 2008). In turn, populist 
actors are supposed to exploit the climate of cynicism and disillusionment gener-
ated by the media. As a result, populist actors have access to the public debate, and 
their critique of the establishment is backed by media news coverage focused on 
scandals and corruption. This process has been labelled video-malaise and is con-
sidered to trigger the success of populist actors while harming democratic quality.6
Several authors have highlighted the decisive role of the media in providing 
an essential space in the public debate to populist actors. According to Ellinas, 
without the spotlight of the media, “Far Right movements might be doomed to 
political irrelevance and relegated to the margins of political discourse” (2010, 
32–33). Art claims that the failure of the populist radical right in Germany 
is related to the media’s attacks on these parties (2006), while Kitschelt and 
McGann maintain that unless the media are willing to disseminate their messages, 
“Far Rightists will not be able to capitalize on the opportunities that are made 
available in the electoral arena” (1995, 130). In general, the role of the media is 
considered as a crucial factor both for the emergence of populist parties and for 
their legitimization (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007).
All in all, virtually every European country seems to constitute a fertile ground 
for populist parties to thrive. As summarized by The New York Times, a few factors 
seem to be unequivocally linked to the breakthrough of far-right parties: “Amid 
a migrant crisis, sluggish economic growth and growing disillusionment with the 
European Union, far-right parties – some longstanding, others newly formed – 
have been achieving electoral success in a number of European nations.”7 The 
next section provides an extensive review of the most relevant studies on the 
topic, and it shows that, for several reasons, the puzzle is far from easily solvable. 
First, populism does not coincide with far-right parties. Second, different studies 
offer different interpretations about the same phenomena according to differ-
ent methods and operationalizations. Third, although every European country is 
experiencing the same transformations across a similar timescale, populism is not 
equally widespread in each country. Since the aim of this study consists in explain-
ing cross-country variance in the social acceptability of populist discourses, these 
aspects are crucial and will be examined in the next sections.
Empirical findings in the literature
A vast literature analyzes the factors linked to the electoral success of (mainly 
right-wing) populist parties, and most of the studies rely on the theoretical frame-
work presented above: radical right populism is widely considered as a counter-
revolution triggered by the effects of modernization and globalization and fuelled 
by processes such as the mediatization of politics and supranational integration. 
There are important empirical results that should be taken into consideration 
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about demand-side as well as supply-side conditions for the electoral performance 
of populist parties. Supply-side explanatory variables concern the conditions that 
are supposed to create the favourable political opportunity structures for pop-
ulism, while demand-side factors concern the reasons why people vote for popu-
list parties (or show populist attitudes). Several authors emphasize the importance 
of considering the interaction between these two sets of factors ( Eatwell 2003; 
Norris 2005; Mudde 2007), and here they are presented separately only for the 
sake of clarity. All the main factors mentioned in relevant studies are included, 
whether or not they will be tested in the analytical section.
For each factor, the results of the relevant empirical research are presented. The 
following section presents and justifies the final choice of the conditions that can 
be considered as relevant for the social acceptability of populist discourses – and 
not only for the electoral performance of radical or new right-wing populist par-
ties. The aim is to create a set of conditions that are supposed to trigger the social 
acceptability of populism and in particular to explain the cross-country variance 
of populism’s social acceptability.
Supply-side factors
Several supply factors have been identified as relevant for the electoral success of 
populist parties: low quality of representative democracy; corruption scandals; 
ideological convergence of the mainstream parties; the presence of a proportional 
electoral system; and the process of mediatization of politics.8
1 Concerning the relationship between democracy and populism, the protest-
voting model argues that people vote for a populist party in order to express 
their distrust towards the political elite (Fieschi and Heywood 2004). Betz 
noted that populist parties “became popular at a time when there was a dra-
matic rise in public disenchantment with traditional parties, political leader-
ship, the political process, and even the way democracy works in developed 
democracies” (2002, 199). In other words, there is space for new political 
parties (including populist ones) as soon as the political system is inefficient 
and unstable, and people show dissatisfaction and resentment towards tradi-
tional politics.
For example, negative public attitudes towards mainstream parties might be 
engendered by cartelization: colluding parties employ the resources of the state 
to limit political competition and to ensure their own survival and electoral suc-
cess (Katz and Mair 1995). Cartelization is usually linked to “the rise of populist 
anti-party-system parties that appeal directly to public perceptions that the main-
stream parties are indifferent to the desires of ordinary citizens” (Katz and Mair 
2009, 759). However, van Kessel found that “populist parties have done well in 
low-trust countries . . . but also in countries . . . where people have been relatively 
satisfied with the way democracy works and where trust in parliament and politi-
cal parties has been relatively high” (2015, 97).
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Empirical research on this topic remains scarce and unsystematic. However, 
several studies analyzing the link between political discontent and radical right 
voting found that political distrust has an impact on the probability to vote for 
a radical right party (Norris 2005; Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011; Caiani, 
Della Porta, and Wagemann 2012).
2 A similar and interconnected aspect concerns the perception of corruption, 
which is supposed to trigger Parteienverdrossenheit (Mair 1998).9 Unsurpris-
ingly, a correlation has been established between perception of corruption 
and low levels of trust in political parties (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; 
Slomczynski and Shabad 2012). In particular, one of the first attempts to 
identify corruption as a trigger for populism is present in Hawkins’ book 
on Chavismo (2010, 153), which confirms the existence of a strong rela-
tionship between corruption across countries and the level of populism in 
the chief executive’s discourse. The author concludes: “the results strongly 
suggest that widespread corruption is at least a necessary condition for the 
emergence of populism.” On the other hand, corruption emerges as an 
insufficient explanation, since many countries with high levels of (perceived) 
corruption lack any noticeable populist leader.
In conclusion, according to van Kessel (2015) and Ivarsflaten (2008), perception 
of corruption does not have a significant impact on the success of populist parties.
3 When political parties converge towards the centre of the political spectrum, 
this provides expanding political opportunity structures for new right-wing 
populist parties (Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). More generally, 
the widespread feeling among the electorate that all the parties are “the same” 
opens a space for new political parties at the extremes of the spectrum and can 
facilitate the creation of niches within the political space (Kriesi 1999).
Several studies have confirmed the convergence thesis (Abedi 2002; Van der 
Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005), although Bornschier (2010b) criticized pre-
vious works for either assuming that party positions can be represented on a 
single right-left dimension or assuming that voters will only support parties that 
adequately represent them on both dimensions.
4 The presence of a proportional rather than a majoritarian electoral system is 
supposed to create favourable conditions for the electoral performance of 
populist radical right parties (Swank and Betz 2003). Although several stud-
ies10 have found support for this hypothesis, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) 
found that, after controlling for socio-demographic variables, the presence 
of a proportional electoral system has a negative impact on the performance 
of radical right parties. Different thresholds for entering the parliament are 
another aspect of the electoral system that has been considered, but the 
empirical findings tend to disprove this hypothesis.11
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5 Finally, the process of ‘mediatization of politics’ has been linked to the 
growing success of radical and populist parties. The idea is that the media-
logic and the political-logic are converging; therefore, media actors and 
political actors have common interests in providing and broadcasting emo-
tional and conflictive stories. This means that political actors are increasingly 
aware of how to ‘use’ the media to gain visibility (a process called ‘self- 
mediatization’),12 while the media find the presence and actions of populist 
actors newsworthy and economically successful. The two aspects converge 
and create a relevant opportunity structure for the presence of populism in 
the public debate.
There is empirical evidence that the media system plays an important role in giv-
ing visibility to radical and populist parties.13 Another aspect of the connection 
between political and media actors concerns the populist attitude of different 
media outlets. In particular, it has been argued that while the tabloid press and 
commercial television are supposed to work in ‘complicity’ with populist move-
ments, quality newspapers are supposed to act as ‘paladins’ of mainstream parties 
(Mazzoleni 2003).
Demand-side factors
Several demand-side factors have been identified as favourable for the electoral 
performance of radical right-wing populist parties: economic hardship; high pres-
ence of immigrants and salience of the issue in the public debate; low welfare 
protection; and demographic factors.
1 It is intuitive to link the poor economic performance of a country with a 
bottom-up critique of its political and economic elites. In turn, this critique 
is supposed to create the space for populist attitudes among the elector-
ate. However, empirical findings largely contradict this theoretical expecta-
tion. Swank and Betz (2003) did not find any evidence that poor economic 
performance – which includes growth, unemployment, and inflation rates – 
affects the vote share for radical right-wing parties independently from other 
factors, in particular the presence of a strong welfare state. Several authors 
focused on the levels of unemployment, again with no results confirming the 
theoretical expectations.14 On the other hand, Jackman and Volpert (1996) 
found that higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable environment 
for radical right parties, while Mughan, Bean, and McAllister (2003, 631) 
claim that job insecurity explains “voting support for populist right-wing 
alternatives in preference to established parties of government.”
Recent studies argue that voters’ preference for populist parties has little to do 
with the objective economic situation. Mols and Jetten (2016) found that per-
ceived relative deprivation better explains the preference for right-wing popu-
list parties than objective relative gratification. In a similar vein, Elchardus and 
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Spruyt (2016) claim that support for populism is a consequence of ‘declinism’ (a 
very negative view of the evolution of society) and the feeling of belonging to a 
group of people that is unfairly treated by society.
2 The role of immigration is probably the most controversial of the demand-side 
explanatory variables for the success of populist right-wing parties. The pres-
ence of immigrants (or refugees), combined with the salience of the topic in 
the public debate, is considered as either extremely relevant15 or negligible16 
according to different authors. In isolation, it seems not to constitute a power-
ful predictor of the electoral performance of radical right-wing populist parties. 
Overall, the empirical results are contradictory, and the levels of immigration 
might have different effects according to aspects such as different national 
political cultures, the presence of a colonial past, or the role of the media.
3 In a context of economic hardship, the presence of a strong welfare system is 
supposed to reduce the appeal of the extreme right. For example, Swank and 
Betz (2003) found that universal welfare states decrease the positive effect of 
immigration on votes for radical right-wing parties. On the other hand, the 
erosion of the welfare system might constitute an advantage for right-wing 
political parties proposing its retrenchment in order to exclude non-nationals 
(Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). Indeed, populists with a welfare- chauvinistic 
position normally blame the elite for cutting the welfare rights of deserving 
‘natives’ and the non-natives for their excessive claims on the welfare state.
4 Finally, there are several voters’ socio-demographic features that show a 
high correlation with the likelihood of voting for populist right-wing par-
ties: for example, being male, under 25, and a manual worker compared to 
being female, middle-aged, and a professional (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; 
Spierings and Zaslove 2017). On the other hand, family income and level 
of education are not linked to party preference on the cultural axis, namely 
concerning pro- or against-immigration parties (Van der Brug, Fennema, 
and Tillie 2005). Moreover, manual workers, self-employed, routine non-
manual workers, and the unemployed are more likely to vote for extreme 
right-wing parties. However, when economic characteristics are added to the 
model, the relationship between unemployment and voting for right-wing 
parties becomes negative (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002).
Building an explanatory model
After having illustrated the main demand- and supply-side factors usually con-
sidered in the relevant literature, the next step consists of selecting the relevant 
conditions that are supposed to bear some explanatory power concerning the 
Salonfähigkeit of populism. Four criteria, as already mentioned at the beginning 
of the chapter, have to be considered in this process. First, the conditions must be 
related to populism as a thin-centred ideology, independent from the full ideology 
attached to it. Second, the aim is to explain the cross-country variations in the 
social acceptability of populism; therefore, conditions that are equally present in 
each country are not helpful in this regard. Third, the data must be available from 
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the 1990s onwards for each of the eight West European countries considered. 
Fourth, no more than four conditions shall be selected.
For all these reasons, not all the conditions illustrated in the literature review 
can be adopted and tested. Moreover, there is a further crucial aspect that must 
be considered in order to select the relevant conditions. A condition becomes 
relevant for this study as soon as it is related not only to the electoral dimension 
of populism but more generally to the social acceptability of populism, given by 
the combination of three factors forming the outcome to explain: the percentage 
of populism in electoral manifestos, the degree of radicalism of the party, and its 
electoral performance.
Populism is here understood as an ideology expressed discursively because it 
makes it possible to measure how often populist messages are articulated over time 
and across countries.17 However, while the electoral performances of populist 
parties vary greatly between countries, it is not clear whether this is reflected in 
the social acceptability of populism. This generates two crucial questions: first, 
to what extent can the variables used to explain the electoral performance of 
populist parties also explain the social acceptability of populist discourses in party 
manifestos? And second, to what extent do the electoral success of populist par-
ties and the presence of populist messages in party manifestos overlap?
Concerning the first question, the existing literature often fails to explain what 
part of the electoral success of populist parties is linked to their radical features 
rather than to their populist nature. These studies often (wrongly) consider 
extreme right-wing parties as automatically populist and attribute their electoral 
success to the populist dimension of their ideology (while it is very likely that it 
should be linked to their nationalist or authoritarian agenda). Moreover, until 
recently there has been almost no space for the analysis of European left-wing 
populist parties. In a similar vein, some of the factors tested in the literature relate 
to new or radical parties, which are often considered as automatically populist. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the main differences between the focus of the existing lit-
erature compared to the approach used in this study.
Table 2.1 Different Approaches to Populism
Understanding of Populism in 
the Academic Literature
Understanding of Populism 
in This Study
Ideological 
Dimension
Mainly right-wing, rarely 
left-wing, (virtually) never 
combined
Populism as thin ideology 
attached to any possible 
full ideology
Radicalism Mainly radical/far/extreme 
right parties are considered
Populist messages are not 
necessarily radical
Parties Mainly new parties, niche 
parties, social movements
Every party can articulate 
populist messages
Empirical 
Manifestation
Electoral component: success 
and performance in electoral 
competition
Discursive component: 
the populist ideology is 
articulated discursively
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Concerning the second question, empirically it is possible that a poor electoral 
performance of populist parties happens in a context characterized by a high 
social acceptability of populist messages. For instance, this might occur in cases 
whereby mainstream parties articulate highly populist messages and populist par-
ties score poorly in elections. On the other hand, good electoral results of popu-
list parties can be coupled with a very low presence of populist messages in party 
manifestos. This might happen in cases where both allegedly populist parties and 
mainstream parties seldom rely on populist messages.
In this study, the discursive and electoral approaches, rather than being considered 
as mutually exclusive, are seen as complementary aspects. Indeed, they relate to two 
distinct but interconnected elements of populism: how often a (more or less radi-
cal) political party discursively articulates populist messages and how well the same 
party performs in elections. Despite the fact that conditions triggering the electoral 
performance of populist parties and those determining the social acceptability of 
populist discourses might partially overlap, they are not necessarily the same.
After all the caveats, considerations, and aspects introduced above, it is time 
to select conditions that will be tested in Chapters 7 and 8. Starting from 
 supply-side factors, two of them are not included in the analysis. First, the pro-
cess of mediatization of politics is not selected because it is a common feature of 
all the countries considered in this study, and also the timing of its development 
is not significantly different across cases. It would be a relevant condition if 
one were to study how widespread are populist messages in newspaper articles, 
TV shows, or social media, but this is not the case. Second, the presence of a 
proportional electoral system is discarded: first, because it relates to the elec-
toral dimension of populism (but not necessarily to its discursive dimension); 
second, because empirical research shows that the presence of a proportional 
electoral system seems to have a negative effect on the performance of radical 
right parties.18
Considering supply-side factors, three of them are not included in the analysis. 
First, the levels of migrants and asylum-seekers in a country, as well as the rel-
evance of the topic in the public debate, cannot be selected as a relevant factor for 
this study. Here the aim is to explain the presence of populism as a thin ideology, 
while these aspects mainly relate to the breakthrough of far-right parties (which 
are not necessarily populist) and considerably less to left-wing and centre parties. 
Moreover, several empirical studies have failed to find any conclusive evidence 
about the correlation between nativism or the number of asylum-seekers and the 
extreme right vote.19
Second, the idea that the presence of a strong welfare system is supposed to 
reduce the appeal of right-wing populist parties is also discarded. By observing 
empirical cases, it would be difficult to explain the presence of populist parties in 
Scandinavian countries since they have a strong welfare system. In fact, populist 
parties such as the Finns Party, the Sweden Democrats, and the Danish People’s 
Party have not only existed for many years, but they have also obtained significant 
electoral results. In fact, it could be argued that universal welfare protection – 
when considered as too inclusive – might constitute an advantage for those par-
ties proposing welfare chauvinism.20 Including a strong welfare system would be 
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problematic since it is empirically unclear whether it triggers or undermines the 
social acceptability of populist discourses.21
Third, at the micro-level, several voters’ socio-demographic features might be 
linked to the electoral performance of populist parties, but there are no reasons 
to consider them since they are relatively equally distributed across the eight 
countries included in the study. In particular being male, under 25, and a manual 
worker is a characteristic that is fairly distributed across countries (see Table 2.2).22
More interestingly, some studies have recently investigated the presence of 
‘populist attitudes’ among the public (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2013; 
van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018). It is feasible to suggest that supply- and 
demand-side factors activate these predispositions. While it is not possible to 
exclude the relevance of socio-demographic factors, it appears premature to claim 
that individual populist attitudes can explain the cross-country variations.
In conclusion, Table 2.3 presents the four factors can are selected for the pre-
sent study and that will be tested in the analytical section: poor economic perfor-
mance, democratic gap, widespread corruption, and ideological convergence of 
the party system.
Table 2.2 Socio-Demographic Factors
Country Proportion 
population 
aged 20–24
Educational 
attainment 
15–24 years 
(male)
Employment 
in high-
tech sectors 
(male)
Employment 
in low-tech 
manufac-
turing 
(male)
Ratio  
men
Median 
age
Austria 6.4 11.67 4.9 5.9 48.99 43
France 5.7 12.28 5 5 49.15 41.2
Germany 5.6 12.4 5.2 5.2 49.21 45.8
Italy 5 12.96 4 7.1 48.70 45.5
Netherlands 6.3 13.18 5.2 5.4 49.73 42.4
Sweden 6.7 13.98 6.5 4.5 50.01 40.9
Switzerland 6 11.22 NA NA 49.52 42.3
United 
Kingdom
6.6 13.72 6.3 4.1 49.31 40
Table 2.3 Supply- and Demand-Side Factors
Factor All Factors Selected Factors
Demand-Side Economic Hardship 
Immigration Flows and Their Salience X
Low Welfare Protection X
Socio-Demographic factors X
Supply-Side Democratic Performance 
High Levels of Corruption 
Ideological Convergence 
Proportional Electoral System X
Mediatization of Politics X
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Following the discussion of each condition, it is possible to hypothesize that:
H1: the more unfavourable the socio-economic and political-institutional 
conditions, the higher the social acceptability of populism.
Four sub-hypotheses can be formulated concerning the four factors in isolation.
H1A: the higher the economic hardship, the higher the social acceptability of 
populism.
H1B: the higher the democratic gap, the higher the social acceptability of 
populism.
H1C: the higher the perception of corruption, the higher the social accept-
ability of populism.
H1D: the higher the ideological convergence of the political system, the 
higher the social acceptability of populism.
These conditions are operationalized and tested in Chapter 7. Chapter 3 discusses 
the importance of considering not only socio-economic and political-institutional 
factors but also cultural ones, in particular the role of collective memory and 
the re-elaboration of the past, in order to explain cross-country variation. The 
analysis, with the inclusion of the levels of stigma of the fascist past, is repeated 
in Chapter 8.
Notes
 1 Given the number of cases considered in this study (23) and the type of method 
employed in the analytical section (fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis), the 
number of total conditions tested should not be higher than five in order to (reduce 
limited diversity and thus) produce more credible results. Since the stigma of the 
fascist past will be tested afterwards, no more than four variables will be extracted 
from the relevant literature. This is not a rule but rather a standard of good prac-
tice. A sixth condition could have been tested, but this would have reduced the 
reliability and credibility of the results (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).
 2 In Chapter 3, an additional condition (the role of different levels of stigma of 
the fascist past) will be introduced. However, the aim here is not to explain the 
social acceptability of populism through an all-encompassing factor but rather to 
understand how short-term and long-term conditions interact and contribute to 
make populist discourses more or less acceptable across countries and over time. 
Therefore, the levels of stigma are supposed to interact with other (short-term) 
factors discussed in the literature.
 3 Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) define the new cleavage as the opposition 
between GAL – TAN values: green, alternative, and libertarian positions versus 
traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist positions.
 4 For an overview about the democratic deficit of the European institutions: Folles-
dal and Hix (2006).
 5 Studies about the mediatization of politics are mainly theoretical, while empirical 
studies are still in their initial phase. On this topic, see Manucci (2017).
 6 Many authors make reference to the concept of video-malaise, from Robinson 
(1976) to Mutz and Reeves (2005).
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 7 The New York Times, “Europe’s Rising Far Right: A Guide to the Most  Prominent 
Parties,” December 4, 2016, available online (consulted in October 2017): 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/world/europe/europe-far-right-political- 
parties-listy.html.
 8 Another element has been mentioned in the literature: the presence of an 
 appealing and well-organized populist party (Taggart 2000; van Kessel 2015). 
However, the presence of a credible populist party in a certain country might be 
associated with the national political culture of the country and indirectly with the 
collective re-elaboration of the fascist past. Including that as a relevant condition 
would be a tautology, and, more importantly, it would generate an endogeneity 
problem. Therefore, this condition will not be further examined.
 9 Parteienverdrossenheit is translatable as “anti-party sentiment” or “disenchant-
ment with the political parties.”
 10 For studies about the impact of electoral systems, see among others: Jackman and 
Volpert (1996); Golder (2003).
 11 Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that higher electoral thresholds reduce the 
support for extreme right parties, but Swank and Betz (2003) and Golder (2003) 
disproved their findings.
 12 The concept of self-mediatization was introduced by Meyer (2002) and devel-
oped by Strömbäck (2008) and Esser (2013). It refers to the ability of political 
actors to adapt to the media-logic in order to gain visibility.
 13 In particular, Plasser and Ulram (2003); Biorcio (2003); Birnenbaum and Villa 
(2003), and Hellström, Nilsson, and Stoltz (2012) linked the success of the Aus-
trian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Front National 
in France, and the Swedish Democrats in Sweden to the role of the media. For an 
overview on this topic, see Manucci (2017).
 14 For The effects of unemployment, see among others: Knigge (1998); Arzheimer 
and Carter (2006); Bjørklund (2007). Arzheimer and Carter argue that perhaps 
voters turn to mainstream parties in times of high unemployment because they are 
considered more experienced.
 15 Immigration has a relevant role according to Thränhardt (1992); Lubbers, Gijs-
berts, and Scheepers (2002); Anderson (1996); Knigge (1998); Golder (2003).
 16 Immigration has a negligible role according to Mayer and Perrineau (1989); 
Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Norris (2005); Arzheimer and Carter (2006).
 17 It is important to notice that, according to Rovira Kaltwasser (2014, 497), by 
considering populism as an ideology it is possible to “grasp that its rise and fall is 
related to both supply side and demand side factors.”
 18 To be fair, there is not full consensus among scholars on the effects of different 
electoral systems on the performance of radical right-wing populist parties.
 19 According to Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002), the effect of different lev-
els of anti-immigrant attitudes is large in Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark 
but much smaller in Austria, Italy, and Sweden. Moreover, among the European 
countries with the highest number of migrants per 1000 inhabitants, there are 
Austria and Switzerland (displaying high levels of populism), while among those 
with the lowest number of migrants there are Italy, France, Poland, and Hungary 
(also with high levels of populism). Source: Eurostat (online data codes: migr_
imm1ctz and migr_pop1ctz). This means that one should also consider other 
factors such as the salience of the topic in the public debate, as well as the framing 
and the attention devoted by the media to the topic. However, the data concern-
ing these elements are extremely difficult to obtain in a reliable and comparable 
way for a period of several decades across eight countries.
 20 The work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2018) seems to confirm this impression, although 
with several caveats. In general, the relationship between right-wing or left-wing 
populism and types of welfare system remains unclear.
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 21 It is also possible to argue that the economic performance of a country, which 
includes the Gini coefficient after redistribution, already contains some elements 
that resonate with the type of welfare system and how inclusive and universal it is.
 22 The statistics about age, ratio of men to women, and median age were obtained 
through Eurostat. The remaining data were obtained through the database 
of QoG (Quality of Government), and they all refer to the last measurement 
performed.
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This chapter introduces the main conceptual novelty of the study: the idea that 
the populist ideology might be more or less legitimate in different countries 
because of cultural and historical reasons. Indeed, it is possible to claim that every 
country presents a certain political culture, which in turn legitimizes or stigma-
tizes different ideas of power. In particular, the collective memory of the fascist 
past might explain the legitimacy of the populist idea of power in a certain coun-
try. This step is necessary since socio-economic and political-institutional factors 
do not fully explain the cross-country variation of the social acceptability of pop-
ulism. The model produced in Chapter 2 is supposed to explain why populism 
thrives or not, but the literature clearly points to the fact that those conditions 
do not have the same effect in every country. This indicates that country-specific 
elements should be considered as well.
This means that the social acceptability populist ideas of power is a fascist leg-
acy, and the same can be said of the rejection of populism.1 To understand what 
kind of fascist legacy is present in each of the countries analyzed in this study, it is 
essential to observe the following cultural structure:
1 The country’s re-elaboration of World War II and the collective memory of 
its own role during the fascist past.2
2 According to the type of collective memory of the fascist past, a certain level 
of stigmatization of that past is present in the country.
3 A strong stigma of the fascist past produces unfavourable cultural opportu-
nity structures, and conversely a weak stigma produces favourable cultural 
opportunity structures.
Short-term factors interact with long-term legacies. On the one hand, the con-
ditions for populism to thrive can be more or less favourable according to the 
economic situation of the country, the levels of corruption, the levels of account-
ability and responsiveness, and the ideological convergence of the political sys-
tem. On the other hand, unfavourable cultural opportunity structures might 
close down the window of opportunity for populism even in countries where the 
political opportunity structures are favourable, and vice versa.
3  Populism, collective 
memory, and stigma  
of the fascist past
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Since legacies are mentioned, it is essential to delineate what kind of past 
is discussed in relation to populism: the fascist past. This choice is linked to 
the fact that the fascist past resonates with the populist present because both 
fascist and populist ideas of power are based on illiberal elements. The way 
a society collectively remembers the fascist past and its role vis-à-vis fascist 
regimes determines to what extent the fascist idea of power is legitimized 
or stigmatized. In turn, this is supposed to affect the social acceptability of 
populist discourses in a certain country. The idea is that a high stigmatiza-
tion of the fascist past closes down the cultural opportunity structures for the 
social acceptability of populism (both right- and left-wing, as explained in 
Chapter 2).
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it illustrates the concept of cul-
tural opportunity structure and its importance in explaining the cross-country 
variation in populism’s social acceptability. It then describes a new typology of 
collective memory and its four different types: culpabilization, heroization, can-
cellation, and victimization. Each type of collective memory is associated with a 
certain degree of stigmatization of the fascist past.
Cultural opportunity structures
The strands of literature examined in Chapter 2 converge in acknowledging 
that the country level plays a crucial role in explaining different electoral perfor-
mances of radical right-wing populist parties. Arzheimer (2009, 274) tested the 
most common factors linked to the electoral performance of extreme right-wing 
populist parties. He concluded that:
[T]here are striking differences between countries. . . . Put differently, given 
the levels of the variables included in the model, in Austria, Italy, and Den-
mark the extreme right is persistently much stronger and in Spain, Sweden, 
and Finland, it is much weaker than one would expect it to be.
Similarly, Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002, 366) found that cross-
country variance is linked to the fact that individual political attitudes are 
unevenly distributed across countries: “[V]ariations in the composition of the 
population, not in social background but in political attitudes, helped account for 
cross-national differences too. Thus, a considerable part of the original country-
level variance was explained.” Indeed, the effect of education is small in Austria 
and Italy, but particularly significant in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. 
On the other hand, the effect of different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes and 
dissatisfaction with democracy is large in Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark 
but much smaller in Austria, Italy, and Sweden.
These findings resonate with the work of Inglehart and Welzel (2010, 554), 
which considers socio-cultural changes as path-dependent since religious and his-
toric legacies are long-lasting. When trying to explain the passage from tradi-
tional and materialist to modernization-linked and post-materialist values (from 
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survival to self-expression values and from traditional to secular-rational values), 
the authors found that “the nation remains a key unit of shared socialization, and 
nationality explains far more of the variance than factors such as education, occu-
pation, income, gender or region.”
Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that national cultural elements play a piv-
otal role in determining the presence of populist discourses. In other words, 
besides structural and short-term elements, country-specific characteristics might 
have an impact on the social acceptability (Salonfähigkeit) of populist messages.3 
The concept of political opportunity structures remains important to understand-
ing and explaining the presence of populism, but long-lasting cultural elements 
should also be considered. This means that political (short-term) and cultural 
(long-term) opportunity structures can – if considered in combination – explain 
the presence of populism in different countries.
Implicitly developed by Lipsky (1968) and formalized by authors such as Tilly 
(1978) and Tarrow (1983), the concept of political opportunity structures refers 
to “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical 
precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest 
movements in some instances and constrain them in others” (Kitschelt 1986, 58). 
In a broader sense, political opportunity structures emphasize the exogenous con-
ditions for party success and combine the presence of stable institutional features 
with volatile or conjectural factors. The combination of supply- and demand-side 
factors for the success of populist parties can be considered as a set of political 
opportunity structures.
As already mentioned, however, socio-economic and political-institutional 
opportunity structures are of little use in explaining cross-country variations in 
the social acceptability of populism. The limitations of the classic approach to 
political opportunity structures and populism can be overcome by introducing 
into the picture Putnam’s idea that civic traditions are important factors for the 
political performance of a country (1993, 2002). Putnam argued that differences 
in the design of institutions are of secondary relevance and that civic traditions 
account for most of the differences in explaining a community’s political perfor-
mance. In a similar vein, it is possible to argue that different political cultures 
influence the perception of different ideas of power and, therefore, the social 
acceptability of populist discourses.
As defined by Almond and Verba in their seminal work (1963, 13), political 
culture is “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political 
objects among the members of a nation.” Since political cultures include all polit-
ically relevant beliefs, values, and attitudes among the population, they determine 
social and political norms at the collective level. In turn, these norms become 
observable through the ritualization of political behaviors. Different narrations 
and re-elaborations of the fascist past retrospectively illuminate different national 
political cultures and allow estimation of the degree of stigma attached to fascism 
(Connerton 1989). To determine whether there are favourable cultural oppor-
tunities structures for populism in a particular country, it is pertinent to observe 
the collective memory of the fascist past.
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The main idea proposed here, is that certain types of collective memory highly 
stigmatize the fascist past, and therefore create unfavourable opportunity struc-
tures for populism. Other types of collective memory do not stigmatize the fascist 
past and therefore create favourable opportunity structures for populism.
I define cultural opportunity structures as specific configurations of symbolical, 
memorial, and historical elements that shape the range of legitimate and stigma-
tized political behaviors, discourses, and ideas of power. A central role is played by 
the collective memory and re-elaboration of the past. Although other elements 
such as collective customs and traditions can concur in forming cultural opportu-
nity structures, collective memories can be used as a valid proxy because they are 
more easily observable.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the mechanisms linking populism to the presence of polit-
ical opportunity structures interacting with cultural opportunity structures. In 
stage I, every country displays a certain pattern of supply- and demand-side fac-
tors for the presence of populism, which in turn form favourable or unfavourable 
political opportunity structures. However, favourable political opportunity struc-
tures are not enough to predict the acceptability of populism. In fact, in stage 
II, a collective memory which highly stigmatizes the fascist past can make the 
populist idea of power socially unacceptable and outside the realm of ‘what can 
be said.’ This creates unfavourable cultural opportunity structures, and therefore 
populism is supposed to be socially unacceptable.
The link between fascism and populism
Some authors have already linked the presence of populism to different political 
cultures, while several studies mention the role of traumatic collective memories 
in blocking the social acceptability of populist discourses, especially concerning 
the case of Germany (e.g. Art 2006). However, this link has never been analyzed 
in a systematic way, given the difficulties in measuring something as intangible 
as collective memories.4 Despite the absence of comprehensive and systematic 
analyses, the relevant literature seems to take for granted that different national 
political cultures can explain why a populist radical right party is conceived as “a 
major democratic threat in a country or as a reliable ally for a government coali-
tion in another country” (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016, 211).
The examples in this sense are numerous. In Germany, extreme right-wing 
populist parties have never become relevant because the debates about the Nazi 
past of the country blocked the possibility for them to emerge (Art 2006, 
196; Betz 2002; Bornschier 2012; Decker 2008, 125; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014, 
212–13; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). On the other hand, in Austria the elite 
reactions shaped the legitimacy of the far-right in a totally opposite way (Art 
2007, 338). In Spain, the ideological links of Fuerza Nueva and Alternativa 
Española with fascism and Franco’s regime always made these parties “morally 
distasteful to the great majority of Spanish citizens” (Alonso and Rovira Kalt-
wasser 2015, 26). Similarly, in Italy its fascist heritage still influences the actions 
of mainstream parties and the public responses (Tarchi 2002, 135–36), while in 
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the United Kingdom the British National Party’s links to Nazism are perceived 
as particularly negative (Fella 2008, 195).
Concepts such as ‘historical burden,’ ‘long-lasting legacy,’ ‘heritage,’ ‘shadows 
of the past,’ and ‘collective memory’ are often associated in the relevant literature 
with penalizing effects on the electoral performances of radical right-wing politi-
cal parties. In a similar vein, notions such as ‘stigma,’5 ‘ostracism,’ and ‘cordon 
sanitaire’ are commonly used to describe the reaction of mainstream parties vis-
à-vis far-right parties (Demker 2011; Widfeldt 2004). In nuce, this is the core of 
the concept of cultural opportunity structures: a certain idea of power is more 
or less acceptable not only because of socio-economic and political-institutional 
factors but also because of long-lasting political cultures and collective memories.
Since the literature about populism has only fleetingly interacted with the lit-
erature on collective memory, the role of collective re-elaborations of the past 
has been acknowledged but not studied in a systematic and comparative way.6 
This study aims at connecting different strands of literature (including history, 
memory studies, and political science) assuming that when a country is confronted 
with an authoritarian regime, in the case of Western Europe fascist regimes, it can 
either stigmatize or legitimize that type of regime and that particular idea of power 
according to different types of collective memories.7 In turn, different collective 
memories indicate favourable or unfavourable cultural opportunity structures, thus 
opening or closing cultural windows of opportunity for the presence of populism.
As visualized in Figure 3.2, the link between populism and fascism is based 
precisely on a set of illiberal elements they both share.8 This does not mean that 
fascism and populism are perfectly overlapping concepts. For example, if a popu-
list party or regime respects democratic procedures (in particular, free elections), 
it clearly has democratic features, but it might still share some illiberal elements 
with fascism. Indeed, while fascism was historically against electoral representa-
tion, populism channels elections in authoritarian terms (Finchelstein 2017, 96). 
The mechanism linking the fascist past with the present populism is based on the 
Populism
FascismDemocracy
Figure 3.2 Populism Between Democracy and Fascism
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fact that, even if at different levels of radicalism, populism includes core elements 
of fascism at odds with a liberal and constitutional interpretation of democracy.9
Historically, fascism in Europe has been a form of political power based on a 
Manichean separation between the common good of the nation and the threat 
represented by the conspiracies of evil and foreign elements. While it claimed to 
interpret the unitary will of the masses, fascism implemented a nationalist, totali-
tarian, and racist ideology. According to Griffin, for example, historically fascism 
was a fascist populism (1995).
This resonates with the three pillars of the fascist ideology provided by Eatwell 
(2017, 367): “the creation of a new man,” “the forging of a holistic nation in 
order to survive internal and external threats,” and “the creation of a neither 
capitalist nor communist third way authoritarian state (which involves govern-
ment for, but not by the people).” In turn, it confirms the observation of de la 
Torre (2014, 463), who argued that “populist disrespect of pluralism is explained 
by their view of the people as a subject with a unitary will and consciousness, and 
of rivals as enemies of the virtuous people.”
Accordingly, it is possible to disentangle three relevant elements concerning 
the relationship between fascism and populism in theoretical and empirical terms:
1 Both fascism and populism claim that the locus of power, instead of remaining 
empty as in liberal democracy (Lefort 1988), must be filled by a substantive 
image of the people as a homogeneous unity (Abts and Rummens 2007). 
For this reason, Urbinati argues that a populist regime can only survive if it 
becomes authoritarian and despotic (1998, 122), while Panizza maintains 
that the need to protect the fictitious unity of the people might ultimately 
lead to totalitarianism (2005, 29). In other words, populism can be consid-
ered as a proto-totalitarian ideology, but it is important to stress that pop-
ulism does not necessarily display strictly fascist characteristics such as refusal 
of democratic elections, para-militarism, corporatism, and imperialism.
2 Both fascism and populism share an illiberal approach based on an uncon-
strained popular will and an unmediated relationship between elite and peo-
ple. Accordingly, they distrust political parties and their competition because 
every type of intermediary body – apart from populist movements – is seen 
as a carrier of particularistic interests in contrast with the common good. For 
these reasons, checks and balances are considered as unnecessary obstacles to 
the implementation of the popular will.
3 Fascism and (mostly radical right declinations of) populism share a nativist 
definition of the people based on exclusionary criteria. When populism is 
attached to a nativist full ideology, it can be understood in terms of a proto-
totalitarian ideology because it goes against minority protection and imple-
ments a dictatorship of the majority (Abts and Rummens 2007).10
Between 1945 and 1948 – as a reaction to the tragic events that led to World 
War II and the Holocaust – every Western country adopted liberal democracy, 
which emphasizes “checks on the power of each branch of government, equality 
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under the law, impartial courts and tribunals, and separation of church and state” 
(Fareed 1997, 26). However, the stigma attached to the fascist past is not equally 
strong in every country, and therefore the cultural opportunity structures for 
populism are not the same everywhere.
While modern populism entails cathartic elements that might constitute a “use-
ful safety valve for discontent in contemporary democracies,” it can also pose a 
threat to liberal democracies as soon as it shows traits such as “egocentric leaders, 
Manichean demonization and loss of faith in a liberal system based on representa-
tive government, compromise and legal rights” (Eatwell 2017, 382). Modern 
populism “is rooted in a post war reformulation of fascism” and although it is 
now essentially democratic, it is impossible to ignore the fact that populism effec-
tively became fascist in the interwar years, switching back to democracy after 
1945 (Finchelstein 2014, 474–76).11
Indeed, when a country is confronted with populist discourses, the literature 
seems to indicate that the collective memory of the fascist past provides the 
guidelines for the rejection or acceptance of the illiberal elements of populism, 
such as lack of minorities’ protection, absence of separation of powers, and refusal 
of pluralism. In other words, a certain type of re-elaboration of the past may open 
up or close down the cultural opportunity structure for populism to be socially 
acceptable in given countries because collective memories shape and determine 
the field of ‘what can be said’ and the ideas of power that can be expressed.
This leads us to hypothesize that:
H2: the lower the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past, the higher the 
social acceptability of populist discourses.
Collective memories of the fascist past and stigma  
for populism
Determining which type of collective memory of the fascist past has become 
mainstream in a given country, and whether secondary narratives have emerged, 
is crucial in order to understand the level of stigmatization of the fascist past and 
therefore of the populist idea of power.12 This task is particularly complex since 
the formation of collective memories is the outcome of a complex process of 
Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit, a concept that expresses the idea of ‘working 
through the past.’ Alternatively, the term Vergangenheitsbewältigung can be used, 
translatable as ‘coming to terms with the past.’ However, the latter expression has 
a crucially different meaning since it implies the idea of ‘let bygones be bygones,’ 
thus silencing the past instead of problematizing it (Adorno 1977).13
Here, collective memory is defined as the outcome of a social and political 
process that selects parts of the past in order to create a collective identity (Gildea 
2002, 59; T. Berger 2002, 80).14 The process can be characterized by collective 
amnesia, removals, and reinterpretations. When divergent historical narratives of 
the same past exist, this generates a conflict and possibly the adoption of second-
ary narratives along the master (or mainstream) narrative.
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The process of memory-building takes place at different levels. Institutional 
commemorations and holidays, names of public streets and squares (odonyms), 
textbooks, movies and TV shows, symbolic actions, speeches – they all contribute 
to the formation (and ritualization) of collective memory. All these aspects create 
layers of narrations, symbols, and discourses, which become part of the collec-
tive memory of a country. The result of this process is shaped by the country’s 
political culture and at the same time contributes to shaping it (Berger 2002, 81).
Different types of historical critical junctures can create a process of working 
through the past, such as revolutions, wars, and regime changes. In the words of 
Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 348), critical junctures are “relatively short periods 
of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ 
choices will affect the outcome of interest.” The fascist past in Europe (a rela-
tively short period) can be considered as a critical juncture determining the ideas of 
power (outcome) that are legitimate or stigmatized in a given society (the agent).
It is possible to argue that, for Western Europe, 1945 represents the ‘year zero’ 
of collective memory and democracy and the fascist past is a critical juncture for 
the development of democratic ideals in Europe. After the end of World War II, 
every country had to re-elaborate its past, offer a narration of its role during the 
war, and take up a position regarding the fascist regimes that directly or indirectly 
affected the country. Every European country had to make sense of the Shoah, 
the fascist and National-Socialist regimes, and had to define the type of collective 
memory to transmit to future generations. In other words, every country had to 
define its own new collective identity.
More precisely, the fascist past is the most important moment of definition 
of national identity for modern nations,15 and it is a common European-wide 
defining moment. Moreover, contrary to what happened with other historical 
and social moments of fundamental change (such as imperialism, World War I, 
civil wars, or state formation), the re-elaboration of the fascist past took place in 
conditions of full democratic mobilization, thus involving the masses in the for-
mation of the collective memory.
It is important to note, however, that it is almost impossible to define the type 
of collective memory adopted in a given country immediately after World War II. 
This is the case because – like after any traumatic event – the process of re-
elaboration is initially blocked by removal and refusal. This initial phase can be 
labelled as the silencing phase. It can be more or less protracted over time, and it 
is characterized by the fact that thorny topics are avoided and the past is not con-
fronted. During this phase, it is not possible to form any collective stigmatization, 
and hence, not surprisingly, right-wing populist movements such as Poujadisme 
and Uomo Qualunque had the opportunity to emerge in France and Italy in the 
1950s. Even in Germany, until the end of the 1950s, a clear distinction between 
“evil Nazis and good Germans” was present in the public debate (S. Berger 2010, 
121) because the country had not yet faced its past.16
After the silencing phase, normally in the 1960s but sometimes not before the 
beginning of the 1970s, countries started examining their role vis-à-vis the fascist 
past and World War II. Usually, the self-critical phase is highly conflictual because 
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opposite interpretations collide and the outcome of intellectual and political 
negotiations determines the country’s collective memory. During the self-critical 
phase, countries decide what has to remain in the mainstream narrative and what 
has to be excluded because it is embarrassing or contradictory. It is worth men-
tioning, however, that some countries might never engage (or engage only to a 
minimum degree) with such a stage of memory-building, thus simply removing 
and ignoring their own role. In other cases, countries might face their past only 
when forced to do so by external or internal pressure.
Normally, collective memories emerge as the result of the self-critical phase and 
crystallize into official and – possibly – secondary narratives. It is in this moment 
that a main narrative clearly emerges and alternative memories either become 
irrelevant and disappear or become accepted as secondary narratives. This means 
that in certain cases diverging interpretations maintain a certain acceptability and 
credibility in the public discourse, while in other cases only an official and main-
stream memory is allowed. Once the self-critical phase is concluded, the main-
stream and (when present) secondary narratives are established and crystallize 
into an official collective memory.
Moreover, while a correct process of socialization can prevent the fading of 
collective memories, a natural generational change combined with the advent of 
new critical junctures (e.g. the end of the Cold War, the September 11 attacks, 
the Great Recession) might change the approach towards official narratives of the 
past. In particular, it is possible that – over time – societies perceive the ‘remote’ 
past as less and less relevant for the present and that the strength of certain cul-
tural opportunity structures fades away.
Before describing the different types of collective memory and assigning one 
type to each country (this will be performed in Chapter 6), it is important to 
explicate four caveats concerning the nature of collective memory and its evolu-
tion over time. First, this study does not consider the pre-1970 period because 
the silencing phase makes it impossible to define any collective memory. Sec-
ond, collective memories can evolve over time. This evolution is triggered by sev-
eral factors, such as debates among historians, international controversies, trials, 
movies and TV shows, and school programmes and makes memories vulnerable 
to variations caused by short-term junctures as well as by long-term processes. 
Third, the process of memory-building is not relevant for the present analysis; 
therefore, it is considered as a black box. In other words, the only relevant aspect is 
the type of collective memory that emerged as the outcome of the process, not the 
process itself. Fourth, not all countries necessarily fit perfectly with only one type 
of collective memory. Indeed, the process of re-elaboration can lead to the for-
mation of two or more coexisting collective memories. In this case, along with a 
mainstream narrative, it is possible to identify one or several secondary narratives.
Types of collective memory and levels of stigma
Operationalizing and measuring different types of collective memory in a com-
parative way constitutes a relatively unexplored field. One could just consider 
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the historic role of a certain country during the fascist past (victim, perpetrator, 
or bystander) in order to determine the degree of stigmatization of the past, but 
this would be highly misleading since the memory of past events does not coin-
cide with the events themselves. What matters is not the role of the country but 
the memory of the country’s role and the legitimacy or stigma attached to the 
country’s past actions.
According to the existing literature, it is possible to identify a typology with 
four ideal-types of collective memory regarding the fascist past: culpabilization, 
heroization, cancellation, and victimization. Each type entails a specific idea of 
the role of the country during World War II and vis-à-vis the fascist regimes. This 
in turn determines different degrees of stigmatization of the illiberal elements 
that fascism and populism have in common. Indeed, populist discourses are seen 
as dangerous because of the unmediated idea of popular sovereignty and the 
disregard for checks and balances that characterize the populist interpretation of 
democracy. In a country where the memory of fascism is strongly negative, these 
elements of populism can be seen as worrying signs for the strength of liberal 
democracy, while the same elements can be socially accepted in countries where 
the memory of fascism is more nuanced.
Culpabilization and heroization have in common the fact that they imply a con-
frontation with the fascist past and its condemnation, which generates, respec-
tively, very high and high levels of stigma towards illiberalism. When a country 
elaborates a collective memory based on culpabilization, the fascist past is con-
demned, the country takes responsibility for the past, and a thorough, self-critical 
examination takes place. The country considers itself to be guilty and assumes 
the burden of guilt for the fascist regime and its perpetrations. This indicates a 
very high degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements by making amends and 
compensating in various forms.17
Opposed to culpabilization, there is a type of collective memory based on heroi-
zation. It also involves a strong condemnation of the fascist past but for completely 
different reasons. This type of memory is based on a narration of the country as 
acting heroically against the fascist threat to defend liberal values and democratic 
institutions. The degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is high, but less high 
compared to culpabilization, since the country was not responsible for the fascist 
past and does not have to take responsibility.18 In other words, heroization strongly 
condemns the fascist past – but not as strongly as culpabilization – because the 
country was not “infected” with the “fascist virus,” and therefore could not fully 
develop the antibodies needed to combat it, including stigmatization.19
Cancellation and victimization have in common the avoidance of  responsibility – 
in other words, they are based on denial.20 A collective memory based on cancel-
lation takes place when a country decides to forget its role vis-à-vis the fascist 
past and avoids responsibility since it considers itself as an external actor. In other 
words, the country does not problematize its implicit or explicit complicity with, 
and accommodation of, fascist regimes. The resulting degree of stigmatization 
of illiberal elements is low because the country avoids the process of working 
through the past.21
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Contrary to cancellation, a re-elaboration based on victimization confronts the 
past. However, this is done in order to overturn it and escape responsibility. It is 
worth clarifying that in this study victimization is understood as self-victimization 
or victim playing and therefore cannot be applied to countries which were actu-
ally victims of fascist regimes22 – in other words, only cases where the country was 
at least partially ascribable to the group of perpetrators. Indeed, the country was 
directly or indirectly supporting a fascist regime, but its refusal to ‘work through 
the past’ makes it ignore its responsibilities while standing as a victim. Moreover, 
the country shifts the blame to external forces while presenting its own national 
experience in a positive light. This type of memory therefore presents a strong 
form of alteration which makes it possible for alternative narratives to be perceived 
as legitimate: no narrative is really stigmatized – including nostalgic and revisionist 
ones. The degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is extremely low because a 
strong self-delusion blocks the formation of negative attitudes towards illiberalism.
Figure 3.3 shows that the different types of collective memories have a nominal 
value, but, in terms of degree of stigmatization, the four types of narratives can be 
conceived as a single variable with an ordinal value. At one extreme is culpabiliza-
tion, with a very high level of stigma due to a combination of two factors: a total 
acceptance of guilt and an existential stigmatization of fascism (++). A step lower 
there is heroization, which stigmatizes fascism without fundamentally question-
ing the country’s identity and national culture (+).
Culpabilization is expected to close down the space for right-wing populism 
because the fascist past is completely condemned and becomes a no-go area. 
Collective feelings of guilt and shame, acquired through socialization over gen-
erations, make any link with the past unacceptable. Responsibility and guilt are 
internalized and undisputed, while holding views associated with the fascist past 
is socially sanctioned. Heroization is expected to close down the space for right-
wing populism as well because any link to a past fought through sacrifice becomes 
shocking and socially sanctioned.
Cancellation, being a type of non-narrative where the past is avoided, neither 
discusses nor alters the past, hence preventing the formation of stigma (-).23 In 
the case of victimization, responsibility is rejected, and the past is altered and 
therefore not stigmatized at all (–). In these two narratives, the stigma associ-
ated with the fascist past is weak or absent – and even when present it can be 
contested. This is the case because the past, being either ignored or altered, has 
no negative connotations, and hence holding views in line with that past remains 
acceptable or not socially sanctioned. In the case of cancellation, this is due to the 
lack of public debate.24 In the case of victimization, this is due to the alteration of 
past roles and to blame-shifting toward external forces.
Chapter 5 will discuss the amount of populism in each country, and Chapter 6 
assigns a type of collective memory to each country. Before moving towards this, 
however, it is necessary to introduce the case selection and the operationaliza-
tion used to measure populism in party manifestos, as well as the methodology 
implemented in order to determine the impact of collective stigmatization of the 
fascist past.
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Notes
 1 There is little consensus on how to conceptualize historical legacies (Witten-
berg 2015; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). The situation is even more compli-
cated when it comes to empirically measure those legacies and establishing their 
effects (Simpser, Slater, and Wittenberg 2018). However, given that the work 
on communist legacies is more developed and uniform compared to studies con-
cerning fascist legacies, those dealing with the latter can learn from the former. 
Indeed, Eastern Europe has been studied through the lenses of communist or 
pre- communist legacies, and many outcomes have been linked to the concept of 
historic legacies: patterns of democratic consolidation, electoral behavior, state-
society relations, and cultural attitudes.
   Classic works assessing authoritarian legacies alongside legacies of the “mode 
of transition” include Crawford and Lijphart (1997). The authors claim that the 
legacy of communism has an impact on centralized economic planning. At the 
same time, they warn that historic legacies do not act in a vacuum but rather co-
exist with other forces. For example, the influence of historical legacies in this case 
compete with incentives for liberalization from the US and the EU.
   Pre-communist legacies are equally relevant and have been considered as well. 
For example, Kitschelt et al. (1999) found that in Eastern Europe the level of social 
and administrative modernization before communism influence the choice of post- 
communist political institutional arrangements. Moreover, they argue that the type 
of political regime and nature of political mobilization before communism influenced 
the degree of bureaucratization (and repression) employed during communism.
   Other studies tested the impact of communist legacies on a vast array of political 
outcomes. Grzymała-Busse (2002) linked the legacy of communism to the skills 
necessary to navigate politics, while Pop-Eleches (2007) found that different lega-
cies drive different aspects of democratization. In their essential book on “Com-
munism’s shadow,” Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) show that the communist 
legacy brings overall diminished mass support for democracy and markets. They 
also studied the relevance of fascist memories: where the right bore the stigma of 
fascism, the pull of communism was stronger and resulted in a larger leftist bias.
   Fascist legacies have been studied less systematically than communist ones, and 
their link to political outcomes appears only occasionally in the literature. For 
this reason, it is important to consider the existing studies on communist legacies 
in order to adapt similar concepts, methodologies, and practices to the study of 
fascist legacies. In particular, two main lessons can be incorporated. First, several 
possible mechanisms can link a certain past to an outcome. Wittenberg (2015) 
identifies three possible mechanisms. In this study, the first of them is adopted: 
the concept of legacies is here employed to study an outcome (partially) unex-
plainable given the circumstances contemporaneous with that outcome. In par-
ticular, the fascist legacy is used to explain different degrees of social acceptability 
of populist ideas of power. Second, when studying a certain type of historic legacy, 
it is important to consider that pre-existing legacies might play an important role. 
In particular, in this study, it is important to consider features of national political 
cultures that predate the fascist experience.
   At the same time, crucial differences exist between this study and the existing 
literature on communist legacies. First, the focus here is not on individual val-
ues and behaviors but on macro mechanisms. There clearly is a link between the 
social acceptability of populist ideas of power and individual attitudes, but they 
are not the same phenomenon. Second, what matters here is the role of collective 
memories in forming different fascist legacies; therefore, it is possible to include 
countries that experienced fascism in some form without having being ruled by 
fascism, while studies on communist legacies focus exclusively on post-communist 
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countries (opposed to countries without a communist past). Third, since here it 
is irrelevant to determine the effects of the fascist legacy on individuals’ values 
and behaviours, it is possible to study fascist legacies on communities that bear no 
direct memory of fascism. This is linked to the fact that collective memories are 
intergenerational.
 2 As already mentioned, the general argument refers to any authoritarian past that a 
country has experienced. Since the focus of this study is on Western Europe, the 
authoritarian past is here represented by the fascist past.
 3 On the concept of Salonfähigkeit and its link to the study of populism, see Art 
(2006, 103).
 4 A notable exception is represented by Art (2011b). More generally, the link 
between collective memory, political culture, and populism has not been applied to 
comparative studies but rather to case studies or binary comparisons. Most of them 
are mentioned in the following pages when analyzing the type of collective memory 
present in each of the eight countries considered. The situation is certainly different 
when it comes to the study of communist legacies in Eastern Europe, which are the 
object of a much more consistent strand of literature (Wittenberg 2015).
 5 The term ‘stigma’ is often used by researchers examining how mainstream parties 
interact with the radical right (Art 2011a; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; 
Van Spanje and van Der Brug 2007). Erving Goffman defined stigma as “the situ-
ation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance” (1963, 12). 
The same definition can be used for parties instead of individuals.
 6 Historical studies sometimes consider the role of previous regimes on the forma-
tion of political cultures. For example, Aguilar and Humlebaek (2002) exam-
ine the impact of the authoritarian past on Spanish political culture. Similarly, 
Power and Zucco (2009) wrote about Brazilian political culture and noted that 
the transition to democracy after a right-wing authoritarian regime generated the 
so-called direita envergohada (‘ashamed right’).
 7 A country can be directly under an authoritarian regime or have to deal with neigh-
boring countries led by an authoritarian regime. The fascist past in Western Europe 
directly affected only a few countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain, and 
those temporarily invaded by them), but indirectly every other West European 
country has had to take a position and subsequently re-elaborate that past.
 8 Many authors described the illiberal elements of populism. Among them: Abts 
and Rummens (2007); Canovan (1999); Pappas (2014); Pinelli (2011); Plattner 
(2010); Riker (1988); Rovira Kaltwasser (2012); Urbinati (1998).
 9 In Umberto Eco’s (1995) list of traits typical of the fascist ideology, there is selective 
populism: “Since no large quantity of human beings can have a common will, the 
Leader pretends to be their interpreter. Having lost their power of delegation, citi-
zens do not act; they are only called on to play the role of the People. Thus the Peo-
ple is only a theatrical fiction. To have a good instance of qualitative populism we 
no longer need the Piazza Venezia in Rome or the Nuremberg Stadium. There is in 
our future a TV or Internet populism, in which the emotional response of a selected 
group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of the People.”
 10 Of course, the link between populism and fascism (and the corresponding stigma) 
is stronger for neo-fascist and radical right parties articulating populist discourses. 
For this reason, the levels of populism in party manifestos will be weighted by the 
degree of radicalism of each party. See Chapter 4 for more details.
 11 Peronism in Argentina is probably the first example of post-war populist democ-
racy. Finchelstein (2014, 476) observes how “Peronism is not fascism, but fascism 
represents a key dimension of its origins.”
 12 For a seminal study on the differences and commonalities between individual 
and collective memory see Halbwachs (1950). For a comprehensive collection of 
papers on the topic: Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy (2011).
56 Populism, collective memory, and stigma
 13 The fact that the German language provides the most appropriate terms to define 
the process of elaboration of the past is clearly not a coincidence. In fact, Germany 
is the country that, more than others – in Europe, certainly, but probably all over 
the world – has had to face and re-elaborate its past in order to build a new iden-
tity and redefine its political culture.
 14 Other seminal works about the link between collective memories and identities 
are Todorov (1995) and Ricoeur (2000).
 15 Another key moment of definition of national identity for modern nations has 
been the process of state formation in the nineteenth century.
 16 Pakier and Stråth (2010) describe in detail the silencing phase and its charac-
teristics. The silencing phase is also the reason why it is not possible to compare 
countries like Portugal and Spain with the rest of Western Europe. The process of 
memory-building here did not start until the 1990s, and therefore the temporal 
comparison with the other countries would be compromised.
 17 The popular expression “once bitten, twice shy” could be applied here to explain 
why culpabilization implies a higher degree of stigma than heroization.
 18 To be clear: the countries’ past is only partially endogenous to their memory. Col-
lective memories are intrinsically linked to the process of collective re-elaboration 
which, in turn, is linked to the country’s role but also to the construction of 
memories of the country’s role which are not necessarily historically accurate and 
serve as ex-post justifications.
 19 In this case, the pre-existent national political culture is quite important. If a lib-
eral and democratic political culture has flourished for a long time, it can provide 
the necessary antibodies against illiberal elements. Otherwise, the stigmatization 
of illiberal elements might be weakened.
 20 In the Oxford Dictionaries, “denial” is defined in one of its meanings as “Failure to 
acknowledge an unacceptable truth or emotion or to admit it into consciousness, 
used as a defence mechanism.” Available online: https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/denial (consulted in November 2017).
 21 In this case, pre-existent national political cultures are extremely important. Since 
the country does not distance itself from that past but rather refuses to deal with 
it, the stigmatization of illiberal elements is mainly linked to the long-lasting effect 
of a pre-existent national political culture.
 22 A case in this direction would be Poland, which neither collaborated with the 
Nazis nor surrendered.
 23 This does not mean that the mechanism described here as cancellation is based on 
inaction. To the contrary, a process of cancellation takes place deliberately, proac-
tively. When a country decides to “conveniently forget” certain elements of its own 
past (in this case it could be its complicity with the Nazis), this has profound political 
implications since it actively blocks the formation of stigma. In this sense, cancella-
tion is not true forgetfulness but rather forced removal, intentional tabula rasa.
 24 The absence of a public debate might be linked to a bottom-up lack of interest 
in the population but also by a top-down decision to restrict the access to public 
archives or by the absence of political actors that want to capitalize on historical 
controversies.
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This chapter illustrates the operationalization of populism, and its measurement 
through a process of semi-automated content analysis. Moreover, several key ele-
ments of this study are explained and justified, such as the case selection, the time 
frame, the criteria for the selection of party manifestos, and the methodology 
used in the analytical section. Before one can understand under which conditions 
populist discourses thrive or are considered as a taboo, it is essential to under-
stand how much populism there is in a certain country in a certain point in time 
and to what extent it is socially acceptable.
Measuring the presence of populism over several decades and across eight 
countries is a task that greatly exceeds the possibilities of a single researcher. The 
tools employed for the semi-automated content analysis of populist discourses 
have been designed in the context of the NCCR Democracy project at the Uni-
versity of Zurich. A four-year joint effort has produced a common codebook for 
the analysis of the texts, the training of a large number of highly skilled coders, 
and the production of an electronic interface (Angrist) that enables the coders to 
input relational data in a quick and efficient way.1
In particular, a team of 76 coders has been trained to analyze several types of 
media outlets. For the present study, only party manifestos for eight countries in 
the period 1970–2014 are considered.2 All coders passed a reliability test to assess 
the validity of their decisions, with a mean agreement of 85.7% in identifying units 
of analysis within the texts and a mean inter-rater reliability of  Kappan = 0.813 in 
coding the content of these units of analysis.3
First, a test was conducted on coder validity (checking the coders’ agreement 
with a gold standard solution), and then a hidden reliability test was conducted. 
During the content analysis, and without notification, coders were assigned sin-
gle texts from a corpus of 29 texts in German and English. The results of these 
two tests for every aspect of populism are generally acceptable, with average levels 
of Cohen’s Kappa of 0.73 for the ‘gold standard’ test and 0.76 for the hidden 
reliability test. Table 4.1 shows the Kappan coefficients for each variable.4
Reliability and validity are just a part of the complex issues that one faces when 
measuring populism, considering the many different approaches that emerged in 
the literature.5 The nature of this study, however, is essentially comparative, and 
the absolute levels of the acceptability of populism are less relevant insofar as the 
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differences across countries are correctly represented. Nonetheless, many aspects 
have to be thoroughly discussed in order to make sure that the measurement is 
performed in accordance with the definition of populism provided in Chapter 1 
and that it allows the highest degree of comparability between countries.
Finally, it is important to highlight why fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA) is the most appropriate method for this study. Since the aim 
is to understand under which socio-economic and political-institutional oppor-
tunity structures populist discourses are more or less socially acceptable, fsQCA 
allows determination of the extent to which each condition is necessary for the 
outcome to occur and which (combination of) conditions are sufficient. Moreo-
ver, it becomes possible to assess to what extent the levels of stigma contribute to 
forming a better explanation for the phenomenon.
Populist discourses in party manifestos
Consistent with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1, this study 
considers populism as an ideology articulated discursively. Hence, the populist 
ideology becomes empirically measurable as soon as an actor articulates it discur-
sively. This allows measuring populism in a consistent and comparable way across 
countries and over time (Aslanidis 2018). Ideally, the best measurement for the 
acceptability of populism – in a certain country at a certain point in time – would 
include each type of discourse circulating in the public debate, as well as every 
type of speaker.6
However, discourses articulated by different types of actors (politicians, jour-
nalists, celebrities, common people, or religious leaders) in different media out-
lets (party manifestos, social media, newspapers, TV shows, or blogs) are not 
necessarily comparable, and analyzing them can be extremely expensive and time 
consuming. Moreover, the hypothesis developed in this study stipulates that pop-
ulist discourses are more or less legitimate according to different levels of stigma-
tization of the fascist past. Therefore, party manifestos are the most suitable and 
convenient type of document to observe for several reasons.
Table 4.1 Kappan Coefficients Coding Populism
Variables Measuring Populism Kappan Coefficient
Praising the people’s achievements 0.984
Blaming the elites 0.629
Expressing closeness to the people 0.983
Denouncing the elites 0.778
Excluding of the elite from the people 0.889
Stating a monolithic people 0.740
Claiming power for the people 0.988
Denying power to the elites 0.946
Stressing the virtues of the people 0.980
Summary 0.813
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First, by analyzing party manifestos, it is possible to observe how often politi-
cal actors rely on populist discourses when they are free to communicate directly 
to the electorate, thus articulating – in an unmediated way – their idea of society 
and, ultimately, their idea of power. Second, non-political actors are less affected 
by the possible stigma attached to the fascist past. It might be more socially 
acceptable for non-political actors to articulate populist discourses than for politi-
cal actors, who have an institutional and official role, to do so, thereby making a 
comparison highly problematic. Third, the decision to investigate the presence of 
populism in party manifestos is linked to previous studies which consider this type 
of material as appropriate for comparative content analysis and “an authoritative 
document that gives a clear overview of the ideas of a party at a certain point in 
time” (Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014, 566).
The advantage of a semi-automated content analysis over expert survey data is 
self-evident. Instead of relying on data that might be biased by theoretical expec-
tations regarding how populist a certain party or politician is, this method pro-
vides fine-grained and objective measures of the levels of populism in the electoral 
manifestos of different political actors. In other words, rather than assuming that 
certain actors are populist by definition, the content analysis indicates how often 
each actor articulates populist messages.
Given that analyzing party materials is labor intensive, most studies in this 
strand of literature focus on specific country cases or engage in small-sample 
cross-national comparisons. One of the strengths of the present study is the com-
bination of a large cross-national sample (eight countries) over a considerable 
longitudinal extension (from the 1970s to the 2010s).7
Semi-automated content analysis is not the only possible way of measuring 
populism, but it is certainly the one providing the most fine-grained information 
about populist messages. Other methods used in the literature, and relying on a 
very similar ideational definition of populism, are holistic grading (Hawkins 2009, 
2010) and the content analysis proposed by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). In 
holistic grading, coders read an entire speech (or manifesto) and assign a grade of 
populism that can be 0, 1, or 2. In the method created by Rooduijn and Pauwels, 
coders indicate – for each paragraph – whether it contains people-centric and 
anti-elitist discourse. The final score is composed by the proportion of populist 
paragraphs in a manifesto (from 0% to 100%). These methods share with the 
one used here a common understanding of populism as an ideology that can be 
articulated discursively but also a very similar operationalization. The main differ-
ence is the unit of observation: a whole text, paragraphs, or statements.
Case selection
This study focuses on eight West European countries: Austria, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. There 
are several reasons behind the selection of the countries. First, it is in Western 
Europe – among the world’s established democracies – that populist actors are 
becoming increasingly successful in elections (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 
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2015) and often manage to set the tone public debate with fiery statements and 
vicious attacks on their opponents (Mény and Surel 2000). In other words, popu-
list actors often set the agenda of the political debate, forcing mainstream actors 
to strategically adapt and react (Rooduijn 2014). Therefore, the growing politi-
cal impact of populism in Western Europe (Mudde 2013) is extremely relevant 
because it speaks to the nature and future of democracy itself.
Second, Western Europe represents a privileged observation point for several 
varieties of populist discourses: from extreme left to extreme right actors, from 
niche to mainstream parties, in West European countries political actors articulate 
virtually every possible type of populist discourse. Moreover, given the longi-
tudinal and comparative dimension of this study, it is important to note that in 
Western Europe the archives of party manifestos – both online and offline – are 
often complete and easily accessible.
Third, the electoral success of populist parties is not uniform across the 
eight countries analyzed. While in countries such as Austria, Italy, Switzerland, 
and France they are consistently successful over time, in other countries, such 
as Sweden and Germany, they are not, with the Netherlands and the United 
 Kingdom as intermediary cases (van Kessel 2015). As Rooduijn (2014) has 
shown, the diffusion of populist discourses in the public debate varies according 
to the electoral success of populist parties, and therefore the variances between 
the selected countries is important.
Fourth, following a most similar systems design (MSSD), these countries dis-
play different levels of populism but share similar patterns of state formation, 
nation-building, and democratization.8 On the other hand, following a most dif-
ferent systems design (MDSD), it might be the case that countries with similar lev-
els of populism have different political cultures. While Switzerland and Germany 
are consensus democratic systems and the United Kingdom is a clear majoritar-
ian democracy, France is a unique example of a premier-presidential system and 
the other cases are parliamentary systems (Lijphart 1999, 2012).9 Moreover, the 
selected countries show a fair amount of variability in terms of accountability and 
responsiveness of the political system, perception of corruption, and economic 
performance. This variance is important in order to test which socio-economic 
and political-institutional conditions are necessary or sufficient for the social 
acceptability of populism.
Finally, every West European country has been confronted – more or less 
directly – with fascism and World War II. Consequently, each country had to 
develop a narrative of those events in order to define its new collective identity. 
This means that they have formed collective memories about the same authori-
tarian past – in this case, the fascist past – therefore making it possible to test the 
impact of stigmatization of the past on the presence of populist discourses.
Moreover, on a pragmatic note, it was not possible to include every West Euro-
pean country in the content analysis, mainly due to practical reasons linked to the 
amount of time available and to obvious financial restrictions. However, the eight 
selected countries are thought to represent other countries such as Denmark, Nor-
way, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Ireland since they show 
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similar institutional features, political systems, socio-economic conditions, and col-
lective memories of the fascist past when compared to the included countries.
On the longitudinal dimension, five time points have been selected. In par-
ticular, for each country, one national election per decade has been chosen.10 
The aim is to have, for each decade, elections as close as possible to those in the 
other selected countries, in order to provide the maximum degree of compara-
bility. Moreover, in France the first round of presidential elections is preferred 
to legislative elections, given France’s unique semi-presidential system and the 
importance that presidential elections play in its political system.11 Finally, Italy 
in the 2000s has been excluded since the two different electoral systems used in 
2001 and 2006 forced the parties to form broad coalitions rather than participat-
ing alone, and therefore separate manifestos are not available.12
The party manifestos issued before the election periods were selected on the 
basis that they are supposed to be particularly well suited to observe populist dis-
courses. Indeed, during election campaigns, political actors are especially active in 
communicating their positions to voters. In particular, they might express more 
frequently their opinion concerning different ideas of power and about the role 
of the elite and the people in the decision-making process. The party manifes-
tos have been retrieved from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 
2016) or from party websites. Additionally, in some cases, the author person-
ally contacted political parties and asked for copies of missing manifestos. As 
Table 4.2 shows, the content analysis concerns 173 party manifestos and a total 
amount of 14,064 coded statements. Appendix 1 (Tables A1.1 to A1.5) provides 
some descriptive data about the manifestos, while Appendix 3 (Table 3.1) lists the 
total number of statements and populist statements for each analyzed manifesto.
Measuring the social acceptability of populism
The social acceptability of populism is here measured as the percentage of popu-
list statements in a party manifesto, which is then weighted by two other factors: 
the degree of radicalism of the party and the vote share the party received in 
Table 4.2 Corpus Manifestos: Overview
Country Election Years N. Manifestos Statements  
in Manifestos
Austria 1975, 1983, 1994, 2002, 2013 21 1,723
France 1974, 1981, 1995, 2002, 2012 22 1,812
Germany 1972, 1983, 1994, 2002, 2013 19 1,489
Italy 1972, 1983, 1994, 2013 17 2,470
Netherlands 1972, 1982, 1994, 2002, 2012 24 2,429
Sweden 1973, 1982, 1994, 2002, 2014 29 1,113
Switzerland 1975, 1983, 1995, 2003, 2011 26 1,185
United Kingdom 1974, 1983, 1992, 2001, 2010 15 1,843
SUM 173 14,064
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that election. Populist statements are identified according to the ad-hoc code-
book, and six indicators are used to detect the presence of populist messages 
(Table 4.3). This section describes in detail the procedure for the measurement 
of populism in party manifestos.
Populism is measured, in each party manifesto,13 as the percentage of populist 
statements compared to the total amount of political statements, which consti-
tute the unit of measure. Those statements which do not contain either an evalu-
ation of a social actor or a position regarding a political issue are removed from 
the total amount of political statements because they do not contain any relevant 
information about the speaker’s ideology, idea of power, or issue positioning.14 In 
other words, a speaker (in this case, a political party) articulates a political state-
ment as soon as an evaluation is expressed:
1 About other social actors. These actors can be political actors (politicians, 
parties, parliaments, or governments) but also economic actors, national and 
supranational organizations, the people, judiciary actors, the police, or the 
army, as well as religious actors or the media.
2 About a political issue. A set of 12 issue-categories was used, which includes: 
economy, culture, welfare, budget, army, immigration, Europe, security, 
institutional reforms, army, ecology, and infrastructures. Each statement in 
which a position on one of these issues is expressed has been coded.
Table 4.3 Operationalization of Populism
Dimensions Questions in the Codebook
Closeness to the people Does the speaker claim to belong to/be close to/
know/speak for/care for/agree with/perform 
everyday actions like/represent/embody the people?
Stating a monolithic 
people
Does the speaker describe the people as homogeneous, 
sharing common feelings, desires, or opinions?
Stressing the virtues of 
the people
Does the speaker describe the people in a positive 
way (moral, credible, competent, no lack of 
understanding, etc.)?
Praising the people’s 
achievements
Does the speaker stress positive actions and positive 
past and future impacts of the people (responsible 
for a positive development/situation, not being 
responsible for a mistake, etc.)?
Exclusion of the elite 
from the people
Does the speaker describe the elites as not belonging 
to/not being close to/not knowing the needs of/
not caring about/not speaking on behalf of/not 
empowering/deceiving the people?
Claiming power for the 
people
Does the speaker argue that the people should have/
gain/not lose power? Does the speaker give the people 
the competence to act or decide on a specific political 
issue? Does the speaker demand institutional reforms 
for more participation of the people in politics?
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In order to make the measurement as strict and objective as possible, and with 
the aim of reducing, if not eliminating, type I errors (false positives), the cod-
ers were trained to code only explicit statements. Implications, hints, and con-
text knowledge are never applied to the coding process. Even if a coder realizes 
that, reading between the lines, a message has a certain implicit meaning, this is 
irrelevant since the statement is only coded if the meaning is explicit.15 Another 
relevant aspect concerns the absolute number of coded statements. Indeed, only 
one statement about each issue or target is coded for each speaker in a party 
manifesto. This means that if the speaker makes several statements on a specific 
issue (e.g. ‘welfare’) or target (e.g. ‘the journalists’), these are considered as one 
single statement, although the message is articulated over several sentences. If the 
speaker criticizes the government several times in the text because ‘it does not 
listen to the people,’ this is coded only once.
After having identified the main characteristics of the unit of measure (political 
statements), it is crucial to identify populist statements. A statement is coded as 
populist – according to the conceptualization outlined in Chapter 1 – whenever 
a party:
1 Claims to be close to the people;
2 Mentions the people as a monolithic actor with a common will;
3 Stresses the virtues of the people;
4 Praises the positive achievements of the people;
5 Introduces a cleavage between the elites and the people; and
6 Demands more power for the people.
Moreover, three caveats are crucial in order to fully describe the operationaliza-
tion of populism used in this study. First, ‘exclusion of the elite from the people’ 
is coded as present only in cases where the target of the critique is the elite as a 
whole. Therefore, a critique targeting only part of the elite – such as a specific 
party, or a certain politician – is not considered as a populist statement.
On the other hand, the type of elite as a whole which is criticized varies accord-
ing to the broader ideology of the speaker. The critique might target political elites 
(‘established parties’ or ‘the government’) but also financial (‘the capitalists’), eco-
nomic (‘the banks’), cultural (‘the academics,’ ‘the media’), or unspecified elites 
(‘the mighty ones’). Moreover, in this way a critique of the elite as a whole is coded 
as populist only if the critique is made with a reference to the people.
Second, the concept of ‘the people’ can also be declined in different ways 
according to the speaker’s full ideology. The codebook includes generic expres-
sions concerning the people but also expressions defining the people as ethnos 
(‘the Dutch’), as a function (‘the voters’), as a hypothetical prototype of the peo-
ple (‘the man in the street’), or any other term which can stand for ‘the majority 
in the society.’
Third, contrary to other studies (Rooduijn 2014, 734; Rooduijn, de Lange, 
and van der Brug 2014, 567), the co-occurrence of people-centrism and anti-
elitism is not required since each statement containing one of the six elements can 
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be considered as populist. An alternative operationalization in line with previous 
studies, therefore using the co-occurrence principle, is presented in Appendix 10, 
and it is possible to observe that the main results of this study remain consistent 
(Appendix 11).
This operationalization, compared to the one based on the co-occurrence prin-
ciple, has several advantages. For example, it reduces the number of manifestos 
with no populism, thus making more meaningful the quantitative comparison.16 
Moreover, it eliminates cases in which a manifesto contains high levels of people-
centrism but no anti-elitism, thus resulting in a ‘zero’ as the percentage of pop-
ulism, while with just one anti-elitist statement the percentage of populism would 
have been much higher.17 On the other and, since this study relies on a definition 
of populism based on both anti-elitism and people-centrism, this operationaliza-
tion also requires several adjustments and clarifications.
For example, a critique of the elite is not coded as populist unless it explicitly 
refers to the people. Since following this kind of operationalization a critique of 
the elite can be sufficient to speak of populism, it would be highly problematic 
to code every critique of the elite as populist. Therefore, this is done only in 
cases where the anti-elitist critique is carried on in the name of the people (and, 
as explained before, in cases where the elite is considered as a whole and not a 
specific actor).
On the other hand, the opposite is not necessarily true: a people-centric mes-
sage, if coded as proposed here, does not require explicit anti-elitism in order 
to be coded as populist because it already incorporates it. For example, political 
statements like those listed below are coded as populist even without an explicit 
critique of the elite because they clearly embed it: “The people are tired of this 
dramatic situation” (stating a monolithic people, as in a purely populist fashion), 
“The people should decide what is better for the future of this country” (stress-
ing virtues of the people, as opposed to those of the elite), “It is thanks to the 
courage of the common people that the situation improved” (praising the peo-
ple’s achievements, as opposed to a passive or negative role of the elite), or “The 
people should decide on this issue through a referendum” (claiming power for 
the people, as opposed to the power of the elite). Indeed, when a party takes the 
side of the people in its electoral manifesto, it is clearly doing so in opposition to 
the other parties.
Moreover, not counting people-centric statements as populist would be highly 
problematic. Indeed, the vast majority of anti-elitist critiques are directed towards 
political elites (such as the government, the parliamentary majority, or the estab-
lished parties) and therefore almost exclusively oppositional and non-mainstream 
parties would be able to articulate anti-elitist statements (hence being able to 
show traces of populism in their manifestos). This means that by using an opera-
tionalization of populism that relies on the co-occurrence of people-centrism and 
anti-elitism, governmental parties and mainstream parties would almost never 
turn out to be populist, thus generating type II errors (false negatives).18
Even with the operationalization applied in this study, which evens out differ-
ences between mainstream and non-mainstream parties, it clearly appears that 
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new non-mainstream parties (the ‘usual suspects’, so to speak) are much more 
populist compared to mainstream parties. The results are not much different 
from those that would have been obtained by using a co-occurrence principle, 
which are fully reported in Appendix 10.19
According to the description of the measurement offered above, the overall 
amount of populism for each manifesto can theoretically range from 0 (none of 
the coded statements is populist) to 100 (every coded statement is populist). The 
results of the content analysis are presented in Chapter 6, but for the moment it 
is possible to anticipate that 715 out of 14,064 political statements (almost 5.1%) 
have been coded as populist. The populism scores of the manifestos empirically 
range from 0% (which is the case for 47 of the 173 manifestos, 24 of which are from 
Swedish parties) to 30% (e.g. the Green Party of Germany in 2013)20 of populist 
statements, and on average a manifesto contains 4.9% of populist statements.21
In order to determine whether populism is socially accepted in a particular 
country, two additional steps are implemented. First, the percentage of populist 
statements is weighted by two additional factors: the vote share and the degree 
of radicalism of the party.22 Figure 4.1 presents a three-dimensional overview of 
the composition of the outcome (or dependent variable). Second, the levels of 
populism in a certain country at a certain point in time (country-decade) are 
obtained by aggregating the weighted levels of populism from all the manifestos 
containing populist statements in that particular election.
The percentage of populist statements is weighted by radicalism and vote share 
because what is relevant in this study is the degree of acceptability of populist dis-
courses in a certain country. If a manifesto contains remarkable levels of populism 
(say 10%) but the party is not radical (1.5 on a 1–6 scale, where 1 is non-radical 
Vote share Radicalism
Populism
Figure 4.1 Salonfähigkeit of Populism in Three Dimensions
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and 6 is very radical) and it obtained only 5% of the vote share, the weighted 
level of populism for that manifesto will be 75 (10*1.5*5). On the other hand, if 
a manifesto containing the same amount of populism (10%) is written by a very 
radical party (say, 5 out of 6) which obtained a striking electoral result (say, 25% 
of the vote share), the weighted level of populism for that manifesto will be 1,250 
(10*5*25). This means that a party can articulate more or less populist messages 
in its manifesto, but what also matters in order to understand how acceptable 
populism is in a certain country is how radical and successful that party – and 
therefore its discourse – is. If a very populist manifesto written by a very radical 
party obtains less than 1% of the votes, it is safe to assume that the party’s message 
is insignificant in the public debate.
Following a similar approach, the level of populism in a certain country is 
obtained by aggregating the weighted levels of populism of all the manifestos 
containing populist statements in that particular election. This means that if 
one single moderate party (say, 2 out of 6) with a populist manifesto (say, 10%) 
obtains 40% of the vote share, while none of the other parties participating in 
that election articulate populism, the total amount is 800 (2*10*40). The same 
amount is reached in a case whereby four moderate parties (2) with equally popu-
list manifestos (10%) each obtain 10% of the vote share. Calculating the average 
amount of populist messages among all the manifestos would render irrelevant 
the fact that in a certain country there are several credible populist actors and 
would assign higher scores to countries with one mainstream party articulating 
populist discourses. On the other hand, in this way it is possible to compare the 
United Kingdom to other countries since one single party with a considerable 
vote share can count as much as several smaller parties.
Theoretically, a country at a certain point in time can have a level of weighted 
populism ranging from 0 to 60,000.23 The higher end is empirically unimag-
inable since it describes a country in which extremely radical parties (6 on a 
scale from 1–6) obtained 100% of the vote share while only articulating populist 
statements in their manifestos (6*100*100). The observed values are, of course, 
much lower. The highest level of weighted populism registered consists in the 
3,418 total points scored by Austria in 2013. In particular, this level is linked to 
the presence of the manifesto of the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs – FPÖ), which alone scores 2,028 (more than 21% populist state-
ments, 4.7/6 in radicalism, 20.5% of the vote share). Apart from the manifesto of 
the FPÖ, it is worth noting that the other five coded manifestos in the same elec-
tion also have significant levels of populism: SPÖ (3.3%), NEOS (5.1%), Grüne 
(7.1%), ÖVP (11.9%), andTeam Stronach (13.9%); altogether, these six parties 
cover 94.4% of the vote share.
Methodology
The hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 will be tested through 
fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This method postulates that 
the presence (or absence) of an outcome can be explained by a combination 
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of different conditions, thereby identifying multiple causal patterns.24 This is in 
contrast with the concept of additivity, which postulates that single variables have 
their own independent impact on the dependent variable. This work follows the 
reasons presented by van Kessel in his book that employs QCA to study the 
conditions for the electoral success of populist parties in Europe (2015, 29–30).
Indeed, several key concepts of QCA are essential in explaining why this par-
ticular methodology fits the task of this study. The principle of equifinality states 
that the same outcome can be explained by different (combinations of) condi-
tions. At the same time, QCA is also based on multifinality, meaning that the 
same (combinations of) conditions can explain different outcomes. Another cen-
tral concept in QCA is conjunctural causation, meaning that it is a configuration 
of combined conditions that relates to a certain outcome. This implies that single 
conditions are not thought to affect the outcome independently but in combina-
tion. Finally, QCA relies on the concept of causal asymmetry, meaning that the 
presence or absence of a certain outcome might be explained by different config-
urations of conditions. All these factors are particularly relevant considering that 
the literature examined in Chapter 2 clearly points to the presence of multiple 
factors and their combinations in order to explain the presence of populism.25
Moreover, the ultimate goal of QCA is to analyze set-theoretic sufficiency rela-
tions. The aim is to verify whether a single condition always leads to the same 
outcome.26 Indeed, the main feature and aim of QCA consists in determining 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a certain outcome to occur (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012). The first step is to assess the presence of any explana-
tory condition that is necessary for the presence of the outcome. At the same 
time, the presence of any condition necessary for the absence of the outcome 
(or, in other words, for the presence of its negation) is also determined. In a fur-
ther step, through Boolean minimization, the analysis determines the presence 
of (combinations of) conditions whose presence is sufficient for the presence (or 
absence) of the outcome. This normally brings to the definition of a solution 
formula showing the sufficient (combination of) conditions for the occurrence of 
the outcome. The solution can be conservative, intermediate, or parsimonious, 
according to the assumptions made about the logical reminders (a discussion 
of this aspect is present in Chapter 8). Each solution has a value for consistency 
and a value for coverage, which illustrates how ‘precise’ the solution formula is 
in explaining the occurrence of the outcome (consistency or inclusion) and how 
many cases are covered by that solution formula (coverage).
In this study, the outcome to be explained is represented by the social accept-
ability of populist discourses, measured as the levels of populism in party manifes-
tos weighted by the degree of radicalism and vote share of the party. In order to 
obtain a deeper understanding of the conditions linked to the social acceptability 
of populism (POP), the impact of the conditions on the acceptability of left-
wing (POP_L) and right-wing (POP_R) populism was also tested separately, for 
a total of three different outcomes. This is done because the social acceptability of 
right-wing populism might be explained by a different combination of conditions 
compared to left-wing populism.
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The cases observed are represented by eight countries, each analyzed during 
three election points in the period 1990–2015, bringing the total of cases to 24. 
Given the peculiar electoral law used in Italy for the elections of 2001, it was not 
possible to find electoral manifestos for the single parties, only the manifestos of 
the two main coalitions. Therefore, the number of cases dropped to 23 (see the 
section in Chapter 6 about populism in Italy). The first part of the QCA analysis, 
presented in Chapter 7, is performed in order to assess the impact of high lev-
els of corruption, poor economic performance, low levels of accountability and 
responsiveness, and high ideological convergence on the social acceptability of 
populism. The second part of the analysis, presented in Chapter 8, introduces the 
level of stigma, a newly constructed condition aiming at assessing whether the 
level of stigmatization of the fascist past can contribute to a better explanation of 
the same outcomes.
Notes
 1 For more information about Angrist, see Wettstein (2014, 2016). The docu-
mentation (retrieved in March 2019) about Angrist is also available online: www.
tarlanc.ch/angrist/ANGRIST_Dokumentation.pdf.
 2 The actual number of coders involved in this particular research project was 43. 
Data about populism in party manifestos before the 1970s are not available. 
However, given the silencing phase described in Chapter 3, it would have been 
empirically less relevant for the present study since the effects of fascist legacies 
before the 1970s would have been non-existent or less strong.
 3 On Brennan and Prediger’s Kappa, see Brennan and Prediger (1981).
 4 The coefficients are presented for all the variables, including those used uniquely 
for the alternative operationalization.
 5 An extensive overview about the possible measurements of populism is offered in 
Aslanidis (2018).
 6 Following previous studies about the presence of populist discourses, I define 
public debates as the public discussion of ideas, facts, feelings, and opinions rel-
evant to politics and involving citizens, politicians, and experts, with the media 
acting at the same time as ‘gatekeepers’ and actors themselves (Rooduijn 2014; 
Bennett and Entman 2001; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007). National news-
papers, magazines, television programs, and internet fora all constitute places 
where the public debate takes place.
 7 Once again, this tremendous and unprecedented effort to understand and meas-
ure populism has been possible thanks to the third phase of the NCCR Democ-
racy programme, the many researchers that worked on it, and the coders that have 
been trained to provide the most reliable (and comparable) results.
 8 On the issue of state formation and nation-building, see Bartolini (1993) and 
Sartori (1991).
 9 Papadopoulos (2002, 53) discusses in detail the impact of the institutional dimen-
sion on the degree of populism.
 10 Although populist parties perform even better in the context of the elections for 
the European Parliament, national elections are more appropriate than European 
ones as the latter are mostly second-order national elections (Van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1996).
 11 In the first round of presidential elections all the candidates are still participat-
ing in the electoral campaign, and therefore it is possible to retrieve an electoral 
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manifesto for each party. Legislative elections, on the other hand, are relatively 
less relevant, given the French semi-presidential system.
 12 In 2006, the centre-left coalition “L’Unione,” for example, counted nine founding 
parties. The Italian election of 2008 would have been technically available because 
the different parties presented separate electoral manifestos. However, this would 
have been in contradiction to one of the criteria stated above: since all the other 
countries under consideration held elections in the period 2001–2003, selecting 
an election from 2008 would have diminished the degree of comparability.
 13 Other authors use paragraphs as the sample unit. The whole manifesto, as explained 
by Aslanidis (2018, 1250), is better than paragraphs because they “frequently con-
tain bullet-pointed lists and short motivational sentences or quotes, features that 
further undermine comparability. . . . segmentation into paragraphs still involves a 
discount in semantic resolution, since mildly populist paragraphs receive identical 
scores with intensely populist ones that carry greater informative content.”
 14 A statement that is discarded from the coding process because it does not include 
any actor evaluation or issue positioning, might sound like this: “Next year there 
will be elections and our party will participate” or “This manifesto aims at illus-
trating the goals of our party.”
 15 The golden rule expressed in the codebook about this aspect is “If you have to ask 
yourself whether a statement is explicit enough to code it, it is not.”
 16 The number of manifestos that would have ‘zero’ populism with the co- 
occurrence principle but that in fact show populism with this operationalization 
is 56 (around 30% of the sample): 8 in the 1970s, 10 in the 1980s, 15 in the 
1990s, 10 in the 2000s, and 13 in the 2010s. Of these, 13 are Swedish manifes-
tos, but the levels of populism are always extremely low; therefore, coding them 
as non-populist does not change substantially the image of Sweden as a country 
without populism.
 17 For example, the SVP (CH) in the 1990s, the ÖVP (CH) in four occasions, and 
the FDP (CH) and the FPÖ (AT) in the 2010s would have been coded as hav-
ing no populism, precisely because they show people-centrism but no explicit 
anti-elitism. In a similar way, several left-wing parties would have been coded as 
non-populist: the SPÖ in Austria (in four occasions), the Left Party in Sweden (in 
five occasions), and the French Socialist Party (in four occasions).
 18 Rooduijn et al. (2014, 567), for example, use the co-occurrence operationaliza-
tion, and indeed nearly all mainstream parties have a very low populism score.
 19 Appendix 10 shows the variables used for the alternative operationalization (Table 
A10.1), the amount of populism in each manifesto obtained with the alternative 
operationalization (Table A10.2), as well as the raw and fuzzy values of populism 
according to the alternative operationalization (Table A10.3).
 20 The Socialist Party in Italy in the 1970s has a score of 40%, but the populist 
statements are 2 out of 5, therefore the reliability of such a measurement is 
questionable.
 21 In a paper with Edward Weber (2017) we measured populism in manifestos and 
newspaper articles, and we used a metaphor to make sense of the presence of pop-
ulism: “one can think about the difference between apple cider, beer, and wine: 
the presence of populist statements can be compared to the percentage of alcohol 
in the three drinks. For example, the manifesto of a highly populist party – like 
the SPD (Germany) in 1983 or the FPÖ (Austria) in 2013 – with 20–30% of 
populist statements, would be a Martini cocktail, while the manifesto of a mod-
erately populist party – 5% populist statements, as in the case of the new Austrian 
party NEOS in 2013 – would be a pilsner beer.” To provide an extra element of 
comparison, one can think about the fact that 5.1% of the statements coded in 
manifestos contain the populist ideology, while 4% of statements are about immi-
gration politics and 7% about European integration and EU-politics.
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 22 When possible, in order to determine the levels of radicalism, the Chapel Hill sur-
vey is used (Bakker et al. 2015). However, the survey does not cover the 1990s, 
for which the Party Manifesto Project is used (Lehmann et al. 2016). The values 
from the two datasets are then normalized and standardized. The data concerning 
the electoral results are obtained via Caramani (2000, 2015).
 23 The levels of the outcome are then transformed into a 0–1 scale in order to per-
form the analysis; the thresholds for cases to be considered as being members of 
the outcome or not are explained in detail in Chapter 7. A simple logarithmic 
normalization from 0–100 based on maximum and minimum values would leave 
most of the cases below 50, for example, thus making the interpretation of the 
values even harder.
 24 Outcome and conditions could be understood as dependent and independent 
variables, but it is not advisable to create terminological confusion since they are 
not fully overlapping concepts. The underlying logic of QCA, in fact, is differ-
ent from the one characterizing statistical techniques (Schneider and Wagemann 
2010).
 25 The most important theoretical works about the concepts used in QCA are: Ragin 
(1987, 2000, 2008) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012).
 26 This is a general principle of every comparative method, and it goes back (at 
least) to John Stuart Mill (1906), who did not believe it was possible to apply the 
method to social sciences, as explained in Caramani (2009).
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This chapter presents the results of the content analysis described in Chapter 4. 
In particular, it illustrates the trend for the presence of populism in party mani-
festos in eight European countries from the 1970s to now. Moreover, it disentan-
gles left- and right-wing variants of populism. Finally, it describes each country 
in detail, explaining which party manifestos articulate populist discourses and 
discussing whether the findings are in line with the literature on the topic.
The data presented also concern two time points that are not included in the 
analysis because the data used to operationalize the conditions are inexistent or 
incomplete for the decades before 1990. Hence, only the 1990s, 2000s, and 
2010s are part of the QCA analysis (Chapters 7 and 8). However, it is interesting 
to present a more long-term picture concerning the development of populism in 
Western Europe. In particular, by including the 1970s and 1980s, three consid-
erations arise. First: the last elections feature unprecedented levels of populism. 
Second: it is not only since the 1990s that populism started growing. In fact, 
the overall levels for the 1970s are higher than for the 2000s. Third, a fact that 
is often neglected in the literature, the manifestos of left-wing parties average 
higher levels of populism compared to those of right-wing parties. Appendix 1 
reports the full data (Tables A1.1 to A1.5).
Figure 5.1 illustrates the average percentage of populist statements in mani-
festos. In other words, it describes how much populism there is on average in 
party manifestos over time. The first element that stands out when observing the 
trend is that populism in manifestos shows higher and higher levels over time. 
On average, a right-wing manifesto in the 2010s contains much more populism 
than in the 1970s; in fact, the percentage of populist statements almost triples, 
going from 2.09% to 5.68%. An average left-wing manifesto was more populist 
in the 1970s compared to the three following decades, but (describing a sort of 
u-curve) it reaches unprecedented levels in the 2010s. As a result, the percentage 
of populist statements in all party manifestos together (solid line) shows that the 
manifestos written for the last elections have been the most populist. While an 
average manifesto contained 4.30% of populist statements in the 1970s, the level 
rises to 6.62% in the 2010s.
Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of the social acceptability of populist discourses. 
These values are the result of the average percentage of populist statements in 
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Figure 5.1 Average Populism in Manifestos (Percentage)
Figure 5.2 Average Populism in Manifestos (Weighted)
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each manifesto (showed in Figure 5.1) weighted by the degree of radicalism 
and vote share of the party author of the manifesto. The reader should therefore 
understand “weighted populism” and “social acceptability of populism” as two 
equivalent concepts. The former refers to the mathematic process of weighting 
populism levels by electoral results and radicalism, while the latter refers to the 
concept obtained through this operation: populism’s Salonfähigkeit. Similarly, 
both labels “unweighted” and “raw” populism refer to the percentage of populist 
statements in party manifestos.
When considering the social acceptability of populism – compared to the sim-
ple presence of populist discourses – a different picture emerges. Overall pop-
ulism does not seem to have significantly increased its social acceptability over 
time. Interestingly, left- and right-wing populism followed opposite patterns. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing populism was much more socially acceptable than 
right-wing populism, but its Salonfähigkeit drastically decreased between the 
1970s and the 2000s (from 517.73 to 123.1). Right-wing populism, in the mean-
time, has become more socially accepted than in the 1970s (72.69), although the 
levels are not much higher now (281.17) than in the 1990s (263.76).
Comparing Figure 5.1 with Figure 5.2, one can conclude that while right- and 
left-wing manifestos are more populist than ever, their social acceptability is not 
following a similar upturn. Indeed, the overall levels of populism were almost 
identical in the 1970s (295.21) and the 2010s (294.45). This means that the 
data show no ‘populist wave’ taking place in Western Europe, at least not when 
it comes to the social acceptability of populist messages in party manifestos. The 
two statistical tests presented in Appendix 2 (Table A2.1 and A2.2) show that 
the development over time is not statistically significant, with only the 1980s 
compared to the 2010s having a significant negative coefficient with a confidence 
interval of 95%.1
Despite the intrinsic interest of visualizing such a temporal trend, the focus 
of this study is to understand how acceptable populist discourses are in a given 
country compared to other countries rather than the average content of populism 
in manifestos over time. For this reason, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the average 
amount of populism at the country level. Now the focus is on the average level 
of populism across countries and the unit of measure is country-decade, not the 
party manifesto. In other words, each country has a value for both right- and 
left-wing populism in each decade, the sum of which gives the overall amount of 
populism. Table 5.1 presents the full data, while Appendix 1 (Tables A1.4 and 
A1.5) reports the averages values across country and over time.
These data will be discussed in detail in the remainder of the chapter, analyzed 
country by country. For the moment, it is interesting to note that when consider-
ing the total levels of populism across countries (solid line in Figure 5.3), the last 
decade is remarkably “more populist” than any other before. Unsurprisingly, this 
reflects the average amount of populism found in manifestos (Figure 5.1). Also 
at the country level, the presence of populism in manifestos is higher now than at 
any other point during the previous four decades, more than doubling between 
the 1970s and the 2010s.
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In the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing populism was dominant compared to right-
wing populism, but this situation was reversed in the 1990s and 2000s. Again, this 
is consistent with the average levels of populism in manifestos presented above: 
from the 1990s onwards, right-wing populism becomes increasingly widespread, 
while left-wing populism follows a u-curve. In the 2010s elections, however, the 
Table 5.1 Populism by Country-Decade Raw and Weighted
Country Decade R.W. 
Populism 
(weighted)
L.W. 
Populism 
(weighted)
Total 
Populism 
(weighted)
R.W. 
Populism 
(%)
L.W. 
Populism 
(%)
Total 
Populism 
(%)
AT 1970 206.56 790.05 996.61 3.70 5.41 9.11
AT 1980 353.06 2,281.86 2,634.92 12.24 15.46 27.70
AT 1990 2,341.72 523.50 2,865.22 26.12 7.14 33.26
AT 2000 419.56 205.55 625.12 4.25 4.80 9.05
AT 2010 2,967.76 450.43 3,418.19 51.96 10.39 62.35
CH 1970 0.00 591.42 591.42 0.00 11.81 11.81
CH 1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CH 1990 1,269.66 800.09 2,069.75 26.66 15.40 42.06
CH 2000 1,724.37 436.78 2,161.15 21.05 6.43 27.48
CH 2010 745.85 1,143.04 1,888.89 22.83 11.88 34.71
DE 1970 0.00 196.29 196.29 0.00 1.79 1.79
DE 1980 1,312.93 2,050.57 3,363.50 12.78 37.23 50.01
DE 1990 331.63 1,264.73 1,596.36 6.05 17.15 23.20
DE 2000 177.24 309.67 486.91 5.68 5.12 10.80
DE 2010 0.00 2,546.25 2,546.25 0.00 69.72 69.72
FR 1970 381.47 752.00 1,133.48 12.63 12.78 27.98
FR 1980 459.73 600.52 1,060.25 12.16 8.12 20.28
FR 1990 801.74 1,089.85 1,891.59 16.38 25.26 41.64
FR 2000 1,358.75 296.31 1,655.06 25.19 9.56 34.75
FR 2010 437.39 295.50 732.88 8.07 9.51 17.58
IT 1970 0.00 2,312.95 2,312.95 0.00 45.00 45.00
IT 1980 21.64 277.77 299.42 3.09 6.76 9.85
IT 1990 1,174.21 24.40 1,198.61 29.73 1.18 30.91
IT 2010 637.43 547.87 1,043.83 26.93 14.56 33.60
NL 1970 0.00 470.55 470.55 0.00 12.22 12.22
NL 1980 0.00 866.57 866.57 0.00 9.20 9.20
NL 1990 120.48 108.98 229.47 2.41 3.91 6.32
NL 2000 562.84 513.06 1,075.91 8.64 22.92 31.56
NL 2010 631.90 183.98 815.88 12.21 3.34 15.56
SE 1970 0.00 258.61 258.61 0.00 3.03 3.03
SE 1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SE 1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SE 2000 73.24 0.00 73.24 2.44 0.00 2.44
SE 2010 233.81 207.00 440.81 4.42 11.11 15.53
UK 1970 211.55 1,462.64 1,674.18 4.55 16.22 20.76
UK 1980 438.28 720.21 1,158.50 5.93 5.33 11.25
UK 1990 290.81 972.61 1,263.42 1.83 9.06 10.89
UK 2000 516.37 454.48 970.85 4.40 12.85 17.25
UK 2010 1,093.86 472.82 1,566.68 9.77 13.24 23.02
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levels for the two types of populism are almost identical, and this might point to 
a new change of scenario in the future.
When taking into consideration not only the amount of populism in party 
manifestos at the country level but also the degree of radicalism of the parties 
as well as their electoral performance (Figure 5.4) – in other words, the social 
acceptability (Salonfähigkeit) of populist discourses – the picture that emerges 
somehow discredits the idea of a populist surge. Once again, populism increases 
over time but not dramatically. The downfall in the 2000s, in particular, is dif-
ficult to explain given the steady increase in the decades preceding and following 
the 2000s (although this phenomenon does not occur with the operationaliza-
tion based on co-occurrence, see Figure A10.3).2 Moreover, similarly to what 
observed in Figure 5.2, left-wing populism is more acceptable in the 1970s and 
1980s, while right-wing populism shows a higher acceptability in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Finally, the levels of both types of populism converge in the 2010s 
elections.
Once again, by comparing the data of populism with or without considering 
degree of radicalism and electoral results, it appears that the total amount of pop-
ulism for the last elections is unprecedented in absolute terms (Figure 5.3), but 
this is not evident when considering its social acceptability (Figure 5.4). While 
party manifestos contain more and more populist statements over time, the social 
Figure 5.3 Average Populism per Country (Percentage)
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acceptability of populism does not rise as steadily. This is consistent with the 
trend observed from the comparison of average levels of populism at the mani-
festo level (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
The results of the content analysis signal that while populist discourses are 
increasingly present in public debates and elections, their social acceptability finds 
some sort of resistance. Researchers on populism might have overestimated the 
electoral results of parties proposing populist messages, as well as their degree of 
radicalism. Including data that go beyond the electoral dimension of populism 
makes one think that liberal democratic systems reward radical populist ideas of 
power less than expected.
This might also indicate that parties articulating populist discourses are becom-
ing less and less radical or, in other words, more mainstream. Indeed, if one con-
siders only the 68 manifestos with at least 5% of populist statements, the average 
value of radicalism (on a scale from 1–6) was 3.1 in the 1970s, 3 in the 1980s, 3.2 
in the 1990s, 2.8 in the 2000s, and down to 2.7 in the 2010s.
These data point to three important consideration. First, it is difficult to 
understand how the globalization and mediatization of politics influence the 
levels of populism in party manifestos and, in particular, their social acceptability. 
The predicted rise in levels of populism from the 1990s appears in the findings 
Figure 5.4 Average Populism per Country (Weighted)
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but is less evident than expected especially when it comes to social acceptability.3 
One could argue that these mechanisms bear a stronger explanatory power in 
relation to right-wing populism only, but, in this case, the effect is not par-
ticularly visible. Second, although most of the literature focuses on right-wing 
parties, populism is more present in the manifestos of left-wing parties and has 
been for a longer time; this aspect should be investigated with greater attention. 
Third, while populism seems to grow over time, it is better to interpret it as a 
somewhat cyclical phenomenon since its levels and its social acceptability go up 
and down over time.
The pervasiveness of populist messages might appear more vividly if one would 
consider also the post-2015 elections (not included in this study). In Sweden, 
Germany, and Italy, for example, the electoral performances of populist and (rela-
tively) radical parties seem to indicate that the social acceptability of (especially 
right-, but also left-wing) populism reached unprecedented new heights. Collec-
tive memories of the fascist past will resonate even stronger in case liberal democ-
racies in Western Europe continue their process of populistization. However, it 
would not be wise to speculate further in this direction since the data available in 
this study do not include the most recent elections.
The remainder of this chapter presents the results of the content analysis coun-
try by country in alphabetical order, describing which parties have consistently 
articulated populist discourses in their manifestos and whether this is in line 
with the relevant literature. Each section discusses the levels of right- and left-
wing, as well as overall populism. While providing examples of populist sentences 
extracted from the party manifestos would help the reader understand what type 
of messages the different political parties send, this is unfortunately impossible. 
Mother-tongue coders have analyzed manifestos written in several languages 
(not all known by the author). Providing examples for some countries but not 
others seems unfair and counterproductive. For those interested in reading the 
manifestos, most of them are available on the database of the Manifesto Project 
(Lehmann et al. 2016).
Austria
Several factors are often used to explain the Systemverdrossenheit (alienation and 
hostility to those in power), and consequently the success, of populist parties in 
Austria: e.g., ‘partocracy’ (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), cartel politics (Müller 
2002), lack of transparency, the structure of the proportional system (Heinisch 
2002), and, in general, a process of de-alignment of the electorate.
In particular, the literature points to the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitli-
che Partei Österreichs – FPÖ) as one of the main examples of a populist party. 
The reason for its success seems to be in line with expectations; in Austria, 
the collective memory of the fascist past is one of victimization (Chapter 6). 
Indeed, as Heinisch argues, Austria’s unapologetic stance regarding its role 
during World War II “allowed the party to take political advantage when many 
Austrians were irritated by international criticism that the country had not 
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come to terms with its culpability in World War II and the Holocaust – particu-
larly during the ‘Waldheim affair’ in 1986” (2002, 70–71).
In a similar vein, Bischof and Pelinka claim that the FPÖ, which was founded 
in the 1950s by former Nazi and SS officers, offered representation to German 
nationalists who ended up being the political losers of post-war Austria (1997). 
Quite unsurprisingly, “the FPÖ’s political opponents have indeed claimed that its 
policy proposals conflict with those values central to liberal democracies” (Müller 
2002, 173).
Its former leader, Jörg Haider – who died in a car crash in 2008 – insisted 
that the Austrian nation was an ideological miscarriage. Tellingly, Haider 
was born in Carinthia, considered Austrian’s stronghold of pan-German 
 nationalist thinking. In 2005, Haider split from the FPÖ and founded a new 
political formation called Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft 
Österreich – BZÖ).
The BZÖ is usually considered a populist radical right party, but since it failed 
to cross the electoral threshold in 2013, it is not included in the content analy-
sis. Finally, the short-lived Team Stronach, launched by the millionaire Frank 
Stronach and dissolved in September 2017, was supposed to articulate a populist 
discourse based on Euroscepticism and anti-bureaucracy when it participated in 
the 2013 elections (Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn 2016).
The content analysis on party manifestos confirms that the FPÖ is highly popu-
list. Its 2013 manifesto is one of the most populist of the whole corpus (21%), 
and the 1994 manifesto is above average as well (10.6%). However, in the 1970s 
and 2000s, the manifesto of FPÖ was either not particularly or not at all populist. 
This speaks volumes about the importance of conceptually differentiate radical 
and populist ideologies since they do not necessarily overlap. To remain on the 
right-wing side, the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP) 
also articulated populist messages on a consistent basis (almost 12% in 2013), 
while Team Stronach and NEOS show above-average levels of populism in their 
manifestos for 2013. Also on the left-wing side, both mainstream and new left-
wing parties emerge as extremely populist over time. With the exception of 2002, 
the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ) 
articulated high levels of populism in its manifestos (with 15.5% in the 1980s), 
as did the Green Party (Die Grünen). Overall, Austrian party manifestos appear 
to contain particularly high levels of populism. Figure 5.5 presents the levels of 
populism’s social acceptability for each country in grey, with the levels for Austria 
highlighted in black.
Concerning right-wing populism’s social acceptability, Austria has always 
shown very high levels. More particularly, while in 1994 and especially in 2013 
the levels are above average, the 2002 levels are notably low compared to the 
other decades.4 Concerning left-wing populism’s acceptability, the levels dur-
ing the elections of 2002 are once again exceptionally low, but the levels are 
extremely high in the 1970s and 1980s. The other two elections points show 
levels of populism in line with (1994) and above average (2013), as compared to 
the other countries.
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France
In France, the link between monarchism and fascist tendencies was already estab-
lished before World War II; the factor cementing the union was the fascination 
for “an authoritarian order with anti-capitalist, anti-market sentiments” which 
kept together Catholic, populist, and Bonapartist movements (Kitschelt and 
McGann 1995, 92). These traits were at the basis of Vichy France, which, under 
Philippe Pétain, collaborated with the Nazis from 1940 to 1944.5
In the 1950s, the Poujadist movement, founded by Pierre Poujade, continued 
on this track combining anti-capitalism and authoritarianism. It peaked at the 
1956 elections when it achieved almost 13% of the vote share (under the name 
Union et fraternité française); for a brief moment, it seemed to constitute a seri-
ous threat to the very foundations of the French Republic (Eatwell 1982). In the 
1950s, the process of memory-building was still fluid; therefore, it is difficult to 
Figure 5.5 Populism in Austria
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identify the type of mainstream collective memory developed shortly after World 
War II. However, it might not be a coincidence that this type of movement was 
successful also (with the Common Man’s Front) in Italy – another country char-
acterized by a collective memory based on victimization (see Chapter 6).
The Poujadist experience, often labeled as populist (Winock 1997), was 
important also because the French populist par excellence – Jean-Marie Le Pen – 
started his career as a national delegate of Poujade’s movement. Le Pen’s party, 
the National Front (Front National – FN) was founded in 1972, and it was able 
to unite a fragmented right. It was not particularly successful in the 1970s but 
increasingly so from the 1980s. Kitschelt linked the party’s success to two fac-
tors: on the one hand, it abandoned the anti-capitalist approach of Poujadisme; 
on the other hand – as a reaction to the movement of 1968 – it showed that it 
was possible to have a new right-wing ideology beyond the traditional extreme 
right.6 While ethno-nationalism remained a core message of the party, other 
issues have been more or less relevant in the party’s message over time, such as 
anti- communism, anti-immigration, and welfare chauvinism (van Kessel 2015b).
Moreover, the party always maintained a strong anti-establishment stance in its 
discourses, calling the establishment “a nomenklatura that pursues its own inter-
ests at the expenses of the national good” (Flood 1998, 28) while claiming to be 
“the only force to defend the people,” the “ordinary folk,” and the “excluded” 
(Balent 2013, 177).
The structural reasons associated with the success of the FN and other popu-
list movements in France usually include the dissolution of the two major par-
ties blocs, media attention, and the strategic response of the established parties 
(Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 96 ff.). Rydgren mentions also political alienation 
and discontent and argues that although ethno-nationalism has re-emerged peri-
odically in France, it was not electorally successful before the FN because extreme 
right parties usually endorsed elements of the Nazi ideology (2008a). Surel argues 
that the new Constitution from 1958 and its focus on the people can be con-
sidered as a condition for the re-emergence of populism in France, as well as 
economic difficulties, financial scandals, and the end of the traditional alignment 
across parties and within voters (2002, 144).
The impact of the FN on French politics goes beyond its electoral performance. 
For example, Surel argues that in 1995 even Jacques Chirac “pursued the strat-
egy of embracing a number of populist themes and ideas in order to create a 
space within the party system and to establish himself as the alternative candidate” 
(2002, 149). Similarly, Mondon identifies Sarkozy as being among those who 
followed the FN’s message by trying to present himself as “the candidate of the 
people against the elite” (2014, 306). In other words, themes and messages typi-
cal of the French extreme right have been exploited by mainstream parties as well.
The FN survived both a split (2007) and the replacement of Jean-Marie by his 
daughter Marine (2011). In 2017, Marine Le Pen reached the second round at the 
presidential elections like her father did in 2002, while the party (recently re-branded 
Rassemblement National) continued its process of dédiabolisation trying to distance 
itself from political extremism and anti-Semitism (Crépon, Dézé, and Mayer 2015).
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The content analysis confirms that the FN articulates populist messages in 
its party manifestos but not as much as it was expected. The level in 1995 is 
above average (5.9% of populist statements), and in 2002 it is definitely high 
(10.4%), but surprisingly it drops in 2012 (1.7%).7 This does not mean that 
France is alien to populist discourses. To the contrary, the analysis reveals that 
the mainstream right-wing party Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour 
la République – RPR)8 has been consistently populist: from the 1970s to the 
1990s, the levels of populism in its manifestos have been very high (12.6%, 
12.2%, and 6.1%). It merged into the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 
of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2002 and continued to show traces of populism (2.9% 
and 2.5%). Even the moderate and rather centrist Union for French Democracy 
(UDF) in the 1990s and 2000s showed high (4.4%) and very high (12%) levels 
of populism, thus confirming that also the mainstream parties in France articu-
late populist discourses.
Figure 5.6 Populism in France
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Similarly, mainstream parties on the left are prone to articulate highly populist 
messages, as the case of the Socialists (PS) illustrates. For the 1970s, their mani-
festo shows a very high 15.3% of populism (thus being the most populist of the 
French manifestos analyzed), and it constantly remained populist over time (2.3% 
in the 1980s, 13.9% in the 1990s, 7.9% in the 200s, and still 2.1% in 2012).
Concerning the non-mainstream left, the Communist Party (PCF), which 
shared the manifesto of the PS in the 1970s, also remained populist over time. 
Workers’ Struggle (Lutte Ouvrière – LO), the Left Front (Front de Gauche – 
FdG), and The Greens (Europe Écologie Les Verts – EELV) also show high 
levels of populism but, paradoxically, less than the mainstream left.
Concerning right-wing populism’s social acceptability, France shows very high 
levels. The trend over time, however, goes against the general one; in fact, there is 
decreasing populism in right-wing party manifestos since the 1990s. With regard to 
left-wing populism’s acceptability, the levels are rather high, but there is a consist-
ent decrease over time. Figure 5.6 presents the levels of populism’s social accept-
ability for each country in grey, with the levels for France highlighted in black.
Germany
Germany is a country with a collective memory based on culpabilization (see 
Chapter 6), and this is reflected in the historically poor electoral performance 
and credibility of populist parties. The Historikerstreit, the controversy about 
the past, spanned the years 1986–1989 and concerned the nature (uniqueness 
or comparability) of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. This already 
signals how Germany was the only country working through its past, taking full 
responsibility for its actions and making amends, thus generating a strong stigma 
that was always a major disadvantage for right-wing populist actors.
The social stigma appears very clearly, for example, when examining the case of 
the Republicans (Die Republikaner – REP), an extreme right party quite popular 
during the 1980s and 1990s founded by Franz Schönhuber (former Waffen-SS). 
The Republikaner demanded the decriminalization of the German past because 
they argued that Germany should no longer be reduced to Auschwitz and the 
gas chambers. The party used the widespread resentments associated with the 
process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung and suggested that Germany should hence 
historicize its Nazi legacy and be a normal country (Betz 2002, 200). This sug-
gestion, however, was heavily criticized, and the party never entered parliament, 
consistently losing votes over time.
More generally, after 1949, Germany never saw the emergence of legislators of a 
Nazi successor organization, contrary to what happened, for example, in Italy and 
Austria. Since international vigilance was focused primarily on Germany, the new 
German democratic regime was forced to “exercise more political control when 
successor organizations of the Nazi party attempted to stage a comeback than 
the Italian postwar governments when facing neofascist movements” (Kitschelt 
and McGann 1995, 205). All the other extreme right parties failed to capture 
any significant vote share. For example, the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei 
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Deutschlands – National Democratic Party) never made it into the Bundestag, 
and the law-and-order Schill Party (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive) failed to 
expand nationally after having performed exceptionally well in Hamburg in 2001.
This has been true until very recently, at least until the creation of Alterna-
tive for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland – AfD). It began in 2013 as a 
bourgeois party founded by a group of Eurosceptic professors, but over time it 
proposed increasingly radical and anti-democratic ideas. Since 2019, AfD most 
extreme members are observed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (BfV, Germany’s domestic security agency). One of them, Björn 
Höcke, called for a 180-degree U-turn in Germany’s politics of remembrance, and 
this is particularly relevant because now AfD sits as the main opposition party in 
the Bundestag (at the 2017 elections, they obtained 94 seats with 12.6% of the 
votes). Without any doubt, AfD it is the most successful party to the right of 
CDU since World War II, and its success is a systemic shock and potential critical 
juncture in Germany’s collective memory.9
Although Germany seemed to show the right conditions for populism to thrive, 
right-wing populist parties were never successful (with the partial exception of AfD 
in last elections). In the 1980s, post-industrial transformations and a growing 
number of asylum-seekers seemed to offer the perfect opportunity structure, but 
in the 1990s, the emergence of right-wing populist parties “was constrained by 
the long-term historical legacy of Germany’s Nazi past” (Kitschelt and McGann 
1995, 221). In Germany, the process of European integration, which is normally 
associated with the success of populism, was not perceived as a threat to national 
identity and sovereignty. On the contrary, even left-wing intellectuals argued that 
it would have represented a complement to the national identity which might 
“release Germany from the legacy of the real trauma, the disastrous attempt to 
realize the utopia of völkish nationalism under Hitler” (Trägårdh 2002, 103).
Among the reasons for the weakness of right-wing populism in Germany, 
Decker identifies the institutional framework and political opportunity structures 
but also “the historical burden that weighs on Germany’s political culture.” In his 
words, the Nazi past and the way it was re-elaborated created “a deeper stigma 
attached to right-wing extremism in Germany than in any other European coun-
try” (2008, 125).
The content analysis confirms that Germany has low levels of populism and 
that no purely “populist” party ever collected more than 5% of the vote share. For 
this reason, none of the Republican or NPD manifestos have been coded, while 
the AfD almost made it in 2013 (Arzheimer 2015) and entered the parliament 
at the next elections in 2017 (not included in the analysis).10 The content analy-
sis shows, therefore, that only mainstream parties such as the Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) articulate populist 
discourses in their manifestos. However, the levels are usually way below the aver-
age (with an interesting exception in the 1980s, which, however, is not included 
in the following analysis).11
The situation changes completely when analyzing left-wing manifestos. In 
this case, populist discourses are present in both mainstream and niche party 
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manifestos. More importantly, the levels are constantly in line with other coun-
tries presenting very high levels of populism. Indeed, the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) consistently articulated populist discourses in its manifestos from the 
1970s, with exceptionally high levels in the 1980s (29.2%) and 2010s (19.2%). 
The same applies to the Green Party (Grüne), which has articulated populist 
discourses since the 1980s but scores exceptionally high in the 2010s (29.6%). 
The Left (Die Linke) in the 2010s presented an extremely populist manifesto as 
well (20.8%).
Germany usually has high levels of left-wing populism; in 2013, the amount of 
left-wing populism is actually the highest recorded in a single country. This seems 
to imply that the collective stigmatization of the Nazi past does not affect left-
wing German parties. Decker is probably right when he argues that Die Linke 
“is immune in every respect to any suspicion of fascism” despite its roots in the 
ruling socialist party of the German Democratic Republic. Therefore, Die Linke 
Figure 5.7 Populism in Germany
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can now address issues and resort to methods “that are normally associated with 
right-wing populism” (Decker 2008, 134).
The opposite scenario appears as soon as one considers only populism in right-
wing party manifestos and their social acceptability. As Figure 5.7 shows, Ger-
many (black line) – with the partial exception of the 1980s – constantly scores 
way below the average for the other countries for the social acceptability of right-
wing populism.12 The already low levels of the 1990s continued dropping in the 
2000s and in the 2010s. Moreover, it is not possible to argue that mainstream 
parties incorporated populist issues over time because there is no right-wing pop-
ulism at all in the 2010s manifestos (unique case).
Overall, it seems safe to assume that the stigma associated with the Nazi past 
plays a crucial role in blocking right-wing populist parties, while this is not the 
case for left-wing parties. Possibly, the stigma associated with the Nazi past works 
in only one direction and leaves untouched the cultural opportunity structure 
for left-wing populism to thrive. This might be the case because the Nazi past 
resonates strongly with new radical right parties but not with the full ideology 
articulated by left-wing parties, and it will be discussed in the next chapters.
Italy
The historic development of populism in Italy has been completely different 
from the German case and much more similar to the French and Austrian ones, 
with whom Italy indeed shares a collective memory based on victimization 
(see Chapter 6). Immediately after the end of World War II, the Italian Social 
Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano – MSI) was founded by supporters of 
Benito Mussolini. The party was highly nostalgic of the fascist ventennio, and it 
could not adapt to the changing political scenario in the 1990s (Kitschelt and 
McGann 1995). Under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini, the MSI transformed 
itself into a more modern, post-fascist movement: National Alliance (Alleanza 
Nazionale – AN).
The party, after the “Fiuggi turning point”, could finally present itself as fully 
democratic. This opened the doors to all the three coalition governments led by 
Silvio Berlusconi together with the Northern League (Lega Nord – LN). National 
Alliance eventually merged into the People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà – 
PdL) in 2009. Northern League, on the other hand, remained an independent 
party and continued its own transformation. Born as Liga Veneta and then Liga 
Lombarda, from the 1990s they presented themselves as a populist movement 
of protest and identity (Taguieff 1995).13 However, they eventually became a 
national party insisting mainly on issues such as immigration and Euroscepti-
cism but less and less on issues concerning regionalism and separatism. In other 
words, the party first “re-opened a centre-periphery cleavage which was never 
completely sealed” (Tarchi 2008, 87) but then became a more traditional far 
right populist party focusing on immigration and law enforcement.
In Italy, populism seems to be so widespread that even Silvio Berlusconi – 
the most mainstream of the populist actors and charismatic leader of Go Italy14 
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(Forza Italia – FI) – continued throughout his career to depict himself as the 
embodiment of the popular will against the corrupt political parties, the Com-
munists, the judiciary system, and the mass media. It is quite hard to imagine 
Berlusconi as a man of the street, given the fact that for several decades he has 
consistently remained among the richest persons in Italy. However,
paternalistic and reassuring, Berlusconi never misses an opportunity to pro-
claim himself as the interpreter and defender of the popular will. . . . ‘Abstract 
principles’ and ‘complicated ideologies’ are, therefore, explicitly banned 
from Forza Italia which must remain ‘a movement’ and expresses an open 
‘aversion to party politics.’
(Tarchi 2008, 93)15
Anti-establishment positions; discourses against political, economic, and media 
elites; appeals to popular sovereignty, post-fascist and regionalist movements: 
Italy seems to represent the perfect thriving ground for populist actors (Zanatta 
2002). Indeed, many scholars pointed to a multiplicity of reasons for this: e.g. 
‘partocracy’ and ideological convergence (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), as well 
as public disaffection and cynicism with the political system (Betz 1994) – traits 
which emerged in the 1940s with the populist movement Common Man’s Front 
(L’Uomo Qualunque), similar in many regards to the Poujadist movement in 
France (Setta 2005).16 The general discontent was fueled by, among other things, 
one of the most notorious corruption scandals of the twentieth century: Bribesville 
(Morlino and Tarchi 1996). Between 1992 and 1994, all the previously existing 
political parties disappeared (apart from the Northern League), and after ten years 
of pentapartito led by the Christian Democrats, the first Republic collapsed leav-
ing the stage for the success of Berlusconi in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as Lega 
and Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S) in recent years.17
However, despite all the favourable conditions for the success of populist dis-
courses, the content analysis shows that the social acceptability of populism in Italy 
is less outstanding than expected (Figure 5.8, black line). Moreover, it was not pos-
sible to measure the levels of populism in 2001 given the special conditions of those 
elections: because of the complex electoral law adopted at the time (the so-called 
“Mattarellum”), the parties had to form broad coalitions rather than participating 
alone. Hence, the single parties did not even write separate manifestos in that occa-
sion. Again, it is important to remember that the values for 2001 are reported as 
zero but they are actually missing data (the same applies to right-wing populism in 
the 1970s since most of the manifestos were not found). Therefore, the only two 
time points considered in the following analysis will be 1994 and 2013.
The results of the content analysis offer contrasting insights. While populism is 
present in each manifesto of right-wing parties, the levels are often not very high. 
For example, populism does not emerge “as the basic feature in the programs 
and communicative style of Forza Italia” (Tarchi 2008, 133).18 In both 1994 
and 2013, Berlusconi’s party articulated some populist messages in its manifestos 
(1.7% and 5.9%) but with much lower levels compared to other parties typically 
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referred to as populist. In this sense, it is possible to concur with McDonnel’s 
argument that Berlusconi’s parties might be personal rather than populist (2013).
The fact that even the manifesto of Civic Choice (Scelta Civica – SC), the 
party founded by the former technocratic Prime Minister Mario Monti, scored 
an astonishing 13.1% in 2013 speaks volumes about the unexpected levels for 
Berlusconi’s party. The manifestos of National Alliance and Northern League 
in 1994 both show traces of populism (7.4% and 5.3%), which is not low but is 
again below expectations. However, it is crucial to observe that each and every 
one of the eighteen coded manifestos contains traces of populism, meaning that 
right-wing populist discourses in Italy have always been largely acceptable, no 
matter its degree of radicalism and electoral success.
Left-wing party manifestos were highly populist in the 1970s, with a remark-
able 40% for the Socialist Party (which can, however, be explained with the five 
Figure 5.8 Populism in Italy
92 Populism in eight West European countries
total coded statements) and – to a lesser extent – with the Communist Party, 
which scored 5% and 1.7% in the 1970s and 1980s. The Democratic Party (PD) 
led by Matteo Renzi scores 6.7% in 2013, in line with the PDS (PD’s predeces-
sor, the Democratic Party of the Left), which scored 7.5% in the 1990s.19 The 
Five Star Movement, which is coded as both right- and left-wing because it is the 
only unclassifiable party in the sample, scores 7.9% in 2013.20 This value is not 
astonishing per se, but it is comparatively high since it is the third most populist 
manifesto coded for Italy.
Concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, Italy follows expec-
tations, especially in 1994, whereas the 2013 levels are lower than expected.21 
The trend is similar for the levels of left-wing populism: they are relatively low 
in 1994, but closer to the average in 2013. Overall, it is possible to claim that, 
compared to the expectations generated by the relevant literature and taking into 
consideration the collective memory based on victimization, Italy shows lower 
levels of populism, but, on the other hand, every party in Italy seems to articulate 
populist messages to a certain extent.
Netherlands
Concerning supply- and demand-side factors for populism, the Netherlands is 
probably the most interesting case among the eight countries included in this 
study. Here populism seems to be articulated mainly by flamboyant personalities 
able to exploit a favourable political-institutional context, such as Pim Fortuyn, 
Geert Wilders, or Thierry Baudet. The perfectly proportional system and the 
fragmented party system, combined with economic stagnation and immigration 
(Lucardie 2008), are supposed to create a mix of favourable socio-economic and 
political-institutional factors, but the success of populist actors has always been 
discontinuous in the country. This is even more puzzling given the country’s col-
lective memory based on cancellation (see Chapter 6), but the limited success of 
populist actors might be linked to deeper traits of the country’s political culture, 
such as liberalism and multiculturalism.
In 2002, Pim Fortuyn was among the most notable exceptions to the elec-
toral failure of populist actors in the Netherlands. A former Marxist and member 
of the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid – PvdA), his movement gained 17% 
of the vote share, partly due to the emotional situation provoked by Fortuyn’s 
assassination 10 days before the elections.22 In 2006, the list of Pim Fortuyn did 
not gain any seat (only 0.2% of the votes), but Geert Wilders, founder of the 
one-man Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid – PVV) and former VVD 
member (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie), gained six seats and replaced 
Fortuyn’s list in the parliament.
While Fortuyn’s former party Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) 
disappeared very quickly, Wilders continued the populist discourse centred on 
restoring democracy and returning the power to the people, while appealing to 
the “ordinary people” even more explicitly (van Kessel 2015a). In 2010, Wilders 
received a surprising 15.5% of the vote share (entering also a short-lived coalition 
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government). In 2019, a new populist actor made his appearance on the national 
stage: by winning the most votes in provincial elections, Forum for Democracy 
(Forum voor Democratie – FvD) – founded in 2016 – obtained two seats in the 
House of Representatives. Thierry Baudet, the current party leader, presented 
himself as a political outsider that wished to lead the attack on what was consist-
ently called the ‘political cartel,’ and he declared that his political views have been 
influenced by two events: the September 11 attacks and the assassination of Pim 
Fortuyn.
Beyond the occasional presence of right-wing parties based on charismatic 
leadership, the electoral results of populist actors have never been particularly 
striking when compared to other European countries. Moreover, another pecu-
liarity of Dutch right-wing populists is their relatively liberal attitude towards 
cultural issues such as the emancipation of women and gay people (Inglehart and 
Andeweg 1993). Pim Fortuyn – who was openly gay himself – was concerned 
Figure 5.9 Populism in the Netherlands
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about the preservation of Dutch liberal values, and Wilders, too, embraces liberal 
values and stresses how Islam threatens them (Akkerman 2005).
On the left, populist discourses have been initially more socially accepted than 
right-wing ones. Indeed, during the 1970s and 1980s, populist discourses were 
articulated almost exclusively by left-wing parties such as the Labour Party. The 
Socialist Party (SP) is another case usually associated with populism, although it is 
included in the analysis only from the 2000s, by which time it had toned down its 
radicalism and dropped references to its communist past (March 2011). Before 
2002, it never reached 5% of the vote share; in 2006, it obtained its best result so 
far, with 16.6% of the votes. Indeed, its two analyzed manifestos contain medium 
(4.7% in 2002) and low (0.7% in 2012) levels of populism.
Overall, according to the content analysis illustrated in Figure 5.9, the 
Netherlands (black line) represent a borderline case, and often it is difficult 
to classify the country and determine whether populist discourses are socially 
acceptable or not. Concerning right-wing populism, it shows high acceptabil-
ity in 2002 and 2012, when, as well as Fortuyn and Wilders, the mainstream 
VVD and the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl – 
CDA) articulated populist discourses. In 1994, however, the levels were par-
ticularly low.23 Left-wing populism was exceptionally acceptable in the 1970s 
and 1980s but much less so in the 1990s and 2010s (in line with the general 
trend). On the other hand, in 2002, when all four left-wing parties articulated 
populism in their manifestos, the country has the highest levels of left-wing 
populism amongst all countries.
Sweden
When dealing with populism in Western Europe, Sweden always represents 
an exceptional case (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Dahlström and Esaiasson 
2013). Indeed, Sweden is often labelled as a negative case: despite favourable 
conditions for the presence of populism, and while all comparable countries 
on the continent (and in the region) witness the growing success of populist 
actors, in Sweden there is virtually no trace of populism. This has been substan-
tially true over several decades, but as the 2018 elections showed, it is time to 
consider that Sweden might no longer be a negative case (Rydgren and van der 
Meiden 2018).
Sweden’s exceptionalism has always been linked to its political culture. 
Developed by the Social Democrats, the core concept of ‘people’s home’ 
(Folkhemmet) has merged demos and ethnos into one concept, hence creating 
a strong link between being Swedish and being democratic (Trägårdh 2002, 
77). This approach allowed the Social Democrats (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska 
Arbetareparti) to fight the national socialist appeal of the Nazis by declining 
concepts revolving around the idea of folk (and not klass, after 1929) in a 
democratic way. By studying the national political culture of the country, it is 
possible to find several other reasons why Nazi groups in Sweden were never 
successful, and this might explain why, despite its collective memory based on 
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cancellation, in the 1970s and 1980s the country never experienced high lev-
els of populism and eventually developed a memory based on culpabilization 
(Chapter 6).
For example, Sweden – together with Switzerland – claimed to have the most 
ancient tradition of popular rule, and the tradition of nation-statism became cen-
tral after the war, contrary to Germany, where civil society became the key figure 
of the new state. Moreover, concepts such as ‘national community’ have been 
invested with positive connotations because in the collective memory they are 
linked to the resolution of the political and social crisis of the 1930s. The process 
of nationalization went hand in hand with the concept of welfare and solidarity, 
thus gaining a positive connotation.
The “lucrative neutrality” the country decided to adopt during World War II 
(Colla 2002) was never fully investigated, and the country decided to impose 
upon itself a ‘silent treatment’ of the issue and to describe itself as a ‘moral super-
power,’ always on the side of the oppressed, thus protecting the purity of the 
Folkhemmet (Dahl 2006). Nonetheless, Sweden apparently did not need to fully 
acknowledge its responsibility in order to develop a strong stigma attached to the 
fascist past. Other characteristics of the country’s political culture can probably 
help to explain the Swedish approach to populism.
Kitschelt and McGann suggest that the lack of a credible far-right in Sweden 
is linked to historical events and to the country’s unique political organization 
(Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 124):
[I]n Scandinavia there was little basis for a strong antidemocratic fascist 
mobilization in the Great Depression of the late 1920s. The German occupa-
tion of Norway and Denmark during World War II and the puppet regimes 
set up by the Nazi state further discredited right-wing mobilization after the 
war and prevented any kind of extremist mass appeal.
However, while this is true for Sweden, it was not the case for Denmark and 
Norway, where extreme right-wing parties have been relatively successful since 
the 1970s (Betz 1994).
One party which is usually labelled as populist might have not been included 
in the content analysis: New Democracy (Ny Demokrati). It gained 6.7% of 
the vote share in 1991, while for the 1990s in Sweden, the 1994 election has 
been selected. Considered as a typical anti-establishment right-wing party, New 
Democracy was launched in 1991 by two media personalities but rapidly disap-
peared and never repeated its first electoral endeavour.
In general, as Figure 5.10 clearly shows, populism in Sweden is almost non-exist-
ent and therefore unacceptable. Only 5 out of 29 analyzed manifestos show any 
trace of populism, and 3 of them are from the 2014 elections. The manifesto of the 
Moderate Party contains very low levels of populism (0.6%), while the manifestos 
of the Sweden Democrats in 2014 (3.8%), the Christian Democrats in 2002 (2.4%), 
and the Centre Party in the 1970s (3%) contain average amounts of populism. The 
only clearly populist manifesto is the Green Party’s manifesto of 2014 (11.1%).
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As already mentioned, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna – SD) 
articulate populist messages in their manifesto, but the levels seem to be rather 
low compared to the manifestos of other right-wing populist parties.24 From the 
second half of the 1990s, they tried to build a respectable façade and break their 
links with fascism (Rydgren 2008b); this translated to better electoral perfor-
mances. Indeed, the Sweden Democrats polled the third most vote share at the 
2014 and 2018 elections, with 12.9% and over 17.5%, although they have been 
participating in elections since 1988.
This shows that a party proposing anti-immigration policies might now exploit 
the existing socio-cultural situation. Rydgren and van der Meiden (2018) link the 
recent success of the Sweden Democrats to four elements that characterized the 
country’s political scenario in the last decade. Class politics declined, the immi-
gration issue gained salience, the mainstream parties increasingly converged on 
Figure 5.10 Populism in Sweden
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the socioeconomic dimension, and the SD have distanced itself from its own 
cumbersome past in order to build a more respectable façade.
It is remarkable, however, that despite political discontent, alienation, declin-
ing party identification, and de-alignment and re-alignment processes providing 
favourable political opportunity structures for emerging populist parties, pop-
ulism has been absent in Sweden until very recently. Since the 1990s, the country 
has not displayed high levels of populism on either the left or the right. This is a 
unique case among the eight countries analyzed. It remains to be seen whether 
the favourable conditions will eventually allow populism to thrive in Sweden as 
pointed out by Rydgren: “First, widespread xenophobia exists in Sweden. . . . 
Second, Sweden has a high level of political distrust in and discontent with politi-
cal parties and other political institutions. . . . Third, there is possibly potential 
for an emerging RRP party to exploit anti-EU sentiments” (2002, 48). So far, 
this does not seem to be the case, and populism remains largely unacceptable. 
However, recent developments might indicate that the electoral success of the 
SD, like the success of AfD in Germany, marked a new era in the country’s politi-
cal culture.
Switzerland
The Swiss Confederation is often portrayed as a populist paradise because the 
peculiar features of the country’s political system and culture make “the gap 
between democracy and populism . . . very narrow, since self-determination and 
participation are part of the Swiss democratic system” (Albertazzi 2008, 102). 
In other words, the Swiss political system, based on direct democratic elements, 
already leans towards a populist democracy. This means that political-institutional 
conditions have always been favourable for the presence of populism. Mecha-
nisms such as consociationalism and direct democracy produce a constant bottom-
up pressure on policy-making processes and in general on the established parties 
(Kriesi 2005). Moreover, the Swiss political culture is based on concepts such 
as self-government, participation, neutrality, and localism, which, over time, also 
produced different forms of discrimination for the new minorities (Albertazzi 
2008). Finally, its type of collective memory, based on cancellation, is supposed 
not to block populism (Chapter 6).
The history of political movements and parties considered as populist is there-
fore quite dynamic. Between the 1960s and 1980s, two anti-foreigner movements 
were rather widespread: National Action – now Swiss Democrats (Schweizer 
Demokraten – SD) – and the Republican Movement, which dissolved in 1989 
when most of its members joined the Federal Democratic Union (Eidgenössisch-
Demokratische Union – EDU). Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, 
the Automobile Party (Autopartei) and the Swiss Democrats were quite success-
ful thanks to their message against established parties and state bureaucracy. In 
1991, the Ticino League (Lega dei Ticinesi) was founded, exploiting the center – 
periphery cleavage and claiming to represent the interests of the common people 
against environmentalists, the state, and the political establishment (Betz 1994). 
98 Populism in eight West European countries
However, none of these parties collected more than 5% of the votes during the 
1970s or 1980s.
Populism started becoming part of mainstream politics in Switzerland from the 
1990s, and populism in Switzerland nowadays means Swiss People’s Party (Sch-
weizerische Volkspartei – SVP), not only in terms of electoral results but also in 
terms of organization and funding (Bornschier 2010; Zaslove 2012). The party 
was formed in 1971 following a merger of the Party of Farmers, Traders and 
Independents, and the Democratic Party. It was only from the 1990s, however, 
that the party started a process of radicalization, following the Zürich party-
branch led by Christoph Blocher, eventually transforming into a radical right 
populist party (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015).
In line with the SVP’s campaigns, and in fact led by Blocher himself from 1986 
to 2003, the organization “Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzer-
land” is highly active in launching and opposing referenda. Among other things, 
the organization founded by Blocher and Otto Fischer from the Free Demo-
cratic Party (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei – FDP) campaigned to maintain 
the Swiss military, opposed Switzerland joining the EU, and campaigned to end 
“mass immigration.”
The SVP is the leading party in terms of vote share since 2003; in 2015, it 
obtained its best result with almost 30% of the votes. In 2005, the Geneva Cit-
izens’ Movement was founded, but like other Swiss populist movements, they 
barely manage to obtain a seat in the parliament. The SVP, on the other hand, 
changed the Swiss magic formula, the unofficial way of dividing the seven execu-
tive seats of the Swiss Federal Council. Since 1959 the FDP, the Christian Demo-
cratic People’s Party (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz – CVP) 
and the Social Democratic Party (SP) each got two seats, while the SVP received 
the remaining one. The SVP took one seat form the CVP in 2003; in 2008, 
some SVP members split from the party and created the Conservative Demo-
cratic Party of Switzerland (Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz – BDP). 
Nonetheless, the SVP obtained its best electoral results after the split, in 2015.
As Figure 5.11 shows, Switzerland (black line) had a rather high social accept-
ability of populism in the last three elections, while this was not the case in the 
1970s and 1980s. This is in line with the expectations derived from the relevant 
literature. On the right, there are no traces of populism until 1995, when three 
parties articulated highly populist messages: SVP (6.8%), CVP (12.1%), and FDP 
(7.7%). In the two following decades, the CVP did not articulate any populist 
message in its manifestos, leaving FDP and SVP as the only two parties articulat-
ing populist messages. On the left, two parties have been consistently populist 
since the 1990s: the Social Democratic Party (SP) and the Green Party (Grüne 
Partei der Schweiz – GPS). The SP was already populist in the 1970s (but not in 
the 1980s), together with the Alliance of Independents (Landesring der Unab-
hängigen – LdU). In the 2011 elections, both the SP and the SVP have been 
extremely populist in their manifestos (9.7% and 18.7%). Overall, Switzerland 
emerges as one of the cases where populism is most socially acceptable, in line 
with expectations.
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United Kingdom
The United Kingdom, having a collective memory of World War II based on 
heroization (Chapter 6), was not supposed to show high levels of populism’s 
social acceptability. However, a quick glance at the results of the content analy-
sis (Figure 5.12) is enough to show that this is not the case. Populism exists, 
and it is mainstream. This result is even more puzzling if one considers that in 
the 1990s, the United Kingdom was supposed not to have favourable political-
institutional conditions for the emergence of radical right-wing parties (Kitschelt 
and McGann 1995). On the other hand, favourable opportunity structures sub-
sequently developed: indeed, there has been a decline in identification with, and 
support for, the two main parties, and tabloids such as The Sun have a fierce 
populist agenda (Fella 2008).
Figure 5.11 Populism in Switzerland
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However, populism in the United Kingdom seems to be unsuccessful when 
combined with radicalism. Given the high level of populism in the mainstream 
parties, it seems plausible to observe that Britain entered the realm of populist 
democracy (Mair 2002), as the whole debate about Brexit seems to remind us. 
Freeden points out that the ideological and institutional relationship between 
state and government is at stake, and the United Kingdom might no longer be 
a liberal democratic state because it lacks a liberal government. One of the aims 
of Theresa May’s government, Freeden argues (2017, 1), “has been to translate 
certain strands of populist sentiment into a fundamental restructuring of the state 
itself, without Parliamentary approval.”
The United Kingdom certainly constitutes a surprising case, and the levels of 
populism are always higher than expected. However, it is important to notice 
how populism is virtually never present in combination with radical or extreme 
Figure 5.12 Populism in the United Kingdom
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parties. For example, the National Front, a far-right party founded in 1967, has 
always been almost irrelevant in elections (it has never reached even 1% of the 
vote share or had an elected representative at any level). Successful populism is 
not combined with radical and extreme parties but rather with the mainstream 
Conservative party. It was British conservatism that, through  Thatcherism – 
“their own unique right-wing populism” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 242) – 
drained attention away from the National Front. No fringe or niche party ever 
used the so-called ‘winning formula’: economic liberalism combined with polit-
ical and cultural authoritarianism. The British National Party (BNP), despite 
the attempts of Nick Griffin – chairman between 1999 and 2014 – to distance 
the party from its fascist roots, also never held any seat, and the best electoral 
result they achieved was 1.9% of the vote share in 2010.
Regarding the failure of extreme right movements in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Kitschelt and McGann explain that, contrary to what happened in Germany or 
Italy, “whatever constraints the extreme Right was facing had more to do with 
the position of the major parties in the dominant competitive arena than with the 
historical legacy of the extreme Right” (1995, 242). Apart from the British cul-
ture of deference which makes it difficult for new parties to challenge the political 
system (Almond and Verba 1963), there is indeed a further obstacle for populist 
parties; the first-past-the-post electoral system makes it almost impossible for new 
parties to effectively challenge the two major parties. Therefore, it should not 
come as a surprise that, according to the content analysis, populism in the United 
Kingdom is a permanent feature of the two mainstream parties. Both the Con-
servatives and the Labour Party have consistently articulated populist messages 
since the 1970s, as well as the Liberal Party, with the result that all 15 analyzed 
manifestos show traces of populism.
The Conservatives were moderately populist both in the 1970s (4.5%) and in 
the 2000s (4.4%) and very populist in the 2010s (9.8%) but showed almost no 
traces of populist messages in their manifestos in the 1980s (1.2%) and 1990s 
(1.8%). The Labour Party has been constantly populist, with average levels in the 
1980s, 1990s, and 2010s (5.3%, 5.7%, and 4.8%) and rather high levels in the 
1970s and 2000s (7.6 and 8.1%). Because of the structure of the electoral system, 
UKIP did not win a seat in the House of Commons until 2015 (losing it again 
in 2017), when for the first time it also scored better than the 5% threshold used 
for the content analysis.25
However, the last British election considered was in 2010; therefore, the only 
other political movement included in the analysis apart from the two mainstream 
ones is the liberal democratic party, which was the result of a union between the 
Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party in 1988. The Lib Dems, always 
considered left-wing apart from during the 1983 elections, articulated similar lev-
els of populism compared to the manifestos of the Labour Party, with particularly 
populist peaks in the 1970s (8.6%) and 2010s (8.4%).
Overall, the levels of populism’s social acceptability in the United Kingdom 
are puzzling because, on the one hand, there is no single manifesto showing 
more than 10% of populist statements, yet, on the other hand, each and every 
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manifesto shows traces of populism. Moreover, the levels of right-wing populism 
seem to be higher than expected for a country whose memory is based on heroi-
zation. In particular, the 2010 elections show very high levels of populism, with 
only Austria scoring higher. The levels of left-wing populism, although never 
particularly elevated, are also rather high compared to other countries.
Conclusions
The content analysis of 173 party manifestos from 8 countries in 5 elections 
reveals that 5 of the 6 manifestos containing the highest percentage of popu-
list statements were written either in the 1970s or in the 2010s.26 Moreover, 
it is interesting that they are written by left-wing parties: the Socialist Party 
in Italy (40%) in the 1970s; The Greens, The Left, and the Social Democrats 
in Germany in 2013 (29.6%, 20.8%, and 19.2%); and the FPÖ in Austria in 
2013 (21%).27
Concerning the social acceptability of populism, the picture is similar but not 
identical. Once again, in the top six, there are mainly left-wing parties from the 
1970s and 1980s, as well as the right-wing FPÖ in the 1990s and 2010s. This 
also confirms that left-wing populism is available to mainstream parties, while 
right-wing populism is mainly articulated by niche or extreme parties and not by 
mainstream and established parties.
Concerning right-wing populism, among the 12 most populist manifestos, 11 
come from only 3 countries: France (4), Austria (4), and Switzerland (3). Surpris-
ingly, the remaining one is from the Italian Civic Choice, Monti’s (technocratic) 
party. Among them, only two are not from the 1990s–2010s, and they are both 
French: the UDR (in the 1970s) and the RPR (in the 1980s). Around 69% of 
the coded manifestos from right-wing parties contain populism (63 out of 91).
Concerning left-wing populism, among the 15 most populist manifestos, all 
8 countries are represented: Germany (5); France, Switzerland, and the Neth-
erlands (2); Italy, Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (1). Among them, 
nine are either from the 1970s or the 2010s, while none are from the 2000s. 
Around 77% of the coded manifestos from right-wing parties contain populism 
(64 out of 83).
Concerning the expectations at the country level, the results seem to be in 
line with the type of collective memory assigned in the next chapter but with 
some remarkable exceptions. The countries characterized by a memory based 
on victimization display a high social acceptability of populism, and this is espe-
cially true for right-wing populist parties. Austria and France seem to follow this 
pattern more precisely compared to Italy, which has slightly lower levels than 
expected. The countries characterized by a memory based on cancellation, on 
the other hand, are more difficult to interpret. Switzerland has very high values 
of populism – even higher than Italy, for example.
The Dutch case is a puzzling one because the levels of populism vary signifi-
cantly over time and they are often lower than expected. Sweden, where in the 
1970s and 1980s there is no trace of populism, seems to confirm that despite 
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favourable opportunity structures, populism is blocked by elements rooted in the 
country’s political culture. Germany is in line with the expectations concerning 
the social acceptability of right-wing populism, but also shows exceptionally high 
levels of left-wing populism. Finally, the United Kingdom, the only case charac-
terized by heroization registers a surprisingly high social acceptability of populism 
over time, concerning both right- and left-wing parties. These aspects are fully 
investigated in the next chapters.
Notes
 1 Appendix 10 (Tables A10.2 and A10.3) shows the same descriptive data based on 
the alternative operationalization implementing the co-occurrence principle. The 
main difference consists in the fact that the alternative operationalization based on 
co-occurrence raises the amount of right-wing populism in the 2000s.
 2 Figures A10.1 to A10.4 show the same type of data as Figures 5.1 to 5.4, but the 
calculations are based on the alternative operationalization that relies on the co-
occurrence principle.
 3 The measurement based on co-occurrence is different but gives similar results, 
and the rise over time is not statistically significant. See Appendix 11 (Tables 
A11.9 and A11.10).
 4 In 2013, the weighted measure for right-wing populism in Austria is 2,968, the 
highest recorded for any country in any decade, and Austria holds the second 
position as well, with 2,341 in the 1990s.
 5 Even before the beginning of the nineteenth century, the so-called Boulangism 
(from the founder Georges Boulanger) was considered a populist threat for the 
French Republic, although from rather left-wing positions (Chebel d’Appollonia 
1996).
 6 This transformation described for the Front National was similar to what the Ital-
ian Social Movement (MSI) was doing in Italy at the same time.
 7 The 2017 election for France is not included in the content analysis.
 8 Until 1976, it was called Union for the Defence of the Republic (Union pour la 
Défense de la République – UDR).
 9 “It has become increasingly evident that some of the party’s most prominent per-
sonalities have turned their backs on democracy altogether. . . . They have char-
acterized refugees as “invaders”, the German government as a “regime” and the 
Third Reich as nothing but a “speck of bird shit” on German history.” Die Spiegel, 
“Germany Considers Monitoring Right-Wing AfD”, October 16, 2018, avail-
able online (consulted in April 2019): www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
germany-considers-monitoring-right-wing-afd-for-extremism-a-1232995.html.
 10 The emergence of AfD and its electoral results in the last years might change the 
status quo and indicate that even Germany is changing its narrative. This will be 
discussed in the conclusions.
 11 This is because the analysis focuses on the last three decades only. The data con-
cerning the conditions to test are not available for the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, 
measured according to the co-occurrence principle, the value of populism would 
be zero (both CDU and FDP show only people-centrism but no anti-elitism).
 12 The exception is only “partial” because with a different operationalization the 
value of right-wing populism would be zero.
 13 Under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, in particular, the Northern League has 
become a fully-fledged national(-ist) party, and therefore dropped the reference 
to the North, thus becoming simply Lega.
 14 Between 2007 and 2013, its name has been “People of Freedom” (PdL).
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 15 In Italy, members of the family Mussolini can be candidates for extreme right par-
ties without raising any major scandal, a thing that would be unimaginable in Ger-
many. For example, two Mussolinis ran for a seat in the 2019 European Parliament 
elections: Alessandra, experienced politician and already member of the EP, and 
Caio Giulio Cesare, who describes himself as “a post-fascist who refers to those val-
ues in a non-ideological way.” The Guardian, “Mussolini’s great-grandson claims 
Facebook suspended his account”, by Lorenzo Tondo, April 9, 2019, available 
online (consulted in April 2019): www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/09/
benito-mussolini-great-grandson-caio-claims-facebook-suspended-his-account.
 16 Qualunquismo “presented itself as the voice of ordinary people, those excluded 
from the division of power, fed up with greedy and corrupt politicians, indifferent 
to ideologies they saw as a mere cover for elite ambitions of domination, skeptical 
of any program and mistrustful of electoral promises they expected to be system-
atically broken by those elected” (Tarchi 2002, 122).
 17 Pentapartito was the five-party coalition that governed Italy between June 1981 
and April 1991. It comprised: Christian Democracy (DC), Italian Socialist Party 
(PSI), Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), Italian Liberal Party (PLI), and 
Italian Republican Party (PRI).
 18 Several other scholars consider Go Italy as a populist party. Among others: Ran-
iolo (2006), Pasquino (2007), Ruzza and Fella (2009).
 19 The Democratic Party of the Left is oddly coded as right-wing in 1994 according 
to the Party Manifesto Project. For the purposes of the analysis, this does not 
make any difference, although it is clearly debatable to what extent the PDS was 
proposing a truly left-wing manifesto at the time.
 20 About the difficult classification of the M5S, see Manucci and Amsler (2018).
 21 In 1994, even if the PDS would have been coded as left-wing (as it is normally 
considered), Italy would still belong to the outcome. On the other hand, it would 
not belong to the outcome for left-wing populism, although it would be close 
enough to the crossover point.
 22 In 2002, Fortuyn’s former party – Liveable Netherlands – also obtained two seats 
in the House of Representatives.
 23 On that occasion, the centre party D66 (Democraten 66) is coded as left-wing 
according to the Manifesto Project. However, even if it were coded as right-wing, 
the Netherlands in 1994 would still not belong to the outcome for right-wing 
populism.
 24 It would be extremely interesting to know the levels of populism scored by the 
Sweden Democrats in the 2018 elections. Unfortunately, our data arrives only at 
the 2014 elections.
 25 UKIP, contrary to the other right-wing movements mentioned above, has the 
advantage of being relatively free from any associaiton with the fascist past.
 26 Five of the six manifestos containing the highest percentage of populist state-
ments were written either in the 1970s or in the 2010s. The exception is the 
manifesto from the German SPD in the 1980s.
 27 Among the coded manifestos, 47 (around 27%) did not show any trace of populism. 
They are mainly manifestos of Swedish parties (23), as well as Swiss manifestos from 
the 1970s and 1980s (11) and Dutch manifestos from the 1970s–1990s (6).
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This chapter assigns to each country a type of collective memory and possibly one 
or more secondary narratives. This is done by analyzing the relevant secondary 
literature on each country’s collective memory of the fascist past.1 Longitudinal 
variations, potential secondary narratives, and disagreement among sources are 
taken into consideration, and eventually the levels of stigmatization of the fascist 
past are assigned to each country.
To determine which types of collective memory are present in a country and 
how they develop over time, secondary sources are used. By utilizing a large 
volume of single-country and comparative studies, it is possible to determine 
the outcome of decades of research in each country from several complemen-
tary perspectives such as history, sociology, and political science. The process of 
memory-building – understood as the dynamic relationship between conflicting 
narratives in the public debate, school programmes, and popular culture – here 
remains as a black box.
The present study does not aim at looking inside the box (although this is 
sometimes unavoidable) but rather at analyzing the outcome of that process, 
understood as the type of mainstream and (possibly) secondary narratives that 
emerged from that conflictual process. Only major academic publications are 
used as sources, and despite the impossibility of including every relevant publica-
tion, it is safe to assume that the type of collective memory and the degree of 
stigmatization of the fascist past are correctly identified.2
This approach is case-oriented, and the intensive knowledge of cases is decisive 
in the attribution of values and can be defined as a direct method of calibration 
(Verkuilen 2005; Ragin 2008). Each country can display each type of collective 
memory on a scale from 0–1: 0 (full non-membership) means that the country 
does not have any trace of that type of collective memory; 1 (full membership) 
means that the country fully belongs to that category. Finally, 0.5 (crossover value) 
means that the country neither belongs to nor is excluded from that category. 
When secondary narratives are present, the sum of the values cannot exceed 1.
This type of grading might be considered too fine-grained. However, a deep 
qualitative knowledge of the cases grants credibility to the values assigned while 
constituting a pillar of the logic on which QCA relies. The assignment of the val-
ues is not at all arbitrary. First, it is transparently discussed and justified. Second, 
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it derives from informed decisions that are based on a substantive familiarity with 
the topic. One might be conservative and assign only coarse thresholds such as 
0–0.33–0.66–1 to indicate full membership and non-membership (1 and 0), or 
‘more in than out’ and ‘more out than in’ (0.66 and 0.33). However, rather 
than constituting an advantage for the analysis, this approach would represent an 
unjustified loss of information.
Moreover, the final amount of stigma of the fascist past is calculated in a way 
that further reduces the disputability of the values assigned. In order to establish 
the level of stigma present in each country, the values for culpabilization are mul-
tiplied by 1 (highest stigma) and victimization by 0 (lowest stigma), while heroi-
zation and cancellation are multiplied by 0.66 and 0.33, respectively (confront 
with Figure 3.3). This means that, for example, when a country (like Austria) dis-
plays victimization – either 0.6, 0.7, or 0.8 – and cancellation – either 0.4, 0.3, or 
0.2 – the level of stigma remains 0.1. To give a further example, in a country (like 
France), it would be possible to assign 0.1 to cancellation and 0.3 to heroization 
(instead of 0.2 to both), but the final level of stigma would be 0.2 in any case.
Now that the method followed to assign types of collective memories to each 
country has been discussed, it is possible to summarize the presence of collective 
memories. Culpabilization is present mainly in Germany, which constitutes the 
best example of a country that decided to deal with its own past and go through 
a process of Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit. Heroization, like culpabilization, is 
a rather unique memory: in fact, it is mainly a British prerogative. This is not sur-
prising since the United Kingdom is the only country in the sample that does not 
have to deal with a cumbersome past.3 Much more widespread is a type of col-
lective memory based on victimization: it is present in Austria, France, and Italy. 
These countries shifted responsibilities and refused to admit their guilt. Finally, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Sweden decided to avoid a public debate, 
silence their past, and forget their role during World War II.
More in detail, alongside mainstream narratives outlined above, secondary nar-
ratives are often present, and they have an impact in determining the overall levels 
of stigma of the fascist past. As already mentioned, culpabilization is prominent in 
Germany, but it is present also in Sweden (as primary narrative from the 1990s). 
Since the 1990s, culpabilization has been present in Austria as well but only as a 
secondary narrative. For this reason, while Germany and Sweden show high or 
very high levels of stigma of the fascist past, Austria features mainly a memory 
based on victimization and hence shows a low stigma of the fascist past. Like 
Austria, also Italy and France display a very low stigma of the fascist past because 
they base their collective memory on victimization (together with secondary 
narratives of cancellation and heroization). The Swiss and Dutch public debates 
largely avoided the past: therefore, their selective memory based on collective 
amnesia and cancellation, completed by a secondary narrative based on victimi-
zation, produced a rather low stigma of the fascist past. Sweden’s memory also 
has a component of cancellation, but since it co-exists with a narrative of culpa-
bilization, the levels of stigma of the fascist past are high. Finally, heroization is 
a type of memory that in the UK is present in its purest form, while it represents 
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a secondary narrative in France and Italy. For this reason, the UK displays high 
levels of stigma whereas Italy and France have a strong component of victimiza-
tion, hence producing very low levels of stigma.
Another very interesting exercise consists in observing how collective memo-
ries were formed, defended, or challenged between the end of World War II and 
now. Establishing new narratives of World War II and fascism was at first very dif-
ficult because of the proportions of the trauma and destruction; therefore, after 
the war, there has been a silencing phase. No country was able to start a process 
of re-elaboration of a ‘past’ that just ended. Crucial in this regard was the role of 
the Allies: after 1948, it was clear that their priority was to fight the communist 
East Bloc; with this in mind, they allowed countries like Austria, Italy, and France 
to rebuild a democratic culture and distance themselves from their past.
The precondition for this to happen was the presence of a scapegoat, one country 
that could only adopt a narrative of guilt: Germany had to pay the price. The Nazis 
became the absolute embodiment of pure wickedness (not a very difficult opera-
tion), and the rest of Europe agreed to blame the Germans. Italy forgot its racial 
laws and concentration camps, the Netherlands and Switzerland ignored the help 
they provided to the Nazis, and Austria pretended it never welcomed the arrival 
of the German Wehrmacht with Nazi salutes and flags. Each country, apart from 
Germany, was free to purge its own memory from thorny issues and traces of guilt.
Maintaining the Western Bloc cohesive and avoiding any tension or revenge 
was a necessity in times of Cold War; for this reason, the United States were ready 
to close an eye (or two) on the institutional continuity with fascism of certain 
European countries, as long as they kept the communist threat under control. 
Italy had to forget the Nazi responsibility for the 50,000 victims on Italian soil 
between 1943 and 1945 so that Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and Greece could not claim 
a long list of Italian war criminals. Austria was allowed to depict itself as first 
victim of the Nazi aggression, while France started building a myth of popular 
resistance and self-liberation. Other countries decided to forget: Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. These countries’ role during the war was not an 
argument that could interest any Superpower at the time, and nobody insisted 
to bring it to the fore. In this way, Germany was used as a lightning rod while all 
the other countries were allowed to ignore the skeletons in their own closets; in 
exchange, they had to follow a process of democratization and embrace a US-
oriented capitalism against the communist pressure from the East.
After the protests of 1968 against military and bureaucratic elites, an increas-
ing number of critical voices from several West European countries tried to shed 
a light on the fascist past, the close collaboration with the Nazis, and all those 
aspects that had been conveniently forgotten for two decades. This generated 
attention: in the 1970s, critical public debates focused on these issues, and histo-
rians started to examine the countries’ past. However, it is not possible to say that 
this was enough to change any country’s narrative. More often than not, heated 
debates did not translate in national awareness, and mainstream narratives were 
rather reinforced while critical voices were silenced. Left-wing social and political 
movements lost an occasion to make Western Europe face its dark past.
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After the 1970s, public debates continued to take place but with varying lev-
els of intensity and salience. Several phenomena constituted possible triggers for 
new controversies. Debates among historians (Historikerstreit), candidates with a 
Nazi past (Kurt Waldheim), books (Boëthius’ Sweden and the Second World War), 
movies (Le Chagrin et la Pitié), trials of important personalities (Klaus Barbie, the 
Butcher of Lyon), official reports by commissions of historians (Volcker Commis-
sion): all these elements contributed to bring to the fore the responsibilities of 
West European countries. In some cases, the past was successfully re-discussed, 
and new narratives emerged (e.g. in Sweden). In other vases, however, the main-
stream narratives were rather reinforced after polarizing debates. In particular, 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, there was no 
need to re-discuss the past any further. Post-fascist parties could enter govern-
ment coalitions, resistance movements were crystallized (and rendered harmless) 
into epic popular movements, and populist parties started becoming increasingly 
successful.
Table 6.1 summarizes the findings presented in the remainder of the chap-
ter. The aim is to assign different types of collective memories (mainstream and 
Table 6.1 Types of Memory and Levels of Stigma in Eight Countries
Country Year CULP VICT HERO CANC Stigma
Austria (AT) 1975 0 0.7 0 0.3 0.1
1983 0 0.7 0 0.3 0.1
1994 0.3 0.7 0 0 0.3
2002 0.3 0.7 0 0 0.3
2013 0.3 0.7 0 0 0.3
Switzerland (CH) 1975 0 0 0 1 0.3
1983 0 0 0 1 0.3
1994 0 0 0 1 0.3
2003 0 0.4 0 0.6 0.2
2011 0 0.4 0 0.6 0.2
Germany (DE) 1972 1 0 0 0 1.0
1983 1 0 0 0 1.0
1994 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 0.9
2002 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 0.9
2013 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 0.9
France (FR) 1974 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
1981 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
1995 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2
2002 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2
2012 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2
Italy (ITA) 1972 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
1983 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
1994 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1
2001 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1
2013 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1
(Continued)
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secondary narratives when present) to each country. Moreover, it is important 
to observe variations in the presence of different memories over time, explain-
ing which turning points determined a change in the collective re-elaboration 
of the past. The countries are listed according to their levels of stigma: first are 
presented the countries with extremely low levels of stigma of the fascist past, 
and progressively the presentation moves towards those countries that present 
extremely high levels of stigma.
Italy
In Italy, the collective memory is one of victimization (De Luna 2011, 43) based 
on selective amnesia (Oliva 2006) and removal (Del Boca 1996) in order to for-
get the fascist past (Fogu 2006). The main recurrent element of this narrative 
consists in portraying Italians as “brava gente” (good folks), thus creating a myth 
which allows Italy to differentiate itself from Germany and distance itself from 
the guilt and responsibility associated with the Nazi and fascist regimes (Bidussa 
1994; Del Boca 2005; Focardi 2013). Another goal of this myth consists in try-
ing to whitewash the massacres of the Italian occupations in Africa and the Bal-
kans (Consonni 2011; Conti 2008; Sluga 1999).
Italy’s historical narrative revolves around victimization, with the aim of por-
traying the country not as the perpetrator but as a victim of the fascist regime and 
its propaganda, a victim of Hitler’s decisions, and, essentially, a victim of history. 
The paradigm of victimization is effectively illustrated by Berger (2010, 122):
[O]fficial memory policy . . . concentrated on Italian victims, above all 
the victims of German-occupied Italy after 1943, thereby highlighting the 
national struggle against a foreign enemy. The history of Italian fascism was 
Country Year CULP VICT HERO CANC Stigma
Netherlands (NL) 1972 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3
1982 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3
1994 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3
2002 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3
2012 0 0.2 0 0.8 0.3
Sweden (SE) 1973 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.6
1982 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.6
1994 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8
2002 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8
2014 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8
United Kingdom 
(UK)
1974 0 0 1 0 0.7
1983 0 0 1 0 0.7
1992 0 0 1 0 0.7
2001 0 0 1 0 0.7
2010 0 0 1 0 0.7
Table 6.1 (Continued)
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presented as a struggle of the Italian people first against fascism and then 
against foreign occupants.
This passage shows how the victimization narrative works hand in glove with can-
cellation and heroization.
Italians, according to the mainstream victimization narrative, were not sup-
porters of fascism but rather its victims, and they heroically fought to free them-
selves from its yoke. The “victimizing storytelling,” claims De Luna (2011, 43), 
has been possible because in parallel the real role of Italy and the Italians has been 
denied (Franzinelli 2002).4 Indeed while prefects, superintendents, and public 
security commissioners remained largely the same after 1945 (Conti 2017), the 
government granted several amnesties to former fascists: in 1946, 1948, and 
1966 (Franzinelli 2006; Ponzani 2008). This lack of justice made some speak of 
a missed “Italian Nurnberg trial” (Battini 2003).
As summarized by Fogu (2006, 159), the victimization memory in Italy was 
based on the following memory-building procedure: “hide the black venten-
nio below the glorious carpet of the red biennio.” In other words, the political 
exploitation of the Resistance movement made it possible to portray the country 
as essentially anti-fascist and therefore to foster a secondary narrative of heroi-
zation. In this way, Italians reinvented themselves as anti-fascist by selectively 
remembering certain aspects of the past linked to the Resistenza while deciding 
to forget others (Poggiolini 2002, 224). As Consonni (2011, 215) stresses, Ital-
ians constructed a national memory as one of occupation “through the memory 
of patriotic resistance and the total negation of any aspect of collaboration with 
Germany.”
The victimization narrative was questioned only by some isolated voices in the 
1960s and 1970s (S. Berger 2010), which, however, did not manage to challenge 
the main narrative. After the collapse of the so-called ‘First Republic,’ partly due 
the corruption scandal Bribesville, other critical voices asked to confront the 
country’s past. De Luna (2011) defined that critical moment as the end of the 
“memorial pact” (based on anti-fascism) of the old parties. Unsurprisingly, rather 
than losing its hegemony, the mainstream narrative based on victimization fully 
succeeded in marginalizing any other narrative. As will emerge clearly in analyz-
ing other countries, debates do not always imply a re-definition of the main-
stream narrative, and they can even lead to its reinforcement.
Elements of denial and cancellation have become so strong over time that 
post-fascist parties (such as National Alliance) managed to obtain the institution-
alization of a ‘memory day’ to remember the Italian victims in the context of the 
conflict between Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia (Gobetti 2013). At the same time, 
the requests of the left-wing parties to commemorate the victims of fascism and 
Italian colonialism were not even discussed (Focardi 2013). Franzinelli (2002) 
explains that Italians have decide to “forget” German crimes in Italy in order to 
be able to make sure that others will “forget” the Italian crimes across Europe 
and Africa. The mainstream narrative remained one of victimization even after 
1994, when an Italian magistrate found the so-called “armoire of shame”: several 
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folders emerged, with 695 files documenting war crimes perpetrated on Italian 
soil under fascist rule and during Nazi occupation.5
To sum up, one can conclude that the myth of the “good Italian” is functional 
to the removal of every uncomfortable national memory (cancellation), thus fos-
tering the idea that Italian fascism was less brutal than Nazism and that the unde-
niable merits of the resistance movement were sufficient to wash away the sins 
and redeem the popular support for fascism (heroization). The rebirth of the new 
democratic Italy, as Poggiolini puts it (2002, 225) was based “on both amnesia 
and remembrance of the Resistance.” This kind of narrative made it possible for 
a long list of politicians to praise Benito Mussolini and his regime over the last 
decades, without provoking the same reactions that one would expect in countries 
like Germany or Sweden.6
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective 
memory in Italy are as follows: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed 
mainly of victimization (0.6) and secondarily by both cancellation (0.2) and heroi-
zation (0.2). From 1992, after the end of the first Republic, the victimization nar-
rative became even more prominent (0.8); in parallel, the actions of the Resistance 
movement became even less relevant (0.1), and cancellation was eroded (0.1) by a 
stronger narrative of victimization. Therefore, the degree of stigmatization of the 
fascist past moved from an already low 0.2 to an even lower 0.1.
France
The memory of fascism and the Second World War in France is characterized by a 
process of cancellation and heroization similar to the one described for Italy. The 
main difference consists in the fact that in France the national myth created by 
De Gaulle describing French people as “all participating to the resistance” was 
even stronger. This was the case because in France the Resistance movement was 
considered as homogeneous and national, while in Italy it was considered as a 
divisive heritage due to the prominent role of the Communists.
The Vichy regime is portrayed in the French collective memory as an “aberra-
tion,” an “interlude,” something totally alien to the national history and culture 
(Judt 1992, 96; S. Berger 2010, 123).7 Moreover, the fascist Vichy regime, which 
collaborated with the Nazis, is considered as having been imposed by the Ger-
mans, although this is historically inaccurate and ignores the fact that the head 
of that regime, Philippe Pétain, was hugely popular in France (Jackson 2002).
During the 1980s, President Mitterrand strategically developed the Gaullist 
myth of the good German to portray both the French and the Germans as vic-
tims of the Nazi regime, thus fostering both cancellation and heroization (Gildea 
2002). Since France decided to describe itself as inherently anti-fascist and not 
to question its own political culture but rather to create a myth of the resisting 
French (similar to the one describing Italians as inherently “good folks”), it fol-
lows that France can only be described as a victim of the Nazi regime (Gildea 
2002, 75). This narrative made it possible to avoid and block out any type of 
responsibility (Michel 2011, 182).
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A narrative based on victimization, like in the case of Italy, relies in parallel on 
elements of cancellation and heroization. On the one hand, the Gaullist myth of 
Resistance portrays the French population as heroically opposed to the fascist 
regime (Golsan 2006, 78) while all those who did not are labelled as ‘traitors’ 
(Jackson 2014). On the other hand, it presents a positively accentuated national 
history which denies the support for Vichy as well as the country’s responsibilities 
towards former colonies (Bell 2013, 156; S. Berger 2010, 131).8
Since the 1960s, the “mythe résistencialiste” (Rousso 1990, 101) has crystal-
lized into a sort of national monument which could not be broken even when 
France was confronted with its past. Following the protests of 1968, several events 
such as the movie “Le Chagrin et la Pitié” (1969), the Barbie trial (1972–84), 
and Paxton’s publication (1972), put abruptly at the foreground the controver-
sial role of France during World War II. However, instead of entailing a change 
of narrative, this resulted in a lost occasion, and the actual role of the country was 
never questioned (Rousso 1990). Even when in 1995 Jacques Chirac for the first 
time publicly acknowledged French participation in the Holocaust (Art 2011, 
363), this did not result in taking responsibility, and the victimization narrative 
was even reinforced.
By considering the characteristics of the process of memory-building that took 
place in France and Italy, it is possible to conclude that in order to produce a main 
narrative based on victimization, two functional sub-narratives must be activated 
as well: cancellation and heroization. Indeed, in order to portray French people 
as victims of the Germans, one should first remove form the picture the collabo-
ration operated during Vichy and then amplify the role of the Resistance. These 
three components are present in the Italian case as well because the victimization 
process has been based upon a heroization of the resistance movement and a can-
cellation of the popular support for the fascist regime and its crimes.
The Vichy period requires France to confront difficult questions about its 
own political culture, but the official narrative continues to consider it only as 
an occupation parenthesis. Like in Italy, the narrative of the Communist Party 
put emphasis on its own “martyrs” and developed a cult of its resistance heroes 
(Jackson 2014), thus creating a secondary narrative of heroization that rein-
force certain aspects of victimization without helping the country to confront 
its past.9 Including the vast majority of the French in the great epic of self-
liberation surely contributes to let the bygones be bygones and create a unitary 
narrative, but it does not produce a sufficiently self-critical re-elaboration of 
the past.
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collec-
tive memory in France are as follows: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was com-
posed mainly of victimization (0.6) and secondarily by both cancellation (0.2) 
and heroization (0.2). From the 1990s, the victimization narrative became even 
more prominent (0.7) and in parallel the cancellation narrative was eroded (0.1) 
because the past was confronted but altered and therefore considered acceptable. 
Accordingly, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past has always remained 
at a low level of 0.2.
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Austria
Similarly to the cases of Italy and France, the type of collective memory estab-
lished in Austria is based on victimization (Ludi 2004), amnesia (Art 2007, 338), 
self-delusion (Pick 2000, 198), distancing (Berger 2010, 121), and avoidance of 
any responsibility (Judt 1992). The main difference consists in the fact that Austria 
could not develop any heroic narrative due to the lack of a Resistance movement.
The victimization narrative revolves around the Anschluss (“annexation”) as a 
central element. Since in 1938 the country was invaded and incorporated into the 
Third Reich, the mainstream narrative goes, Austria cannot be blamed for World 
War II and the Holocaust (Pick 2000, 198). The tone of the narrative is apologetic 
and avoids any type of responsibility or admission of guilt and goes along with the 
strategy of the Allies and their effort to avoid any excessive emphasis on Austria’s 
past in order not to alienate them from the Western Bloc (Judt 1992, 88).10
Uhl (2006) identifies the Rot-Weiß-Rot-Buch (Red-White-Red Book), a gov-
ernmental publication from 1946, as the official source for the “victim theory.” 
Building upon this text, collective memory has been developed based on the idea 
that Austria was not just a victim of Nazism, but rather the first victim of Hitler 
(Berger 2010, 120). This narrative, however, has no historical confirmation (Art 
2006, 42) and ignores several facts, such as the overwhelming support of Austri-
ans for the Anschluss.11
Two critical points marked the evolution of collective memory in Austria: the 
“Waldheim affair” in 1986 and the speech of then Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in 
1991. Kurt Waldheim, former Secretary-General of the United Nations between 
1972 and 1981, became in 1986 the ninth President of Austria, although it 
emerged during the electoral campaign that he had previously lied about having 
been drafted into the Wehrmacht. This sparked a long and heated debate. On the 
one hand, it produced a partial revision of the victim theory and “mainstream 
public opinion internalized the idea of Austrian responsibility” (S. Berger 2010, 
126), introducing a modified “co-responsibility thesis” (Uhl 2006, 63). On the 
other hand, Heinisch (2002) stresses that despite the international community’s 
criticism of Austria, Waldheim won those elections and, as a reaction, the FPÖ 
gained consensus. In fact, the debate initially produced a rather nationalistic and 
Anti-Semitic answer (Art 2006; Wodak 1990).
The change in the mainstream narrative, however, is certified in 1991, when 
for the first time in history an Austrian Chancellor, Franz Vranitzky, highlighted 
Austrian culpability live on TV (Pick 2000, 199). The country had to make for-
mal amends for the past, and this created more debate, which translated into 
more polarization (Art 2011). The fact that it constituted such a delayed apology 
confirms how deep-rooted and difficult to challenge the victimization narrative 
was. However, it also stresses how important it was, at least at the symbolic level, 
an official admission of guilt and a partial adoption of the culpabilization narra-
tive. Since then, Bischof argues, Austria can no longer be considered the “black 
sheep of Europe” when it comes to dealing with the Nazi past (2004, 25). In 
sum, it is possible to claim that a new secondary narrative based on culpabilization 
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emerged between 1983 and 1994, replacing cancellation, but the narrative based 
on victimization remained mainstream. Indeed, the party that most insists on that 
type of victimizing narrative, the FPÖ, could become a member of the govern-
ment coalition in 2017.12
It is difficult to conclude to what extent a culpabilization narrative has really 
been adopted in Austria. On the one hand, several political figures finally for-
mulated the necessary institutional apologies and made some efforts to confront 
the country’s past. On the other hand, as Art argues (2006, 203), chauvinist 
language and anti-Semitic stereotypes are not rare in the Austrian public debate 
because politicians “shifted the bounds of the legitimate discursive space and ren-
dered ideas previously associated with the extreme right acceptable.” While apol-
ogetic narratives of the Nazi past are virtually impossible in Germany, Austrian 
politicians are “free to adopt revisionist positions without risking their careers.”
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective 
memory in Austria are as follows: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed 
mainly of victimization (0.7) and secondarily of cancellation (0.3). From 1994, 
the victimization narrative remained prominent (0.7), but cancellation was no 
longer possible and was replaced by culpabilization. Therefore, the degree of 
stigmatization of the fascist past changed from 0.1 to 0.3.
Switzerland
Contrary to victimization narratives, cancellation narratives imply that the past 
is not altered but rather neglected or denied. This is precisely what happened in 
Switzerland, where neutrality during World War II has for decades been consid-
ered as a sufficient reason not to look closely at the country’s active and passive 
collaboration with authoritarian regimes at least until 1995 (Kellerhals-Maeder 
2000). Ziegler (1997) claims that this has been done without guilt or question, 
generating what he calls Swiss amnesia. The construction of a Swiss common 
memory builds upon the concept of spiritual national defense (Geistige Landes-
verteidigung) against any totalitarian ideology, thus eliminating any inconvenient 
element (Kreis 2000).
As Ludi puts it “the common representations of the past have been highly selec-
tive, and most efforts to address thorny questions have been doomed” (2004, 
119). Similarly, Judt describes the Swiss memory as “purged” (1992, 96). Swit-
zerland decided to exclude from the public debate several thorny issues. Among 
them, the distinction the country made between Jews and non-Jewish Germans – 
with the former returned to the Nazis whenever they attempted to cross the 
 border (Judt 1992, 96) – as well as the delivery of Swiss arms to Nazi Germany 
and the dismissal of Jews from Swiss companies (Berger 2010, 129).
The Swiss commander in chief during the war, General Henri Guisan, resolved 
to pull back his troops and establish an impregnable “redoubt” in the Alps. Swit-
zerland expanded and refined its defensive system – based on the fortifications 
begun in the 1880s to secure the mountainous central part of Switzerland – to 
protect the country from a potential German invasion. However, the invasion 
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never took place, while the wealth generated by the cooperation with the Nazi 
(managing looted gold, help in purchasing raw materials, and fees for the use of 
Swiss rail links) continued to the last days of the war, long after Germany could 
have realistically threatened the country.
For the Swiss, neutrality is a pillar of their national identity (Lebow 2006, 20), 
and this is at the base of the mainstream narrative describing Switzerland as a 
small country unable to defend itself against external enemies (Berger 2010, 124). 
The idea of the Helvetic Confederation as the charitable home of the Red Cross 
with a long tradition of neutrality allowed the formation and consolidation of a 
traditional national identity and fostered the Sonderfall Schweiz myth, describing 
Switzerland as a ‘special case’ and therefore helping to avoid the debate (Ludi 
2004, 126).
The absence of a public debate might be confused with an accidental lack of 
narrative, while in fact it was rather a proactive intervention of the institutions to 
prevent any public discussion of the country’s past. For example, the government 
restricted access to archives and documents; Berger (2010) claims that the Swiss 
state “was extraordinarily active in preventing a different memory” by restricting 
access to archives and documents and sponsoring official publications. Therefore, 
the memory based on cancellation was not a non-narrative but an intended con-
sequence of the government’s policy (Ludi 2004, 124).
Although critical voices such as Edgar Bonjour existed at least since the 1970s, 
Switzerland could afford not to officially face its past until the 1990s, when 
(mostly external) pressures forced the country to take action.13 In 1995, Swiss 
president Kaspar Villiger apologized to the Jewish people for the country’s asylum 
policy during World War II, but the confrontation of the past became particularly 
pressing in 1996 when Jewish organizations forced Swiss banks to undercover 
dormant accounts of Holocaust victims, an issue that had been ignored for a long 
time and that created negativity. As a reaction, the Swiss government refused to 
acknowledge its past and take responsibility, while outbursts of Anti-Semitism 
characterized the public debate (Ludi 2004, 120–22).14
The reports published between 1998 and 2002 by the Volcker Commission 
(also known as the Independent Committee of Experts or ICE) did not help to 
settle a real mainstream narrative, partly because the media barely took notice 
of them. The Swiss collective memory remained based on denial and removal 
because the revision of the country’s history was driven by “the urge to exculpate 
Switzerland,” to “deny the necessity of acknowledging responsibility,” and “to 
refuse to feel ashamed of what had happened in the Nazi era” (Ludi 2004, 138). 
In parallel to the consistent mainstream narrative based on cancellation, a second-
ary narrative based on victimization developed after 1995. Ludi claims that being 
forced to face its past between 1995 and 2002, and by refusing the allegations 
of wartime accommodation, Switzerland had to “turn the table,” generating a 
secondary victimization narrative – similar to the Austrian one – that minimized 
the country’s culpability and responsibility (2006, 212).
Switzerland’s wartime neutrality was depicted by the Volcker Commission 
as being of dubious quality, but this did not translate into a self-critical public 
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debate. To the contrary, an active process of cancellation and collective amnesia 
remains the core element of the country’s mainstream narrative. Switzerland 
continues to consider itself as a special case, thus refusing to join the European 
Union (while in 2002 it finally became a full member of the United Nations). 
In 2015, the Swiss People’s Party became the largest in the Federal Assembly, 
and it is not surprising to notice that its nationalist and conservative views are 
rooted in the interwar period, when its predecessor (Party of Farmers, Traders 
and Independents) entered the mainstream of Swiss politics as a right-wing con-
servative party.
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective 
memory in Switzerland are as follows: a value of 1 for cancellation between 1970s 
and 1994, while for the 2000s and 2010s the values are 0.4 (victimization) and 
0.6 (cancellation). Indeed, the debate about the country’s responsibilities was 
revitalized from 1996, but instead of resulting in culpabilization, it generated a 
secondary narrative based on victimization. The overall level of stigma therefore 
passed from 0.3 to 0.2.
Netherlands
Similar to the Swiss memory of cancellation, the Dutch national collective mem-
ory has been highly selective and, in line with the Italian and French narratives, 
fostered an inaccurate image of the ‘Good Dutch.’ This image was instrumental 
in distancing the Netherlands from the Nazi regime and made it possible to avoid 
controversial aspects of the country’s role during World War II (Brants 2000; De 
Haan 2011; Judt 1992). In other words, the main narrative in the Netherlands 
portrayed the Dutch as reluctant collaborators despite the complicity of the popula-
tion (Brants 2000, 229).
The Dutch self-portrayal focuses on the narrative of ‘a small country without 
a choice’ against external aggression and consequently ignores its collaboration 
with the Nazi regime, showing further similarities with the narrative developed in 
Switzerland. As Judt explains, “the active and enthusiastic collaboration of some 
Flemings and Dutch was stricken from the public record” (1992, 96).15 Moreo-
ver, two other important and embarrassing elements were excluded: the fact that 
in the Netherlands Jews had the lowest chance of survival compared to any other 
European country and the fact that Queen Wilhelmina could have done more in 
fostering anti-German and pro-Jewish interventions during her radio speeches 
from the UK (Bovenkerk 2000). Traditionally, public debates about the coun-
try’s past have always been avoided. For example, Jan De Quay became prime 
minister in 1959 “without even a single debate about his political past” (De 
Haan 2011, 81). During World War II, De Quay was one of the leaders of the 
nationalist Dutch Union, which promoted collaboration with the Germans, but 
his election did not provoke any confrontation with the past.
The narrative distinguishing between the categories of goed Dutch and fout 
collaborators remained the main paradigm in Dutch historiography and collective 
memory for decades (De Jong 1978). Like in other countries, only in the 1970s 
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and 1980s did “more critical voices [highlight] the extent of Dutch collabora-
tion with the Nazi occupiers” (S. Berger 2010, 127). Although the country’s 
role during World War II had become salient in the public debate, this was not 
enough to change the mainstream narrative, and in fact it rather reinforced it (De 
Haan 2011, 85).16 As already mentioned, not only cancellation but also elements 
of victimization are present in the Dutch public discourse (Brants 2000, 229); 
the country can claim to have been the victim of the Nazi invasion, therefore 
rejecting any responsibility.
It has been particularly challenging to find sources about the formation of 
a collective memory in the Netherlands. In resonance with what happened 
in Switzerland, a debate has been avoided, and several elements conveniently 
forgotten. This has been possible because, contrary to what happened in other 
countries, the absence of international pressures, internal scandals, debates 
among historians, or ad hoc commissions brought no credible challenge to 
the mainstream narrative. The role of the Netherlands during the Nazi occu-
pation remains a topic that political actors, journalists, and institutions prefer 
to avoid. Under these circumstances, a change of narrative is most unlikely to 
take place.
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective 
memory in the Netherlands are as follows: a value of 0.8 for cancellation and 0.2 
for victimization. The two values remain stable over time because there is no trace 
in the literature of a change of narrative. Even after an increase of the saliency 
of the country’s past, it seems that denial and amnesia remained the glue of the 
national collective memory. The level of stigma, therefore, remains constant at 
0.3 during the whole period.
Sweden
In Sweden, the collective memory about the country’s role vis-à-vis fascism 
revolves around the “small state realism” narrative (Johansson 1997, 175). Simi-
larly to Switzerland and the Netherlands, the country depicted itself as a small 
victim, a bystander without any choice against German aggression; limited conces-
sions and neutrality were considered as the best possible outcome for the nation 
and its neighbors (Östling 2011, 128).
The Swedish narrative of cancellation is based on denial and removal; as 
Johansson puts it, difficult questions were “swept under the carpet” (1997, 
176). According to Colla, many elements of the country’s history were not only 
excluded from the national collective memory but were conveniently forgotten 
(2002). Similarly, Judt claims that abiding memories were “purged from the 
national collective memory” (1992, 96). The country decided not to address 
issues such as: the Wehrmacht being allowed to use Sweden for military transport; 
the trade of iron, wood, and coal, which maintained the German war machine; 
and the eugenics program of compulsory sterilization established from the 1930s. 
These and other memories were removed in the name of realpolitik (Gilmour 
2010, 70; Spektorowski and Mizrachi 2004).
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Through a process of cancellation, according to Östling, small-state realism 
became Sweden’s patriotic narrative of the Second World War (2008). This cre-
ated a myth, which describes values of solidarity and humanism as inherently 
Swedish.17 The collective memory established wide “repressed areas” in order to 
protect the idea and purity of the folkhemmet (the “people’s house” – in other 
words, Sweden and its welfare state as political culture). In parallel to cancella-
tion, the myth of Sweden centered on humanitarian efforts that engendered a 
secondary narrative of heroism (Östling 2008, 203).
It is precisely this deeply rooted idea of folkhemmet that characterizes the Swed-
ish collective memory and its uniqueness. Indeed, contrary to other cases of can-
cellation such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, pre-existing political cultural 
elements linked to the idea of folkhemmet closed the door for a nationalist inter-
pretation of the events linked to World War II and enhanced the levels of stig-
matization of that past (Trägårdh 2002). For this reason, Sweden interestingly 
displays a higher degree of stigma compared to other cases of cancellation.
This is due also to the presence of another secondary narrative based on culpa-
bilization, which became dominant especially from the 1990s. The culpabiliza-
tion narrative was articulated and legitimated by several schools of thought, and 
not necessarily for the same reasons: “The leitmotiv of this critical interpretation 
was that the coalition government, with its concessions to Nazi Germany, had 
pursued a morally irresponsible policy, whose only purpose had been uncondi-
tionally to keep Sweden out of the great power conflict” (Östling 2011, 132).
Although the culpabilization narrative was already present in the years immedi-
ately following the war, it was only from the “decade of debates” (Östling 2011, 
139) – the 1990s – that it became prominent. This is a rare case, in which a criti-
cal public debate triggers a clear stigmatization of the fascist past – to the point of 
challenging the mainstream narrative. This was possible also because, in parallel, 
the small-state narrative progressively lost its monopoly. One book in particular 
created much debate about the country’s role: Boëthius’ Sweden and the Second 
World War (1991). The debates generated in those years paved the way for a 
more critical narrative and marked the beginning of the gradual transition from 
a narrative based on cancellation to a narrative based on culpabilization (Östling 
2011, 137).18
Sweden was reticent in developing a clear culpabilization narrative (surely 
more than Germany, but less than Austria). However, after decades of cancella-
tion, culpabilization became the mainstream narrative and the stigma of Nazism 
became “a powerful weapon in domestic debates” (Östling 2016, 152). This 
was also visible in the government’s research program “Sweden’s Relations with 
Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust,” which was launched in 2000.19
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective 
memory in Sweden are as follows: a value of 0.6 for cancellation, 0.1 for heroiza-
tion, and 0.3 for culpabilization in the 1970s and 1980s. From the 1990s, the 
small-state realism narrative lost its monopoly and Sweden was more resolute in 
facing its past, hence culpabilization increased (reaching 0.6) while cancellation 
went down to 0.3. The levels of stigma thus increased from 0.6 to 0.8.
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United Kingdom
The British narrative of the country’s role during World War II is unanimously 
considered as one of heroization. The fight against fascist regimes is described as 
Britain’s “finest hour” (S. Berger 2010, 124; Reynolds 2017, 194), in line with 
the topos introduced by Winston Churchill in one of his speeches from 1940 
(commonly referred to as ‘Their Finest Hour’).20 The British collective memory 
is based on the narrative of World War II as a “good” war that liberated Europe 
from evil (Bell 2013, 156). A people’s war with epic and heroic connotations 
depicting Britain as a fortress standing alone against hostility (Reynolds 2013, 
204), linked to the idea of British heroism as “totemic of an indomitable Albion” 
(Tombs 2013, 3).
The collective memory of the country’s role is extremely consistent over time 
and does not contain any secondary narrative. Some elements have been omit-
ted or underplayed, such as the contribution of the Commonwealth (Reynolds 
2013, 204) or the question of whether Britain could have done more to protect 
European Jews (Bell 2013, 156). However, the total opposition to fascist regimes 
and the defense of liberal values has never been at stake.
One of the outcomes of Britain’s unique type of experience was to set apart 
the country from Continental Europe, “creating a strong mental barrier against 
a common European memory of the war.” This in turn contributed to enduring 
“suspicions of post-war continental European supranational integration, a sense 
of superiority compared to other Europeans, and a notion that the United King-
dom’s role in European international politics was still that of a balancer of other 
continental powers” (Deighton 2002, 100). Well before Brexit, Deighton (2002, 
106) observed that: “Euro-indifference and Euroscepticism did not develop sim-
ply as a matter of ideological or constitutional distaste for supranational integra-
tion” (2002, 106).
Heroic and positive memories of the war continued to dominate memory dis-
courses for decades. Significantly, Luxembourg and Britain were the only two 
democratic countries “to experience no significant changes to the memory cul-
ture of the Second World War during the 1960s and 1970s” (T. Berger 2002, 
124). Unsurprisingly, in Britain wartime films about the finest hour are broad-
casted on all television channels (Berger 2010). Indeed, the film and publishing 
industries – similarly to what happens in the US – “continue to produce a stream 
of movies and books about the war, few of which problematize anything other 
than personal experiences of combatants” (Lebow 2006, 39).
The heroization narrative has remained the only accepted one in the public dis-
course, and it has never been questioned. As Berger claims (2010, 130), heroic 
and positive memories of the war and remembrances of solidarity in suffering 
“continued to dominate memory discourses up to the present day.” It is there-
fore safe to claim that the main narrative of heroization has not been under-
mined by the passage of time (Bell 2013). However, as it will emerge in next 
chapters, a memory of heroization does not produce the (low) levels of pop-
ulism expected.
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Considering the literature on the topic, the value attributed to the collec-
tive memory in the United Kingdom is as follows: a value of 1 for heroization 
throughout the whole timespan. Therefore, the level of stigma has remained 
stable at 0.7.
Germany
Germany constitutes a textbook case of culpabilization. A large literature on Ver-
gangenheitsbewältigung (or ‘coming to terms with the past’) shows that Ger-
many decided to face the past and to take responsibility for it (Art 2006, 19–20; 
T. Berger 2012, 63–64; Reichel 2001; Niven 2002; Olick 2007). This is rather 
unique, given that “the historical experience of other countries before and after 
the Nazi regime suggests that silence, avoidance, repression of the memory and 
past crimes are the norm rather than the exception” (Herf 2002, 184). The 
country did not have many options since the decision to blame everything on 
Germany “was one of the few matters on which all sides, within each country and 
among the Allied powers, could readily agree” (Judt 1992, 87).
Collective re-elaboration in Germany formed a memory built upon pillars such 
as collective guilt (Maier 1988), a culture of contrition (Art 2007, 338), the 
concept of Nie Wieder or ‘never again’ (Art 2006, 20), Aufrechnung or ‘set-
tling of accounts’ (Moeller 2006, 111), and Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit or 
‘working through the past’ (Adorno 1977). The German approach to the events 
which led to World War II and the Holocaust is based on acceptance of its own 
responsibility (Judt 1992, 87). However, it was not an immediate and spontane-
ous achievement. The pre-condition for the creation of a self-blaming memory of 
the Holocaust was the Allied military victory, which resulted in the Nuremberg 
trials and the de-Nazification process (Herf 2002, 185).
Initially, under Konrad Adenauer, Germany produced a victimization narrative 
portraying the people as victims of the Nazi regime (Moeller 2005; Niven 2010; 
S. Berger 2010, 91; Gregor 2008). In 1952, Bundespräsident Theodor Heuss 
ended this silencing phase and urged: “Diese Scham nimmt uns niemand ab! No 
one will lift this shame from us,” a speech which entered in the German political 
culture and “began an elite tradition of political recollection that would eventu-
ally contribute to broader public discussion and action” (Herf 2002, 190–92), 
although it was not until the end of the 1950s that the country established its 
process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Kansteiner 2006, 102).
Once established at the end of the 1950s, the culpabilization narrative was 
never seriously challenged in Western Germany, and the main contrast was rep-
resented by the possibility of comparing the Holocaust with other events. In the 
period 1986–87, this debate was particularly intense, to the point that it was 
labelled Historikerstreit, the “historians’ dispute” (S. Berger 2010, 131; Baldwin 
1990). Subsequently, according to several authors, the country went through a 
process of ‘normalization’ (Olick 1998; T. Berger 2002, 99) which led to the 
possibility to show once again some degree of patriotism and to shed the ghosts 
of the past – for example, with the 2006 football World Cup and the 1999 NATO 
124 Collective memory and fascist legacies
campaign in Kosovo. Therefore, it is possible to claim that – in an effort to 
normalize the country’s past – cancellation became part of the official narra-
tive, particularly as a result of a politics of memory (Geschichtspolitik) fostered by 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Art 2006, 50).
The ritualization of the German guilt has been zealous, and “it is hard to main-
tain that the horrors of the Nazi past have been forgotten” (T. Berger 2002, 95). 
This type of re-elaboration created in Germany a very distinctive perception of 
power politics and nationalism as “fundamentally incompatible with democracy” 
and “a threat to peace” (T. Berger 2002, 97). In Germany, a critical confronta-
tion with the Nazi past is a precondition for democracy, a way societies have to 
“inoculate themselves against pernicious ideas and, in the process, develop liberal 
democratic values” (Art 2006, 20). It is not surprising to notice that contrition 
is the only acceptable frame in the ritualized language characterized by political 
correctness for publicly discussing the Nazi past in Germany. It was Willy Brandt, 
the first SPD Chancellor (1969–1974), who promoted the so-called Streitkultur 
(culture of contention), while this frame was reinforced during the Historiker-
streit: “the public debates of the 1980s changed the boundaries of the legitimate 
discursive space in Germany and produced what I term ‘political correctness, 
German style’ ” (Art 2006, 82).
Another factor to consider is the impact of reunification on the country’s col-
lective memory (T. Berger 2002, 99; Herf 2002, 192). In the East, the collective 
memory was one of heroization because “Eastern Germany argued that it repre-
sented the opposition to fascism and thus bore no responsibility for the crimes of 
the regime it replaced” (Olick 1998, 559). In other words, “the communist nar-
rative presented East Germans as heroic antifascists who had liberated themselves 
from the Nazi capitalists” (Art 2006, 43). This heroic narrative made it possible 
for the East to reject and deny any responsibility (Herf 1997, 2016).
The communist narrative is the opposite of the one developed in the other half 
of the country. By observing the geographic distribution of the support for the 
AfD, it is possible to argue that this is (at least in part) “a legacy of the DDR’s 
externalization of the Nazi past” (Art 2006, 43). Indeed, Eastern German politi-
cians, similarly to what happened in Austria, largely externalized the Nazi past by 
“blaming the western German capitalists for the crimes committed by Nazism” 
(Art 2006, 198). This type of memory in the East was formed on what seems 
to constitute a contradiction: in fact, it was the East German communists, also 
victims with Jews in the concentration camps, “who rejected any responsibility or 
restitution for Jewish victims, and even blamed capitalist Jews for fascism” (Herf 
1997, 161). To build its own heroization memory, the East German regime 
“repressed the memory of the Jewish catastrophe and then moved on to anti-
Zionist, at times anti-Semitic, ideology and policy” (Herf 2002, 204). However 
problematic its core elements, the heroization narrative definitely entered Ger-
many’s collective memory after the process of reunification.
Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective 
memory in Germany are as follows. A value of 1 is given for culpabilization for 
the 1970s and 1980s since no other narrative challenged it. After reunification in 
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1989, the level of culpabilization drops to 0.8 because the process of normaliza-
tion of the past begins – thus introducing cancellation (0.1) – while the Eastern 
German narrative introduces elements of heroization (0.1) linked to the fight 
against the Nazis. The overall levels of stigma are therefore 1 in the 1970s and 
80s and 0.9 for the following decades.
Notes
 1 This section builds on (and expands) the analysis presented in Caramani and 
Manucci (2019). The paper, which constitutes a first step in the direction of 
examining the role of collective memories in explaining populism, presents addi-
tional information concerning the classification of countries. In the online appen-
dices, the relevant literature for each country is presented with the indication 
of the source, the relevant pages, and keywords that help assigning master and 
secondary narratives as well as to assess changes of narrative. Finally, in the online 
appendices are listed at least two experts per country who have been consulted in 
order to assess whether the literature included was relevant and complete enough.
 2 The advantage of assigning collective memories through the analysis of secondary 
literature consists in effectively addressing two of the caveats identified in Chap-
ter 3: the presence of secondary narratives and the variation over time of collective 
memories.
 3 Since the type of past analyzed here is fascism (and not, for example, colonialism), 
the United Kingdom does not have to deal with a cumbersome past.
 4 Italy describes as ‘victims’ even the fascist soldiers killed in the Northeast by Tito’s 
partisans. Neo-fascist organizations, indeed, can openly celebrate the “victims of 
Communism” each February, during the recently institutionalized “National Memo-
rial Day of the Exiles and Foibe.” To diminish the atrocities of the fascist regime, the 
mantra of those “killed in the foibe” is highly recurrent, and not only among extreme 
right-wing activists but also in mainstream parties both from the right and from the 
left, anxious to put the past behind them and finally form a shared memory (Tenca 
Montini 2014). Tellingly, a picture that often circulates to represent “the atrocities 
against the poor Italian victims” actually depicts Italian soldiers killing civilians in 
Slovenia. In this way, 20 years of fascist violence in the Balkans are removed. What 
remains is the victimization of a country that pretends not to remember what Ital-
ians did in Istria and Dalmatia (Focardi and Klinkhammer 2004).
 5 In 1994, the memorandum titled by the British Secret Intelligence Service 
Atrocities in Italy, was found in a wooden cabinet in Rome. The magistrate that 
exposed the content of the armoire of shame was Antonino Intelisano, who later 
condemned the SS commander Erich Priebke to a life sentence for participating 
in the Ardeatine massacre in Rome (March 1944) in which 335 Italian civilians 
were killed. Priebke could live for 50 years in Argentina after the defeat of Nazi 
Germany.
 6 It will suffice to cite a very recent example. In March 2019, the president of 
the European parliament Antonio Tajani has declared that Mussolini had done 
positive things and, in particular, that he had a good record on developing infra-
structure. Now, imagine a German politician (not necessarily as important as the 
president of the European parliament) who attributes positive traits to the gov-
ernment of Adolf Hitler. This simple thought experiment is quite effective in 
showing the opposite collective memories developed in the two countries.
 7 In 2017, Marine Le Pen claimed that in her opinion France is not responsible for 
the Vel d’Hiv. She was thus denying that France (which in 1942 was governed 
by the Vichy regime) was responsible for the roundup of more than 13,000 Jews 
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who were then sent to Nazi death camps. Her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has 
been convicted repeatedly for Anti-Semitic and racist comments such as calling 
the Holocaust a “detail of history.”
 8 It would be extremely interesting to observe whether a correlation can be estab-
lished between the cancellation of the fascist past in Western countries and the 
denial of the atrocities committed in their former colonies.
 9 Things might further evolve in the near future. In July 2017, French President 
Emmanuel Macron publicly denounced France’s collaboration in the Holocaust 
and announced, “It is convenient to see the Vichy regime as born of nothing-
ness, returned to nothingness. Yes, it’s convenient, but it is false. We cannot build 
pride upon a lie.” The New York Times, “Macron Denounces Anti-Zionism as 
‘Reinvented Form of Anti-Semitism’ ”, by Russell Goldman, July 17, 2017, avail-
able online (consulted in July 2017): www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/world/
europe/macron-israel-holocaust-antisemitism.html.
 10 A telling joke about Austria’s collective memory is attributed to Billy Wilder, 
Austrian-born Jewish American filmmaker: “The Austrians have accomplished 
the feat of turning Beethoven into an Austrian, and Hitler into a German.” Der 
Spiegel, “Späte Heimkehr”, by Hellmuth Karasek, May 16, 1994.
 11 In 2018, the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz claimed that Austria was so quick 
to embrace fascism in the 1930s because of “the endless quarrels between the right 
wing and the left,” which in turn made democracy slip into chaos. A dialogue 
“with all political sides” constitutes his recipe for a strong democracy. Coherently, 
Chancellor Kurz handed to the Freedom Party (which has roots in Austria’s Nazi 
past) the posts for the interior and foreign ministries. The leader of the Free-
dom Party and now vice chancellor of Austria, Heinz-Christian Strache, has been 
photographed more than once participating in paramilitary exercises with banned 
Nazi groups. The quotes from the speech of Sebastian Kurz are in: Time, “Aus-
tria’s Young Chancellor Sebastian Kurz Is Bringing the Far-Right Into the Main-
stream”, by Simon Shuster, November 29, 2018, available online (consulted in 
March 2019): http://time.com/magazine/south-pacific/5466661/december-
10th-2018-vol-192-no-24-asia-europe-middle-east-and-africa-south-pacific/.
 12 It is unclear to what extent Austria has really dismissed its former narrative, in 
particular after the formation of the coalition government between ÖVP and 
FPÖ in 2017. Christian Kern, former Austrian Chancellor, claims that Kurz 
and his allies are “shifting the red lines of what is morally and politically accept-
able permanently to the right.” Financial Times, “Sebastian Kurz: saviour of 
Europe’s mainstream or friend of the far-right?”, by Ben Hall and Ralph Aykins, 
January 6, 2019, available online (consulted in March 2019): www.ft.com/
content/9396664c-044d-11e9-9d01-cd4d49afbbe3.
 13 Edgar Bonjour, a Swiss historian, questioned the neutrality of the country and 
examined its implications. See Bonjour (1970).
 14 The reactions of the Swiss public opinion remind the Austrian case in the after-
math of the Waldheim affair.
 15 Tellingly, only a small number of collaborators were prosecuted, and none of 
them served a sentence of more than 15 years (De Haan 2011, 78).
 16 It is remarkable to notice that the Netherlands state-owned train company, Ned-
erlandse Spoorwegen (NS), decided to compensate individuals whose Jewish rela-
tives were deported on its trains to concentration camps. The decision came only 
in November 2018, after the company already apologized in 2005 for its role in 
the WWII deportations of Jews. However, no real public debate took place about 
the country’s past.
 17 Although the myth does not necessarily contain only truth, since “myth and 
historical consciousness tend to be mutually exclusive as approaches to reality” 
(Colla 2002, 131).
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 18 The results of the Sweden Democrats at the last two elections (2014 and 2018) 
show that they established themselves as the country’s third largest party. This 
might signal a new change of direction in Sweden’s collective memory. The fact 
that a party with roots in neo-Nazism and that promises to “give Sweden back to 
the Swedish” can expect to participate in a government coalition in the near future 
reveals that the levels of stigma might have decreased in Sweden. However, it is also 
true that the Sweden Democrats toned down their radicalism in order to be accepted 
as a credible party. In the meantime, “the country’s political discourse has so dras-
tically transformed in both tone and content that the Sweden Democrats’ world-
view no longer appears as part of a radical fringe, but rather a prominent fixture of 
the mainstream.” Jacobin, “The Far Right Comes to Sweden”, by Petter Larsson, 
November 1, 2016, available online (consulted in March 2019): www. jacobinmag.
com/2016/01/sweden-democrats-jimmie-akesson-far-right-europe/.
 19 It also included a survey published (in English) in 2006, titled “Sweden’s Rela-
tions with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.”
 20 A few passages of the speech delivered in Parliament at Westminster, 18 
June 1940, are worth mentioning to better understand the British heroization 
narrative (author’s italics): “Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian 
civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our 
institutions and our Empire. . . . Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this 
island or lose the war. . . . Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so 
bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thou-
sand years, men will still say: ‘this was their finest hour’.”
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This is the first of two analytical chapters aiming at understanding which factors, 
or combination of factors, explain the different levels of populism’s social accept-
ability in different countries over time. It presents the results of the fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), testing the impact of four conditions 
that are supposed to explain populism’s Salonfähigkeit: high levels of corrup-
tion, low accountability and responsiveness, high ideological convergence of the 
political system, and poor economic performance. The selection of these condi-
tions is rooted in the vast literature on the electoral performance of populist 
parties, and it has been adapted to the scope of this study, as explained in detail 
in Chapter 2. The results show that the factors tested in this chapter – at least 
with the current operationalization and calibration – fail to provide a convincing 
explanation for the social acceptability of populism in a consistent way across the 
three outcomes.1 On the one hand, the conditions behind the acceptability of 
overall populism are quite in line with the expectations, and the solution formula 
has acceptable coefficients. On the other hand, the solutions obtained for right- 
and left-wing populism are far from satisfactory. As Chapter 8 demonstrates, the 
introduction of levels of stigma of the fascist past produces much better results, 
especially concerning right-wing populism.
Operationalization and calibration
In fsQCA, the data are expressed in fuzzy set membership scores ranging from 0 
to 1. This means that a certain case (a country in a decade, say France in 1995) 
can be more or less part of a certain outcome (social acceptability of left-wing 
populism) or a certain condition (high levels of corruption). Set membership 
scores (between 0 and 1) express how much that case is part of an outcome or 
a condition. When France in 1995 scores 0.7 in the condition ‘high levels of 
corruption,’ it means it does show rather high levels of corruption. This chap-
ter, therefore, presents the raw data collected through several databases (for the 
conditions) and the content analysis (for the outcomes), and in a second step it 
shows the calibration of the raw data into fuzzy set scores. Appendix 4 shows the 
conversion or raw values into fuzzy set membership scores for the four conditions 
(Table A4.1) and the three outcomes (Table A4.2).
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Fuzzy – rather than crisp – membership scores offer the possibility to overcome 
a pure dichotomization of data (Ragin 2000). For example, while crisp scores 
would reduce the acceptability of populism to a ‘yes or no’ configuration, fuzzy 
membership scores describe to what extent populism is acceptable in a certain 
country – not simply whether it is acceptable or not (above or below 0.5) but 
rather how acceptable it is. The same applies to each of the conditions tested. It 
would be reductive to have only cases with low and high corruption when it is 
possible to determine to what extent corruption is present in each country. In this 
way, it is possible to make a better use of the data and to transfer to the analysis a 
more precise and detailed type of information.
The calibration procedure is a key element in order to obtain fuzzy set mem-
berships as adequate as possible. For example, using the average of the raw val-
ues to set the 0.5 threshold is a possible strategy, but it might be devoid of any 
substantial meaning. For this reason, a deep qualitative knowledge of the cases 
is an essential pre-condition. As it will be clear reading the next sections, here 
calibration is not performed arbitrarily but through a substantive familiarity with 
the topic which allows to perform calibration in an informed way.
This section discusses the operationalization of conditions and outcomes, as 
well as their calibration.2 Both substantive theoretical knowledge and empiri-
cal evidence constitute the main parameters for the calibration. When the direct 
method of calibration is used (based on minimum, average, and maximum val-
ues), the software calculates the membership scores for each case in the different 
sets by means of a logarithmic function. A value of 1 is assigned to cases which 
are fully members of that set, while 0.5 is the point of maximum ambiguity, which 
means that it is not possible to establish whether the case is a member or a non-
member of the set, and 0 indicates full non-membership (Ragin 2008). As much 
as possible, purely data-driven calibrations are avoided, while a great amount of 
attention is devoted to the location of qualitative anchors.
Outcome: social acceptability of populism
The outcome to be explained is the social acceptability of populism, which is also 
further disentangled in left- and right-wing populism, for three total outcomes. 
Theoretically, the four selected conditions are supposed to explain populism per 
se, regardless of the thick ideology attached to it. However, it might be the case 
that the conditions fail to explain the social acceptability of populism’s overall 
levels, while they explain the acceptability of either right- or left-wing populism. 
In other words, the four selected conditions are supposed to explain populism’s 
acceptability in general, but it is relevant to observe whether they perform dif-
ferently when it comes to explain precise ideological manifestations of populism.
The social acceptability of populism is measured as the percentage of populist 
statements in a manifesto that are then weighted by the degree of radicalism of 
the party as well as its vote share in that election (see Chapter 4). The values 
are displayed in Appendix 3 (Table A3.1). In the case that, during an election, 
more than one party manifesto had traces of populism, so the percentages were 
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aggregated. In order to assign full membership or non-membership for the cases 
in the outcomes, as well as the crossover points, it is essential to observe the 
empirical data. Each choice is here justified and explained in detail in order to 
transparently expose the process of calibration and link it to the intensive knowl-
edge of each case.
As Table 7.1 shows, a country displays high levels of social acceptability of pop-
ulism, and therefore is a full member of the outcome, if it shows a value which is 
equal to or higher than the one displayed in France in 1995 (1,891). Cases with 
even higher values than France in 1995 are considered as outliers and extraneous 
variation. France in 1995 is considered as a full member of the outcome because 
each and every manifesto analyzed contains populism. Three are from left-wing 
parties and three from right-wing parties. On the left, both mainstream (PS) and 
non-mainstream parties (PCF, LO) show average or very high levels of populism 
in their manifestos (between 4% and 13%). On the right, the situation is similar, 
with the mainstream RPR and UDF articulating populist messages (6% and 4%) 
as well as the Front National (5%). Moreover, the PS and the RPR together 
obtained more than 44% of the vote share, and the degree of radicalism of the 
non-mainstream parties is extremely elevated (between 4.3 and 6). These fac-
tors combined draw the conclusion that France in 1995 is a case which deserves 
Table 7.1 Conditions and Their Calibration
Conditions Description Calibration
POP Percentage (combined) of populist statements in 
the party manifestos per country in each decade 
(weighted by radicalism and vote share)
1 = 1,891
0.5 = 816
0 = 0
POP_L Percentage (combined) of populist statements in left-
wing party manifestos per country in each decade 
(weighted by radicalism and vote share)
1= 800
0.5 = 436
0 = 0
POP_R Percentage (combined) of populist statements in 
right-wing party manifestos per country in each 
decade (weighted by radicalism and vote share)
1 = 802
0.5 = 419
0= 0
C High levels of corruption 1 = 12
0.5 = 68
0 = 92
D Poor democratic performance in terms of 
accountability and responsiveness
1 = 48
0.5 = 65
0 = 75
E Poor economic performance: slow growth GDP per 
capita, high Gini Household Disposable Income 
coefficient, high unemployment rate
1 = 16
0.5 = 10
0 = 5
CNVG High ideological convergence of the political parties 1 = 0.22
0.5 = 0.45
0 = 0.67
S Low levels of stigmatization of the fascist past 1 = 0
0.5 = 0.5
0 = 1
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full membership in the outcome. Switzerland in 2011 shows very similar values 
(1,888), and it could have been chosen as well. Moreover, there is a clear gap 
in the scale since both cases precede a jump in the values. Indeed, the next case 
(Switzerland in 1995) shows a much higher level (178 points difference).
The crossover point is identified at a value of 816, meaning that the United 
Kingdom in 2003 is considered as being a member of the outcome but the Neth-
erlands in 2012 is not. There is an obvious gap in the levels of populism of these 
two cases but also more substantial reasons. It is true that all six coded manifestos 
in the Netherlands in 2012 show traces of populism, but all six are definitely 
below the average (5.7% for right-wing manifestos and 7.6% for left-wing mani-
festos), with only the PVV getting close to it (5.1%). This makes it particularly 
difficult to interpret the actual level of social acceptability of populism in the 
country at that time. Moreover, in the Netherlands the levels of radicalism are 
low or very low, once again with the exception of the PVV. On the other hand, in 
the United Kingdom in 2003, the three coded manifestos have average or high 
levels of populism (the Labour Party’s manifesto reaches 8.1%), and together 
they cover more than 90% of the vote share. All the cases with values higher than 
the one for the Netherlands in 2012 are therefore considered as more in than 
out of the category concerning the social acceptability of populism, while those 
below are more out than in.3
Only 9 cases are below the crossover point, while 14 are above it. The fact 
that only a few cases are more out than in simply reflects the fact that, in Western 
Europe in the last three decades, populism is a constant feature of party manifestos. 
Moreover, considering the levels of radicalism and the voter share received by 
parties articulating populist messages, it is possible to observe how populism has 
become socially acceptable. This confirms how important the finer details and 
unique characteristics of each case are in order to perform calibration. Finally, the 
low number of cases which do not belong to the outcome suggests that it would 
be interesting to expand the analysis to countries with a lower social acceptability 
of populism (such as Portugal) in order to produce more generalizable results.
A country displays high levels of social acceptability of left-wing populism, and 
therefore is a full member of the outcome, if it shows a value which is equal to 
or higher than the one displayed in Switzerland in 1995 (800). Cases with even 
higher values are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. Switzerland in 
1995 can be considered as a full member of the outcome because both coded man-
ifestos from left-wing parties display levels of populism close to or greatly above 
the average percentage for populism in left-wing manifestos (5.6%). In particular, 
the Green Party has a level of 3.8%, while the Socialist Party displays a remarkable 
11.6% which, combined with the medium level of radicalism (3) and a good elec-
toral result (21.8%), confirms that in Switzerland mainstream left-wing parties can 
be highly populist and therefore left-wing populism is socially acceptable. On the 
other hand, the case considered below, Austria in 1994, cannot be regarded as a 
full member because there is only one left-wing populist manifesto (SPÖ, 7.1%).
The crossover point is identified at a value of 436, meaning that Switzerland in 
2003 is considered as being the most borderline member of the outcome while 
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Germany in 2002 (310) is not a member at all. Apart from the clear gap in the 
levels, other significant reasons for the calibration exist. In Switzerland, both 
party manifestos contain populism; although the levels are below the average 
(they show levels of 3.1% and 3.3%, compared to an average level of 5.6%), the 
mainstream left-wing party (SP) is not only populist but also highly radical (4.8).4 
On the other hand, it is also true that in Germany both coded manifestos contain 
populism but at lower percentages (3.6% and 1.5%). Moreover, the mainstream 
left-wing party (SPD) is very moderate compared to the Swiss Socialist Party 
(2 on the radicalism scale). All the cases with values higher than that of Germany 
in 2002 are therefore considered as more in than out of the category concerning 
the social acceptability of left-wing populism, while those with values below are 
more out than in.
This time, the distribution is more even: while 11 cases are below the crossover 
point, 12 are above it. Compared to the overall levels of acceptability of pop-
ulism, left-wing populism seems to be less socially accepted (this is certainly a 
result of the fact that the 1970s and 1980s are not included in the analysis; see 
Chapter 5, Figure 5.4). It would be interesting to expand the analysis to South 
European countries such as Spain and Greece in order to produce results that are 
more generalizable.
A country displays high levels of social acceptability of right-wing populism, 
and therefore is a full member of the outcome, if it shows a value which is equal 
to or higher than the one displayed in France in 1995 (802). Cases with even 
higher values are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. France in 1995 
can be considered as a full member of the outcome because all three coded mani-
festos from right-wing parties display levels of populism close to or above the 
average percentage of populism in right-wing manifestos (4.5%). Moreover, the 
three parties combined obtained more than 54% of the vote share, with the Front 
National showing the highest possible degree of radicalism. Switzerland in 2011 
has similar values and could have been used as well.
The crossover point is identified at a value of 419, meaning that Austria in 
2002 is considered as being a member of the outcome while Germany in 1994 
is not. In Austria, both right-wing party manifestos contain populism (3.5% and 
0.7%), although the level is below average (4.5%). Moreover, they both present 
a high degree of radicalism, and the two parties combined obtained more than 
46% of the vote share. On the other hand, although in Germany both party 
manifestos also show traces of populism (2.4% and 3.7%), the parties are less 
radical and obtained a smaller portion of the vote share than in Austria. All the 
cases with values higher than that of Austria in 2002 are therefore considered 
as more in than out of the category concerning the social acceptability of right-
wing populism, while those below are more out than in. It follows that only 
8 cases are below the crossover point, while 15 are above it. It would be interest-
ing to expand the analysis to countries with a low social acceptability of right-
wing populism (although currently they seem to be scarce) in order to produce 
more generalizable results. Appendix 5 shows the distribution of cases in the 
three outcomes (Figure A5.1 to Figure A5.3).
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Condition 1: corruption
The first condition refers to levels of corruption. The raw data are obtained by 
scaling and standardizing the values from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
by Transparency International – measuring the overall extent of perceived cor-
ruption in the public and political sectors – and the data published by the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – assessing the levels of corruption within 
the political system.5 I take into account the average levels of corruption for the 
four years preceding the election and then reverse them in order to obtain a value 
of 1 where the level of corruption is very high and 0 where it is very low. This is 
the case because populism is supposed to become more socially accepted when 
corruption scandals are widespread and corruption is perceived as problematic.
The determination of full membership and non-membership for the cases is 
based on the most extreme cases in the distribution. Sweden and Switzerland in 
the 1990s are the countries with the lowest perception of corruption, scoring 
values above 90, while Italy in both 1994 and 2013 has the lowest values (12). 
The average value for all countries is 68, and this is used to determine the crosso-
ver point. Hence, 8 cases are below average, while 15 cases are above it. Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands are always members of the outcome, while 
Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom two times out of three. Italy (2) and 
France (3) are never members of the outcome, meaning that they have a problem 
with (perceived and actual) corruption. This distribution mirrors the fact that in 
West European countries the levels of corruption are generally low, while at the 
same time it takes into consideration the average value in order to set a threshold.
Condition 2: accountability and responsiveness
The second condition refers to the levels of accountability and responsiveness, 
here unified in a single measure. The two intertwined concepts insist on dem-
ocratic elements that play a prominent role in the populist critique of liberal 
democracy. While responsiveness consists in “reflecting and giving expression to 
the will of the people” (Pennock 1952, 790), accountability refers to politician’s 
capability to respond to citizens for the decisions taken, and it is assessed in terms 
of the “ends achieved” and the “means employed” to achieve them (Moncrieffe 
1998, 388–89).
Determining these aspects is a particularly complex task, and it was necessary 
to construct a (certainly rough) proxy by combining four indicators present in 
the Democracy Barometer (DB).6 For responsiveness, two indicators have been 
selected from the DB: governmental capability and representation. The former 
combines measures for the government’s length, stability, and popular support, 
while the latter combines measures for anti-government actions, political inter-
ference by the military and religion, and effective implementation of govern-
ment decisions. For accountability, two indicators have been selected from the 
DB: transparency of the political process and fairness of competition. The former 
combines measures for freedom of information, informational openness, and the 
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transparency of government policy, while the latter combines measures for the 
openness and competitiveness of elections.7
The goal is to measure the quality of democratic mechanisms regulating the 
relationship between the people and their representatives, a key element of the 
populist critique to the liberal idea of democracy. The stronger accountability and 
responsiveness are, the less space there should be for a populist critique, therefore 
making populism less socially acceptable.
The final value of the condition is obtained by calculating the average values of 
the four indicators (two for accountability and two for responsiveness) in the four 
years before the elections (Table A4.3). The distribution of cases was considered 
to obtain the anchors for calibration. Moreover, since a low level of accountability 
and responsiveness is supposed to trigger populism, the DB’s values have subse-
quently been reversed.
Switzerland in 2011 scores better than any other country (75), therefore it is 
taken as the anchor for full non-membership (in Switzerland democratic mecha-
nisms of responsiveness and accountability seem to be particularly strong). The 
United Kingdom in 1995 has the lowest value (48), and it is therefore selected 
as the anchor for full membership (this might be linked to the country’s institu-
tional setting and electoral system). The average value for all countries is 62.5, 
but the selected crossover point is 65.
This is due to the fact that Austria and Germany in 2013 would have been 
members of the outcome by taking into consideration just the overall average, 
but if one considers the average for the specific decade (64.6) they fall below that 
level. The same applies to Austria in 2002, which scores below the average for the 
decade (64.7). Therefore, the crossover point is established at 65, and the only 3 
countries included in the set are Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. On 
the other hand, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are 
always non-members of the condition. This shows a clear demarcation between 
countries delivering in terms of accountability and responsiveness and countries 
that do not deliver. Moreover, it suggests that – despite the fact that every West-
ern Europe country can be considered as fully democratized – some democratic 
mechanisms such as those considered here can and should be improved.
Condition 3: economic performance
The third condition concerns the economic performance of the countries. It 
includes the average values in the four years before elections for three parameters: 
unemployment rate, Gini household disposable income, and the growth of GDP 
per capita. The final value consists of the sum of the data for unemployment 
and the Gini coefficient minus the value for unemployment (since the first two 
have high values when the situation is negative, while the last works in the other 
direction). High values indicate a poor economic performance, which in turn is 
supposed to trigger populism.
The data for unemployment are obtained from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)8 and from the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF)9 for the missing cases. The Gini household disposable income is 
considered more precise than the general Gini coefficient because it measures 
inequality after redistribution, and it is obtained from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database.10 It is important to consider inequality because the 
gap between the poor and the rich, which is supposed to be a key element in 
triggering populism, can explain the presence of populism also in rich countries. 
Finally, the data concerning the growth of GDP per capita are obtained from the 
World Bank.11
The determination of full membership and non-membership is based on the 
most extreme cases in the distribution (Appendix 4, Table A4.4). Sweden in 
2002 scores better than any other country (5); therefore, it is taken as the anchor 
for full non-membership in the condition ‘poor economic performance.’ The 
Swedish economy in the 2000s was performing very well, in particular the GDP 
growth was remarkable (+14% in the four years preceding the 2002 election), 
while the Gini coefficient indicating inequality was particularly low (23). The 
country with the worst economic performance is Italy in 2013 (16), and it is 
therefore selected as the anchor for full membership. Italy in 2013 was still heavily 
affected by the economic crisis, certainly more than any other country included 
in this study: high inequality (32) was combined with high levels of unemploy-
ment (almost 9%), and the GDP per capita decreased significantly (-7.1%) in the 
four years before the elections.
The average value for all countries is 10.2, and this is used as the crossover 
point, making Switzerland in 2011 the most ambiguous case. This reflects the 
importance of including in the measure the levels of inequality after redistribu-
tion, in which Switzerland in 2011 scores rather poorly (27.5) while, for exam-
ple, its unemployment rate was very low (only 3.4%). Overall, the distribution 
of cases is homogeneous (11 cases are members of the condition while 12 are 
not). Interestingly, no country is always a member or a non-member (apart 
from Italy, which is a member two times out of two). Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden are non-members in two cases out of three. Switzer-
land, France, and the United Kingdom are members in two cases out of three. 
This indicates that, in the short period, the economic performance varies more 
compared to rather stable elements linked to accountability and responsiveness 
of the political system.
Condition 4: ideological convergence
The fourth condition refers to the ideological convergence of the party system, 
and it is calculated following Dalton’s formula (2008) which takes into account 
the number of parties, their vote share, and their positioning on the right-left 
scale.12 The degree of radicalism is provided as explained in Chapter 4. The meas-
urement includes all the parties which obtained at least 5% of the vote share. Since 
the formula measures polarization (going from 0 when all parties are located at 
the same position on the right-left scale to 10 when all parties are located at the 
extreme positions), the values for ideological polarization are reversed in order 
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to provide the degree of ideological convergence on a scale from 0 (lowest) to 
1 (maximum convergence). This is done because the ideological convergence of 
the political spectrum is often considered as a trigger for the social acceptability 
of populism.
One might argue that the ideological convergence of the political system 
(measured with Dalton’s formula and therefore taking into consideration the 
parties’ vote share and degree of radicalism) is endogenous to populism’s social 
acceptability (which also includes the parties vote share as well as their degree 
of radicalism). This, however, is not necessarily true. First, it is hard to think of 
any potential uncontrolled confounder causing both the ideological convergence 
and the social acceptability of populism. Second, it is unlikely that the social 
acceptability of populism could cause the convergence of the ideological space 
(while the opposite is definitely possible). For example, Ezrow et al. (2010) show 
that mainstream and niche political parties rely on different strategies to adjust 
their position on the right-left scale as a reaction to the shift of voters’ positions. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to imagine that the social acceptability of pop-
ulism explains the convergence of the ideological space. To be completely sure 
about the fact that including this condition does not alter the results because of 
endogeneity, several robustness tests that excludes convergence are performed.13
The determination of full membership and non-membership is based on the 
most extreme cases in the distribution. The Netherlands in 1994 has the low-
est value for polarization (0.22), and therefore it represents the anchor for full 
membership. On the other hand, Switzerland in 2003 has the highest values for 
polarization (0.67), and hence it represents the anchor for full non-membership. 
The average is 0.45, and there are no theoretical reasons not to use it as crosso-
ver point. Accordingly, 15 cases belong to the outcome, while 8 cases do not. 
This means that a majority of the cases analyzed shows a (relatively) high level of 
ideological convergence. Appendix 5 (Figure A5.4) shows the distribution of the 
cases in the four conditions.
Results
This section presents the results of the fsQCA analysis. First, it tests whether it is 
possible to assess any necessary condition for the presence of the social accept-
ability of populism. Second, it tests whether any combination of conditions is 
sufficient for the presence of the outcome. The analysis is then repeated with the 
same conditions but considering first only left- and then only right-wing parties.14
According to the common notation system in QCA, all the conditions as well 
as the three outcome variables are indicated by a capital letter to indicate their 
presence (D) and a lowercase for the absence (d). Moreover, in Boolean alge-
bra, the signs + (addition) and * (multiplication) are used to explain the rela-
tion between several conditions. The addition sign (+) stands for the logical ‘or,’ 
while the multiplication sign (*) means a logical ‘and.’ Finally, in QCA there are 
three possible solutions that can be reported: conservative (or complex), inter-
mediate, and parsimonious solution. They differ with regards to the assumption 
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they make about logical remainders.15 They are fully reported in Appendix 6, 
but the analysis focuses on the most parsimonious solution. Since the aim is to 
confront the results with or without the introduction of the levels of stigma of 
the fascist past, the assumptions made are the same, and the results are easier to 
interpret. Moreover, Appendix 9 shows the parsimonious solution for the analysis 
performed without the condition measuring the ideological convergence of the 
political spectrum (with similar results).
According to the principle of causal asymmetry, necessity and sufficiency are 
also tested for the absence of the three outcomes, and the absence of conditions 
is tested both for the outcomes and their absence. Deviant and typical cases are 
analyzed in Chapter 8 in order to assess whether the introduction of the levels of 
stigma is a difference-maker in explaining the social acceptability of populism.16
To interpret each solution, three indicators are reported: inclusion, coverage, 
and PRI. The coefficient for inclusion (other authors use the term consistency) 
shows how ‘precise’ the solution formula is in explaining the occurrence of the 
outcome, while coverage coefficients describe how many cases are covered by 
that solution formula. Although they are not strictly necessary (and for this rea-
son they are not discussed), the PRI values are reported as well. PRI stands for 
proportional reduction in inconsistency and is an alternate measure of inclusion. 
It is more exacting than the usual raw consistency, and it expresses how much a 
given solution is not only a subset of the outcome but also of the absence of the 
outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thiem and Duşa 2013).
Explaining the social acceptability of populism
This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
social acceptability of populism (it includes all manifestos analyzed, both right- 
and left-wing). The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and respon-
siveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C), and 
high levels of ideological convergence (CNVG). The levels of stigma associated 
to the fascist past will be introduced in Chapter 8.
The analysis for necessity evaluates whether the outcome is a subset of any of 
the analyzed conditions, meaning that the condition appears every time the out-
come is present. I checked whether each condition has an inclusion coefficient 
possibly close to 1 and never below 0.9. This is not the case, and the same applies 
to the absence of the outcome. The analysis for the absence of the conditions, 
in line with the theoretical expectations, does not produce any significant result. 
This means that none of the four conditions (or their absence) is a necessary con-
dition for the presence or absence of the outcome.
The next step consists in assessing sufficiency – in other words, determining 
which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of 
the outcome. If a condition (or configuration of conditions) is sufficient, it means 
that it is a subset of the outcome, and this implies that when the configuration 
is present, the outcome must also be present. Each case, a certain country in a 
certain time point, can be a member of only one configuration of conditions 
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(following the crisp approach that for each condition a case can only be in or out, 
below or above the 0.5 threshold).
This is visualized in the truth table (Table 7.2), which displays 16 rows because 
there are 4 tested conditions (k), which means that there are 16 possible configu-
rations (2k). The column “Populism” indicates whether a certain configuration 
leads to the outcome (1: high social acceptability of populism) or to its absence 
(0: low social acceptability of populism).
The logical reminders, configurations which are not covered by any empirically 
observed case, are represented by the last four rows. They represent configura-
tions of conditions which are not covered by any empirical case analyzed here. 
In the most parsimonious solution, assumptions are made about the outcome 
attributed to these configurations. The level of inclusion shows to what extent 
each configuration is sufficient for the outcome, and the last column indicates 
which cases cover that configuration.
This analysis considers only configurations with an inclusion coefficient higher 
than 0.88. This means that the first 9 rows indicate the configurations that are 
considered as sufficient for the outcome; 17 out of 23 cases are therefore cov-
ered. All the other rows are not considered as sufficient configurations for the 
outcome. The inclusion threshold is rather high (.88) because of the distribution 
of the cases concerning the outcome.
Since a majority of cases is more in than out for the presence of the outcome, 
only those rows with a higher explanatory power are included. Normally a clear 
jump in the coefficients would be used, but in this case, there is no clear jump.17 
For these reasons, .88 seems to provide a reasonable cut-off point. Importantly, 
Table 7.2 Truth Table: Total Populism
Conditions Outcome
C D E CNVG Populism n Inclusion Cases
1 1 0 0 1 1 0.9859 AT_94
1 1 1 1 1 4 0.9763 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
1 1 1 0 1 1 0.9627 FR_12
0 1 1 0 1 2 0.9613 DE_13,UK_95
0 1 1 1 1 1 0.9375 AT_13
0 0 1 1 1 2 0.9246 CH_95,CH_11
1 1 0 1 1 2 0.9070 DE_02,FR_02
0 1 0 0 1 2 0.8992 AT_02,DE_94
0 0 1 0 1 2 0.8874 NL_12,SE_94
0 0 0 0 0 1 0.8709 CH_03
0 1 0 1 0 1 0.8703 UK_03
0 0 0 1 0 4 0.7548 NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1 0 0 0 ? 0 -
1 0 0 1 ? 0 -
1 0 1 0 ? 0 -
1 0 1 1 ? 0 -
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the same criteria will be applied when explaining the two outcomes: populism in 
right- and left-wing party manifestos. Moreover, the choice of the cut-off point 
is relatively important for the type of analysis performed in this study; since the 
crucial point is the difference between the two models, with and without the 
levels of stigma of the fascist past, what ultimately matters is to observe in which 
model more cases can be explained.
The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (per-
formed via software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular config-
uration. The first solution is called complex or conservative, and it makes no 
assumptions about the configurations for which there are no observed cases (log-
ical reminders). The intermediate solution, on the other hand, includes direc-
tional expectation; in this case, each condition is supposed to trigger high levels 
of social acceptability of populism. Finally, for the most parsimonious solution, a 
hypothetical outcome is allocated to the configurations without observed cases 
as long as this leads to a simpler (more parsimonious) solution. For this type of 
solution, it is important that there are no simplifying assumptions (certain con-
figurations without an observed outcome might be assumed to explain both the 
outcome and its absence, which would be a contradiction).18
All the sufficient rows with inclusion higher than .88 were included after check-
ing also for contradictory rows (configurations with observed cases leading both 
to the outcome and to its absence). For reasons of space, I will avoid presenting 
here the conservative and intermediate solutions (see Appendix 6, Table A6.1). 
The formula obtained for the most parsimonious solution is:
C E D cnvg POP+ + =>*
The solution has acceptable coefficients and is quite in line with the hypothesis, 
apart from the condition CNVG; it is the polarization of the ideological space, 
rather than its convergence, that, combined with D, C, or E, explains the social 
acceptability of populism. This means that high levels of corruption (C), (+) a low 
economic performance (E), or a combination of low accountability and respon-
siveness with (*) a low ideological convergence of the political space (D*cnvg) 
are sufficient to explain the social acceptability of populism. Figure 7.1 represents 
the plot between the solution formula and the social acceptability of populism.19
This solution has an inclusion coefficient of .814, indicating that cases fall close 
to the line (the effect of the configuration is predicted precisely). The coverage 
coefficient is .772 (acceptable but meaning that more that 20% of the cases are 
not explained by this solution formula). This indicates that some deviant cases 
coverage have a higher score in the solution rather than in the outcome (upper-
left quadrant): Switzerland and the United Kingdom in 2003 and the Nether-
lands in 2002. They are therefore truly logically contradictory cases because they 
show a high acceptability of populism while not being members of the solution 
(C + E + D*cnvg). This implies that there is another condition, not included in 
this model, that explains the presence social acceptability of populism. Moreover, 
there are several deviant cases for consistency. They should be members of the 
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outcome (meaning that they were supposed to show high social acceptability of 
populism) but for some reason they are not: Sweden in 1994, Austria and Ger-
many in 2002, and France in 2012.
Explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism
This section repeats the analysis but this time trying to explain the social accept-
ability of right-wing populism only. The analysis does not indicate any neces-
sary condition for the presence (or the absence) of the outcome. Similarly, the 
absence of conditions does not give any result. All the coefficients are far from 
the threshold typically assumed to indicate necessity (.9). This means that none 
of the four conditions (or their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence 
(or absence) of the outcome.
Figure 7.1 Plot with Solution for Total Levels of Populism
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The next step consists of assessing sufficiency – in other words, the aim is to 
determine which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or 
absence) of the outcome. The analysis reveals that no configuration is sufficient 
for the absence of the outcome. The truth table (Table 7.3) presents the results 
for the presence of the outcome, and it is composed of 16 rows displaying all the 
possible configurations. For the subsequent minimization, only configurations 
with an inclusion coefficient of at least 0.83 are included.20 This means that only 
the first 5 rows indicate the configurations that are considered as sufficient for the 
outcome: 9 out of 23 cases are therefore covered. The other rows are not con-
sidered as sufficient configurations for the outcome. The truth table is then logi-
cally minimized through a Boolean process that identifies irrelevant conditions 
in a particular configuration. The conservative and the intermediate solutions are 
reported in Appendix 6 (Table A6.2). A high social acceptability of right-wing 
populism is explained by the following parsimonious formula:
C cnvg E CNVG POP R* * _+ =>
Although it can be considered a sufficient path to explain the outcome because 
the empirical information barely deviates from a perfect subset relation (the coef-
ficient for inclusion is .896), it also covers a quite small part of the outcome. In 
fact, the solution plotted in Figure 7.2 has a very low coefficient for coverage 
(.600). This indicates that this solution formula explains just 60% of the cases. 
Table 7.3 Truth Table: Right-Wing Populism
Conditions Outcome
C D E CNVG Right-
Wing 
Populism
n Inclusion Cases
1 1 0 0 1 1 0.9327 AT_94
1 1 1 0 1 1 0.9266 FR_12
1 1 1 1 1 4 0.9121 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
0 1 1 1 1 1 0.8399 AT_13
0 0 1 1 1 2 0.8356 CH_95,CH_11
1 1 0 1 0 2 0.8257 DE_02,FR_02
0 0 0 0 0 1 0.8233 CH_03
0 0 1 0 0 2 0.8184 NL_12,SE_94
0 1 0 0 0 2 0.7887 AT_02,DE_94
0 1 1 0 0 2 0.7829 DE_13,UK_95
0 1 0 1 0 1 0.7740 UK_03
0 0 0 1 0 4 0.6914 NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1 0 0 0 ? 0 -
1 0 0 1 ? 0 -
1 0 1 0 ? 0 -
1 0 1 1 ? 0 -
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High corruption and low convergence (C*cnvg), or poor economic performance 
and high convergence (E*CNVG), almost perfectly explain the social accept-
ability of right-wing populism but only for a small portion of the cases included 
in the analysis. As the plot shows, many cases are in the upper-left quadrant, thus 
being deviant in kind because their high social acceptability of populism remains 
unexplained by the solution formula. The deviant cases with a higher score in the 
solution rather than in the outcome represent around a third of the cases, and this 
indicates the necessity to include another condition in the model.
Explaining the social acceptability of left-wing populism
This section repeats the analysis but this time to explain the social acceptability of 
left-wing populism only. The analysis does not indicate any necessary condition 
Figure 7.2 Plot with Solution for Right-Wing Populism
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for the presence (or the absence) of the outcome. Similarly, the absence of con-
ditions does not give any result. This means that none of the four conditions 
(or their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence (or absence) of the 
outcome. The coefficients are always way below the conventional threshold for 
necessity.
The next step consists in assessing sufficiency – in other words, determining 
which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of 
the outcome. The truth table is composed of 16 rows displaying all the possible 
configurations, and for the subsequent minimization, only configurations with an 
inclusion coefficient higher than .84 are included.21 This means that only the first 
8 rows indicate the configurations that are sufficient for the outcome; 14 out of 
23 cases are therefore covered, and the other rows are not considered as sufficient 
configuration for the outcome.
The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (per-
formed through the software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular 
configuration. Both the conservative and the intermediate solutions are identi-
cal, and they are reported together with the details concerning the parsimonious 
solutions in Appendix 6 (Table A6.3). There are two different most parsimoni-
ous solutions, none of which reaches a satisfactory coefficient for coverage, and 
therefore none of them can be accepted:
S1 c D E CNVG C cnvg POP L
S2 c D E CNVG D cnvg POP L
: * * * _
: * * * _
  
  
+ + =>
+ + =>
Table 7.4 Truth Table: Left-Wing Populism
Conditions Outcome
C D E CNVG Left-Wing 
Populism
n Inclusion Cases
0 1 1 0 1 2 0,9125 DE_13,UK_95
0 1 1 1 1 1 0,9117 AT_13
1 1 0 0 1 1 0,8864 AT_94
0 0 1 1 1 2 0,8643 CH_95,CH_11
1 1 1 0 1 1 0,8505 FR_12
1 1 1 1 1 4 0,8494 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
0 1 0 1 1 1 0,8442 UK_03
0 1 0 0 1 2 0,8416 AT_02,DE_94
0 0 1 0 0 2 0,8122 NL_12,SE_94
1 1 0 1 0 2 0,7987 DE_02,FR_02
0 0 0 0 0 1 0,7549 CH_03
0 0 0 1 0 4 0,7018 NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1 0 0 0 ? 0 -
1 0 0 1 ? 0 -
1 0 1 0 ? 0 -
1 0 1 1 ? 0 -
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None of the solutions can be used given the low coefficients for inclusion (the 
first solution has a coefficient of .743, the second of .732). Moreover, even if the 
coefficient for inclusion would have been acceptable (above .750), these solutions 
are extremely difficult to interpret. They are almost identical, apart from the pres-
ence of C or D in the last term of the solution (the second solution is identical to 
the intermediate one, see Table A6.3). The first term, c*D, represents a combi-
nation of low corruption and low accountability and responsiveness. The second 
term of the solution, E*CNVG, represents a combination of poor economic per-
formance and high political convergence. The last term presents a combination 
of high corruption and low convergence in the first solution, and low democratic 
quality and high convergence in the second solution. Figure 7.3 presents the plot 
between the outcome and the first solution, which has an inclusion coefficient of 
.743 and a coefficient for coverage of .756 (the second solution has an inclusion 
coefficient of .732 and a coefficient for coverage of .770).
Figure 7.3 Plot with Solution for Left-Wing Populism
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Conclusions
The first step of analysis, consisting in assessing necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the outcome to occur, produced mixed results. The model tested in 
this chapter focuses on short-term supply- and demand-side factors derived from 
the relevant literature and seems to explain fairly well the overall levels of social 
acceptability of populism but not the two ideological declinations of populism.
Concerning the overall levels of populism’s social acceptability, none of the 
single conditions is necessary for the outcome to be present (or absent). How-
ever, a solution can explain the social acceptability of populism in more than 75% 
of the cases (.772) while having an acceptable coefficient for inclusion (.814). In 
Boolean algebra, the solution is expressed as C + E + D*cnvg => POP. It means 
that high levels of corruption, a poor economic performance, or a combination of 
low accountability and responsiveness with a low convergence of the ideological 
space are sufficient for the presence of high levels of acceptability of populism.
Three cases do not display high levels of populism’s social acceptability although 
they are member of the solution: the Netherlands in 2002 and Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom in 2003. The goal is to explain these cases by introducing 
the levels of stigma in the model because the idea is that short-term supply- and 
demand-side factors interact with cultural opportunity structures in determin-
ing the social acceptability of populism. In general, these findings confirm the 
hypothesis formulated in Chapter 2: the more unfavourable the socio-economic 
and political-institutional conditions, the higher the social acceptability of pop-
ulism. Moreover, in line with what the relevant literature pointed out, it is not 
a single condition but rather a combination of factors than can explain the social 
acceptability of populism.
Concerning right-wing populism, none of the single conditions is necessary 
for the outcome to be present (or absent). Moreover, it was impossible to find 
a sufficient path to explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism. In 
fact, the parsimonious solution is problematic since despite an excellent inclusion 
coefficient (.896), only a very small part of the cases is explained (coverage .600). 
Populism in left-wing manifestos is not explained by any solution formula since 
no conditions are necessary for the outcome (or its absence) and the inclusion 
of the two, quite complex, final solution formulas is lower than the conventional 
.75 threshold.
From this first step of analysis, one can conclude that the short-term condi-
tions typically linked to the presence of high levels of populism have indeed a 
strong resonance with the overall social acceptability of populism. However, when 
trying to disentangle the different types of populism, this model seems to fail in 
explaining the social acceptability of both left- and right-wing populism. This 
might reflect the choice of the conditions, which were selected to explain the 
overall social acceptability of populism. Moreover, different operationalisations 
and calibrations, as well as the introduction of additional countries, might pro-
duce different results.
The aim of the next chapter is to combine the four conditions already tested 
with a long-term, cultural element: the levels of stigma attached to the fascist 
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past. The model is tested a second time with the addition of the stigma levels in 
order to find a configuration of conditions which can better explain (inclusion) a 
broader range of cases (coverage) for the social acceptability of populism as well 
as for its right-wing and left-wing manifestations.
Notes
 1 In social sciences, the tendency in studies using QCA is to discard solutions show-
ing coefficients below .750 for inclusion and coverage. Here these thresholds are 
not considered as particularly relevant because the most important aspect con-
cerns the comparison of the two models before and after introducing the levels of 
stigma. However, it is possible to say that in this study solutions with coefficients 
for inclusion below .750 will be treated as inconclusive (because the solution is 
not precise enough), while coefficients for coverage below .800 will be considered 
as sub-optimal (because this means that the solution leaves unexplained more 
than 20% of the cases). Finally, when the coefficients for inclusion are below .750 
it is irrelevant to observe the coefficients for coverage.
 2 The next chapter relies on the same operationalization and calibration; therefore, 
this section will not be repeated.
 3 The point at which a country has full non-membership in the outcome is 0 for all 
the examined types of populism (total, right- and left-wing).
 4 For Switzerland, the data on radicalism are derived from the Party Manifesto 
Project since the Chapel Hill survey does not include the country.
 5 Normalization and Standardization are operated by the Democracy Barometer 
in the indicator “Absence of Corruption.” It is considered as part of the features 
determining governmental capabilities and, in particular, its transparency.
 6 For details about the indicators of the Democracy Barometer, see Merkel et al. 
(2016).
 7 The DB codebook provides all the information concerning the sources of the 
data, and their scaling and standardization. Moreover, it offers detailed definitions 
of the concepts employed and notes about the measurements. The dataset of the 
DB does not directly refer to concepts such as responsiveness and accountability; 
therefore, I use their dataset by interpreting the type of information it contains in 
order to adapt it to the scope of this analysis.
 8 OECD (2017), Unemployment rate (indicator). Doi: 10.1787/997c8750-en 
(Accessed in April 2017).
 9 International Financial Statistics (World Economic Outlook), June 2015, avail-
able online (accessed in April 2019): www.imf.org/external/datamapper/LUR@
WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD?year=2015.
 10 Solt (2016) SWIID version 5.1.
 11 World Development Indicators, GDP growth (annual %), December 2015, avail-
able online (accessed in April 2019): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
 12 Dalton measures the Polarization Index (PI) as follows. PI = SQRT{Σ(party vote 
sharei)*([party L/R scorei – party systemaverage L/R score]/5)
2}. In particular, 
“i” represents individual parties. Here the formula is slightly adjusted. First, the 
left–right score is calculated according to the Chapel Hill survey or, since the 
survey does not cover the 1990s, the Party Manifesto Project is used (see notes to 
Table A3.1). Second, the effective number of parties is here intended as the num-
ber of parties which obtained at least 5% of the vote share, in order to include only 
those parties whose electoral manifestos are included in the analysis. The Com-
parative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides all the information needed 
to measure the polarization index: www.cses.org (consulted in October 2017).
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 13 The results remain consistent, both with the normal operationalization (Appendix 
9, Table A9.1 and A9.2) and with the alternative one based on the co-occurrence 
principle (Appendix 11, Table A11.7 and Table A11.8).
 14 Appendix 11 reports all the solution formulas for the alternative operationaliza-
tion (Table A11.1 to A11.3).
 15 About the different types of solutions in QCA, see Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012, 165–77).
 16 All analyses are performed using the free software R, in particular the packages: 
‘QCA: Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ (Dusa 2019) and ‘Set methods: Func-
tions for Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research and Advanced QCA’ (Medzihor-
sky et al. 2016).
 17 Other credible inclusion cut-offs have been tested but they are not reported for 
reasons of space. The results remain consistent with those obtained with the cut-
off point at .88.
 18 See Ragin (1987) on different ways to treat logical reminders.
 19 All the cases are displayed in Figure 7.1. However, typical cases and deviant 
cases consistency (in relation to sufficient terms or single terms) are not inter-
pretable through this plot. When relevant, this is done separately (see Appendix 
8). What is interpretable and relevant for process tracing and causality mecha-
nisms when plotting the whole solution, like in this case, is the comparison 
between deviant cases coverage and individually irrelevant cases (Rohlfing and 
Schneider 2013).
 20 An inclusion cut of .81 (closer to the jump in the values) gives extremely similar 
results. The results of this study (also in comparison with the findings that are 
presented in Chapter 8) would remain consistent also with cut-off points set at 
.82 or .84. This means that with any reasonable cut-off level by introducing the 
level of stigma the results show that right-wing populism becomes explainable.
 21 Again, there is no clear jump to be used for the inclusion cut-off. Given the 
membership of the cases in the outcome, a rather high threshold is used. Higher 
thresholds have been tried as well, but they give even less interpretable solutions.
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This chapter repeats the analysis of the conditions for the social acceptability of 
populism, this time introducing into the model a fifth variable: the levels of stigma 
attached to the fascist past. The results show that by introducing the role of fascist 
legacies, it is possible to explain with greater precision the social acceptability of 
populism. However, while the new model works particularly well for overall pop-
ulism and right-wing populism, left-wing populism’s social acceptability remains 
unexplained. The results produced make it possible to conclude that the fascist 
legacy, especially in combination with other political opportunity structures, plays 
a key role in opening up or closing down the cultural opportunity structure for 
right-wing populism to thrive.
The chapter follows a structure identical to the one used for the previous step 
of analysis. The results of the fsQCA are presented first for the overall social 
acceptability of populism and then for the two ideological variants (right- and 
left-wing populism). In addition, it is discussed whether the new solutions are 
able to explain some of the cases that in the previous step of analysis deviated for 
coverage or inclusion. When the coefficients of inclusion and coverage improve 
after introducing the new condition, this is a good indicator that the new model 
works better, but it is not automatically a sign that the causal mechanism works 
as hypothesized. In fact, it is necessary to examine which deviant cases can be 
explained with the new model compared to the previous one without levels of 
stigma as a condition.
The relevant row lines of the truth tables are presented, as well as the plots 
illustrating where the cases fall when considering the relationship between the 
most parsimonious solution and the outcome. The inclusion cut-off for the pro-
cess of minimization is always maintained exactly as in Chapter 7 in order to grant 
perfect comparability of the results. Appendix 8 (Figure A8.1) shows the distri-
bution of cases in the newly introduced condition “low levels of stigma.” The lev-
els of stigma are assigned to each country in Chapter 6, where the choices made 
are explained in detail and justified according to the existing literature (Table 6.1 
summarizes the findings). Since the relationship hypothesized is between the 
presence of low levels of stigma and high levels of social acceptability of pop-
ulism, the values assigned in Chapter 6 are reversed; in this way, a level of stigma 
equal to 1 becomes 0 in the condition “low levels of stigma” (S), and vice versa. 
8  The effect of fascist legacies 
on populism
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A country is a full member of the condition (S) if its levels of stigma are extremely 
low, which in turn is supposed to trigger a high social acceptability of populism.
Compared to the distribution of cases in the other four conditions (Figure 
A5.1), the levels for stigma of the fascist past cluster around very low and very 
high levels. This means that three countries display values such as 0.1 (Germany), 
0.2 (Sweden), and 0.3 (UK) in the condition “low levels of stigma” because their 
stigma levels are very high; therefore, they are supposed to close down the oppor-
tunity structure for populism. The other five countries (Austria, France, Italy, 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands) display levels between 0.7 and 0.9 because 
they have low levels of stigma, which in turn are supposed to open up the oppor-
tunity structure for populism. This element further confirms that the memories 
assigned to each country in Chapter 6 are not too fine-grained since it is possible 
to distinguish in a very clear (although nuanced) way between countries that 
developed a strong stigma of the fascist past and countries that generated low 
levels of stigma.
The next three sections examine the presence of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the social acceptability of overall populism as well as its two ideo-
logical declinations. The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and 
responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption 
(C), and high levels of ideological convergence (CNVG). Moreover, compared 
to the analysis presented in Chapter 7, low levels of stigma (S) are included in 
the model. Appendix 8 shows the plot between each of the three outcomes with 
stigma alone (Figure A8.2 to A8.4). Intuitively, it is possible to understand the 
impact of low levels of stigma on high levels of populism’s social acceptability. 
This is true, in particular, for the social acceptability of right-wing populism (Fig-
ure A8.3). The coefficients for inclusion (.885) and coverage (.773) show that 
stigma alone can very well explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism 
in almost 80% of the cases. The most obvious exception is the UK (in 2003 and 
2010): the country shows high levels of Salonfähigkeit of populism despite the 
presence of a strong stigma. On the contrary, the Netherlands in 1994 show lev-
els of right-wing populism’s social acceptability much lower than expected, con-
sidering that the country has a low stigma for the fascist past. These and all the 
other problematic cases will be discussed in detail in the remainder of the chapter.
Explaining the social acceptability of populism
Compared to the analysis performed in Chapter 7, the outcomes and conditions 
remain the same, as well as their calibration. The analysis for necessity does not 
produce any results. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary condi-
tion for the presence of high levels of social acceptability of populism. This is a 
first, important result. The simple presence of low levels of stigma cannot explain 
the social acceptability of populism. If they do so, this can only be the case when 
there is an interaction with other conditions.
This time, since there are 5 conditions included in the model, there are 32 
possible configurations. For reasons of space, only the rows above the inclusion 
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cut (.88) are displayed (Table 8.1).1 Similarly, configurations that are considered 
as insufficient for the outcome (below the inclusion cut-off) as well as logical 
reminders (which will be considerably more since the number of cases is stable 
while the number of possible configurations doubled) will not be displayed. The 
logical reminders are now 15, and all the solutions are reported in Appendix 7 
(Table A7.1), including their coefficients for inclusion and coverage. Concerning 
the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the most parsimo-
nious solution is now more elegant, interpretable, with a much higher coefficient 
for coverage, and composed of two terms:
S D POP+ =>
The solution S+D has an inclusion coverage with a coefficient of .802, which is 
slightly lower than before (.814), but also a coverage coefficient of .862, which is 
considerably higher than before (.772).2 Now, testing the model with the inclu-
sion of stigma, a low level of accountability and responsiveness (D) or a low stigma-
tization of the fascist past (S) are both relevant paths for the presence of the outcome 
(plotted in Figure 8.1). Interestingly, the presence of S alone has a coefficient 
for inclusion of .826, one for raw coverage of .690 (indicating which share of 
the outcome is explained by S) and one for unique coverage of .177 (indicating 
which share of the outcome is exclusively explained by a certain term).3
Germany and the UK, for each of the election points included, display high 
levels of social acceptability of populism. Since the two countries have collective 
memories that are supposed to close down the opportunity structure for pop-
ulism, it is unsurprising to observe that their presence is explained through the 
Table 8.1 Truth Table: Total Populism
Conditions Outcome
C D E CNVG S Populism n Inclusion Cases
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0,9999 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0,9975 FR_02
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0,9851 AT_94
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0,9656 UK_10
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0,9608 FR_12
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0,9573 NL_12
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 0,9569 CH_95,CH_11
0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0,9561 DE_13,UK_95
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0,9525 AT_13
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0,9349 DE_94
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0,9216 CH_03
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0,9050 UK_03
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0,8911 DE_02
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0,8883 AT_02
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0,8815 NL_94,NL_02
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other term of the parsimonious solution (D). As hypothesized, the social accept-
ability of populism is linked to an interaction between stigma and other short-
term conditions. In the UK and Germany, the presence of low accountability and 
responsiveness explains the high social acceptability of populism. Other countries, 
such as Italy, France, and Austria, have high levels of populism’s social acceptabil-
ity, and this is explained by both D and S. Indeed, these countries display both 
low levels of stigma and low levels of accountability and responsiveness. 4
 At this stage of the analysis, there is a crucial element to consider: the variation 
of the deviant cases between the fi rst model without the levels of stigma and the 
deviant cases in the model after the introduction of the levels of stigma ( Bennett 
and Elman 2006 ;  Schneider and Rohlfi ng 2016 ). In other words, it is impor-
tant to observe  which cases that were not explained by testing the four conditions 
extrapolated from the literature can now be explained by taking into consideration 
 Figure 8.1 Plot with Solution for Total Populism 
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the levels of stigma. This aspect is paramount because it makes it possible to assess 
whether the new condition improves the explanatory power of the model. There 
are two categories of deviant cases: consistency (or inclusion) and coverage. The 
former constitutes a puzzle because it points to cases that should be members of 
the outcome but, in fact, are not. The latter is a puzzle because it includes cases 
that, conversely, are members of the outcome for reasons not disclosed by the 
QCA solution.
The previous model produced three deviant cases coverage: the United King-
dom and Switzerland in 2003 and the Netherlands in 2002. They displayed high 
levels of populism’s social acceptability for reasons not explained by the solution 
C + E + D*cnvg => POP. After the introduction of the role of stigma, with 
the new solution formula D + S => POP, they are not deviant cases coverage 
anymore. Low levels of accountability and responsiveness, or a low stigma, can 
now explain why these three cases show high (the Netherlands 2002 and United 
Kingdom 2003) or very high (Switzerland 2003) levels of social acceptability 
of populism. By looking at the truth table and at the details of the solution 
presented in Table A7.1, it is clear that for Switzerland and the Netherlands the 
change is due to the role of fascist legacies (low values of S). In the case of the 
United Kingdom, the presence of the outcome is explained by the low quality of 
the democratic process (D).5
Finally, the model with four conditions did show several deviant case con-
sistency (or inclusion). Unfortunately, the new solution does not constitute an 
improvement. In Figure 7.1, five cases that were members of the solution were 
not members of the outcome, and the model with the levels of stigma of the 
fascist past produces very similar results. As Figure 8.1 shows, the Netherlands 
in 2012 remains a very ambiguous case, while Germany and Austria in 2002 and 
France in 2012 remain deviant cases consistency. Finally, while the Netherlands in 
1994 was an irrelevant case, now it is a deviant case consistency, while the oppo-
site is true for Sweden in 1994. Germany might show low levels of populism’s 
acceptability because of its very high stigma for the fascist past; therefore, it is not 
particularly surprising. France is quite close to the crossover point, and it might 
be that the manifestos in 2012 were coded as not very populist while the par-
ties developed highly populist discourses outside the manifestos. Austria and the 
Netherlands, however, remain unexplained and problematic cases that find no 
explanation in the solution D + S => POP.6
Explaining the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism
This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the social acceptability of right-wing populism. The analysis for necessity does 
not produce any results. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary 
condition for the presence of the outcome. However, S can be considered as a 
sufficient condition for the presence of high levels of social acceptability of right-
wing populism (POP_R). As mentioned above, Figure A8.3 shows the relation of 
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sufficiency between the levels of stigma and the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism. The coefficients for inclusion (.885) and coverage (.773) show that 
stigma alone can very well explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism 
in almost 80% of the cases.7 The analysis will establish whether S works even bet-
ter in explaining POP_R when combined with short-term socio-economic and 
political-institutional conditions.
Once again, since there are 5 conditions included in the model, there are 
32 possible configurations. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut-off 
(.83) will be displayed (Table 8.2). It is worth mentioning that in this case, the 
cut-off threshold is even more accurate than in the model without the levels of 
stigma (Table 7.2). Indeed, the last case reported in the truth table is UK_10 
with a level of .873, while the next case (UK_03) comes only after a very clear 
jump (.802). Configurations which are considered as not sufficient for the out-
come (below the inclusion cut-off), as well as logical reminders, are not displayed 
for reasons of space. The logical reminders (configurations with no observed 
cases) are now 15, and all the solutions are reported in Appendix 7 (Table A7.2).8 
The cases assigned to the 11 sufficient configurations are now 15. Concerning 
the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the two most par-
simonious solutions are:
S1 S C E POP R
S2 S E CNVG POP R
: * _
: * _
+ =>
+ =>
( )
( )
The two solutions have, respectively, an inclusion coefficient of .856 and .846 
and a coverage coefficient of .804 and .819. Both solutions constitute a remarkable 
improvement compared to the solution obtained without stigma levels, which had a 
Table 8.2 Truth Table: Right-Wing Populism
Conditions Outcome
C D E CNVG S Right-
Wing 
Populism
n Inclusion Cases
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.9895 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.9875 AT_94
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.9857 FR_02
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.9742 FR_12
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.9531 NL_12
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 0.9461 CH_95,CH_11
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9405 AT_13
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.9346 CH_03
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.9192 AT_02
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0.8811 NL_94,NL_02
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.8725 UK_10
The effect of fascist legacies on populism 159
coverage coefficient much lower than .750.9 The first term of the two solutions 
indicates that a low level of stigma (S) is in both cases part the solution for-
mula that can explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism (POP_R). 
Moreover, a combination of bad economic performance with either high levels 
of corruption (C*E) or with a high ideological convergence (E*CNVG) consti-
tutes the second term of the two solutions. Even more importantly, it is possible to 
argue that a low level of stigma is per se a sufficient condition for the presence of the 
outcome since it has an inclusion coefficient of .885 and a raw coverage of .773 
(with a unique coverage of .241, meaning that stigma alone can explain almost a 
quarter of the cases).
It is difficult to establish which one of the two solutions is preferable and bet-
ter explains the social acceptability of right-wing populism. For this purpose, 
it is necessary to look at several aspects linked to the concept of coverage. The 
solution coverage indicates how much of the outcome is covered by the solution 
term; raw coverage indicates which share of the outcome is explained by a certain 
alternative path; and unique coverage indicates which share of the outcome is 
exclusively explained by a certain alternative path (Ragin 2006). The term C*E 
has a coefficient for inclusion of .910, while E*CNVG has a coefficient for inclu-
sion of .883. Both terms can explain the outcome with a very high precision. 
Concerning their coefficients for raw coverage, the two alternative paths have 
similar values: C*E has .472 while E*CNVG has .492. Finally, their coefficients 
for unique coverage are negligible: C*E in isolation cannot explain any single 
case, while E*CNVG has a coefficient of 0.015. To make a comparison, the levels 
of stigma (S) alone can explain almost a quarter of the cases (its coefficient for 
unique coverage is .241).
It is impossible to choose a solution path rather than the other by observ-
ing their coefficients for inclusion and coverage because they are very similar 
in this regard. Another important parameter to consider consists in observing 
the variations that occur in the presence of deviant cases coverage and deviant 
cases consistency (or inclusion). It is crucial to observe which cases that were 
not explained by testing the four conditions extrapolated from the literature can 
now be explained by taking into consideration the idea of stigma. This makes 
it possible to assess whether and possibly how the new condition improves the 
explanatory power of the model and which particular solution path is the most 
appropriate.
By observing the variation of the deviant cases, however, it makes once again 
no difference which of the two parsimonious solutions is selected. Figure 8.2 
plots the second solution, which has a slightly higher coverage, while Figure 8.3 
plots the first solution. They are almost identical since the levels of stigma alone 
constitute the first term of the solution, and the second term is very similar as 
well; a bad economic performance appears in both cases, once in combination 
with high corruption and once in combination with high convergence.
The previous model (with only four conditions) produced six deviant cases 
coverage: Switzerland in 2003, the Netherlands in 2002 and 2012, Austria and 
France in 2002, and the United Kingdom in 2003. These cases were perplexing 
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because they were members of the outcome for reasons not disclosed by the 
QCA solution. Now, after having introduced a new condition (S), fi ve of these 
six cases can be explained. Tellingly, only the United Kingdom in 2003 is still a 
deviant case coverage (no matter which solution is selected), while all the other 
fi ve cases can now be explained.  The reason why these fi ve cases can now be explained 
is the low level of stigma , which produces a high social acceptability of right-wing 
populism. This remains true for both solution formulas. 
 For example, by observing the truth table in  Chapter 7 ( Table 7.3 ) of the 
four initial conditions, Austria in 2002 only had low levels of responsiveness and 
accountability; now, by introducing the levels of stigma, it can be explained why 
it shows high levels of right-wing populism’s social acceptability. The same is true 
for the Netherlands in 2002; it displayed high convergence, like Sweden in 1994 
and 2002, but the Scandinavian country did not show high levels of populism’s 
 Figure 8.2 Plot with Solution for Right-Wing Populism 
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acceptability. Similarly, the Netherlands in 2012 displayed a bad economic per-
formance, like Sweden in 1994, but while Sweden shows no acceptability of pop-
ulism, the Netherlands do. Switzerland in 2003 had no visible reasons to belong 
to the outcome (it was not a member of any condition that were supposed to 
explain right-wing populism’s social acceptability), but with the introduction of 
stigma this case can be explained. Finally, France and Germany in 2002 showed 
the same combination of conditions: high corruption, low accountability and 
responsiveness, and high convergence. Once the levels of stigma are included, the 
high levels of right-wing populism’s acceptability in France can be explained, and 
the country is no longer a deviant case coverage.
Whereas previously these six cases were in the upper-left quadrant (see Fig-
ure 7.2), leaving the presence of the outcome unexplained by the solution, now 
only one case remains. At this stage, none of the conditions analyzed explains 
the high social acceptability of right-wing populism in the United Kingdom in 
2003. However, the case is also rather close to the crossover point (especially 
Figure 8.3 Plot with Alternative Solution for Right-Wing Populism
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in Figure 8.2); this indicates that a different operationalization or cut-off point 
might have produced different results. On the other hand, given the fact that the 
United Kingdom in the 2010s also shows rather high levels of right-wing pop-
ulism’s social acceptability, one might consider the possibility that the type of collec-
tive memory assigned to the country, heroization, actually does not produce the high 
level of stigmatization of the fascist past that was expected. Future studies should 
focus on the levels of stigma produces by a narrative based on heroization. Other 
countries that might be considered are the United States and Australia.
Apart from the United Kingdom in 2003, however, high levels of right-wing 
populism’s social acceptability are now explained much better, and this is clearly 
linked to the inclusion of long-lasting fascist legacies in the model. Austria, 
France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands have low or very low levels of stigma of 
the fascist past because their collective memories are based on either cancellation 
or victimization, and this makes it possible to explain why right-wing populism is 
socially acceptable although the other conditions that were supposed to trigger it 
were not present. After the inclusion of stigma in the model, these cases moved 
from the upper-left quadrant and now the outcome is explained.
Concerning deviant cases consistency (or inclusion), the previous model did 
not show any because all the cases which were not members of the outcome were 
also not members of the solution. The new model, in contrast, produces a deviant 
case coverage: the Netherlands in 1994 (bottom-right quadrant). Although it is 
a member of the solution, it is not member of the outcome, meaning that both 
solutions fail to explain why the acceptability of right-wing populism in this case 
is not high. Moreover, the Netherlands in 1994 is not a borderline case because 
the case clearly belongs to the solution but displays a very low social acceptabil-
ity of right-wing populism. One might argue that the measurement was biased 
by the fact that the party D66 has been coded as left-wing according to the 
degree of radicalism of its party manifesto and not as centre or right-wing as it is 
often described by experts. Had it been coded as right-wing, however, the social 
acceptability of right-wing populism would have still been lower compared to 
expectations (the level would have been around 230, with the crossover point still 
very distant at 419). The fact that the country in 1994 belongs to both solution 
formulas but show low levels of right-wing populism’s social acceptability might 
be linked the volatility of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands, often 
related to the presence of some charismatic leader.
Finally, Germany and Sweden are considered as irrelevant cases; they belong 
neither to the solution nor to the outcome. In other words, the fact that they have 
very low levels of right-wing populism’s social acceptability cannot be explained 
by the short- and long-term conditions that were supposed to explain the social 
acceptability right-wing populism. It is not possible to establish whether Sweden 
and Germany show low levels of populism because there are no favourable con-
ditions or because other conditions (not included in this study) close down the 
cultural and political opportunity structures for populism. However, by confront-
ing these cases with other cases that show identical configurations of conditions 
(e.g. France and the Netherlands), it is possible to observe that countries with 
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similar socio-economic and political-institutional conditions, but also high levels 
of stigma of the fascist past, show a high acceptability of right-wing populism.
Explaining the social acceptability of left-wing populism
This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
social acceptability of left-wing populism. The analysis for necessity does not pro-
duce any results. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary condition 
for the social acceptability of populism. The social acceptability of left-wing pop-
ulism, even after the introduction of levels of stigma of the fascist past, remains 
unexplainable.
Once again, since there are 5 conditions included in the model, there are 
32 possible configurations. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut-off 
(.84) are displayed in Table 8.3. Configurations that are considered as not suf-
ficient for the outcome, as well as logical reminders, will not be displayed for rea-
sons of space. The logical reminders (configurations with no observed cases) are 
now 15. The conservative and intermediate solutions are reported in Appendix 7 
(Table A7.3). The cases assigned to the 12 sufficient configurations are now 16. 
Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the 
most parsimonious solution path is now:
C D s E S POP L+ + =>* * _
The solution (plotted in Figure 8.4) has an inclusion coefficient of .690 and 
a coverage coefficient of .784. Given the fact that the inclusion coefficient is 
extremely low (significantly below the minimum required value of .750), this 
Table 8.3 Truth Table: Left-Wing Populism
Conditions Outcome
C D E CNVG S Left-
Wing 
Populism
n Inclusion Cases
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.9443 UK_10
0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0.9253 DE_13,UK_95
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9053 AT_13
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.8813 DE_02
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.8782 AT_94
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 0.8779 CH_95,CH_11
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.8772 UK_03
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.8769 DE_94
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.8689 NL_12
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.8430 FR_02
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.8440 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.8428 FR_12
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solution cannot be accepted as sufficient for the presence of the outcome. Three 
solution terms appear in the most parsimonious solution: high corruption (C); 
bad accountability and responsiveness but high stigma (D*s); and bad economic 
performance with low stigma (E*S).
Compared to the solutions obtained before the introduction of stigma, the coef-
ficient for inclusion is even lower (it was .744). The coefficient for coverage is higher, 
but this is irrelevant since the levels of inclusion are unsatisfactory. The most interest-
ing aspect of this solution formula is the presence of both S (low levels of stigma) 
and s (the absence of S, therefore high levels if stigma).10 In other words, the role of 
stigma seems to be conflicting; both high and low levels of stigma are present in the 
solution that is supposed to explain the acceptability of left-wing populism.
This was predictable because a quick glance at the truth table (Table 8.3) 
shows that the three cases with the highest inclusion in the outcome involve 
Figure 8.4 Plot with Solution for Left-Wing Populism
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countries with very high levels of stigma: Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Afterwards, two countries with very low levels of stigma are present: Switzerland 
and Austria. Left-wing populism is acceptable in countries with opposite levels 
of stigma, and this is reflected in the solution formula. Moreover, this relation-
ship between stigma and left-wing populism is displayed in Appendix 8 (Figure 
A8.4): Germany and the UK are in the upper-left quadrant because they show 
high levels of left-wing populism’s acceptability but also high levels of stigma of 
the fascist past.
In particular, the solution term D*s (low levels of responsiveness and account-
ability combined with high levels of stigma) has a unique coverage of .137, 
meaning that alone it explains around 14% of the cases. To be precise, this 
configuration explains Germany (in 1994 and 2013) and the UK (1995 and 
2003).11 The other solution term E*S explains all the cases with low levels of 
stigma (the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, France, and Italy), but it has a 
unique coverage of .069. Overall, the solution formula provides a very weak 
path for the explanation of left-wing populism’s social acceptability (inclusion 
coefficient of .690). Moreover, the introduction of the levels of stigma of the 
fascist past does not produce any improvement; in fact, the solution seems to 
bring us even further away from the explanation of left-wing populism’s social 
acceptability.
It is clear that this new solution formula does not constitute an improvement 
compared to the model without stigma. This is true also considering deviant 
cases. While the previous model produced four deviant cases coverage, there are 
now five. Moreover, while before there were three deviant case consistency (or 
inclusion), now there are five cases which were supposed to display high levels of 
social acceptability of left-wing populism but do not: France (2002 and 2012), 
Germany (2002), the Netherlands (2012), and Italy (1994). In general, the new 
model works even worse than the old one, and the introduction of fascist legacies 
did not help explain more cases than before.
In fact, the contrary happened, and many cases remain problematic. The UK 
was already a problematic case concerning right-wing populism because its social 
acceptability remained unexplained. This might confirm that the type of collec-
tive memory present in the UK (heroization) does not block populism. Germany, 
on the other hand, follows a completely different trajectory. Right-wing pop-
ulism in the country is socially not acceptable, while left-wing populism is very 
acceptable. This might be interpreted as follows: fascist legacies block the social 
acceptability of right-wing populism but not of left-wing populism.
However, it is not even possible to establish that for left-wing populism fascist 
legacies work in the opposite direction compared with what happened with right-
wing populism: low levels of stigma can explain right-wing populism, but the 
simple fact of highly stigmatizing the fascist past cannot explain the social accept-
ability of left-wing populism. This leaves only one possible conclusion: in order 
to explain the social acceptability of left-wing populism, one must look beyond 
the levels of stigma of the fascist past, as well as beyond the short-term factors 
included in this analysis.
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Conclusions
The second step of analysis tested the same conditions and outcomes but also 
introduced a fifth condition: the levels of stigmatization of the fascist past. The 
results can be considered as more or less satisfactory according to the three dif-
ferent outcomes that are included in the model. Results are satisfactory to explain 
the overall social acceptability of populism, very satisfactory for right-wing populism, 
and unsatisfactory for left-wing populism. Moreover, none of the models pro-
duced any necessary condition for any of the outcomes. This might signal the 
importance of considering new conditions in future research, while it testifies to 
the extreme variance when dealing with empirical manifestations of populism and 
its social acceptability across countries.
Concerning the overall social acceptability of populism, by introducing the 
levels of stigma, the rather complex but precise solution (C + E + D*cnvg => 
POP) is replaced by a more elegant and precise one: S + D => POP. The levels of 
stigma now help in explaining three additional cases, thus making the new solu-
tion not only more precise but also with a higher explanatory power: the Neth-
erlands in 2002, and the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 2003, can now be 
explained thanks to the introduction of the levels of stigma. Moreover, it is worth 
mentioning that stigma alone has a coefficient for inclusion of .826 and one for 
unique coverage of .177 (indicating that almost 20% of the outcome is exclusively 
explained by levels of stigma).
Concerning the social acceptability of left-wing populism, after introducing 
the levels of stigma the solution still fails to reach an acceptable coefficient for 
coverage while the coefficient for inclusion is even lower than before, thus mak-
ing the solution itself not strong enough to denote sufficiency. This aspect will 
be further investigated in the Conclusions, but it seems safe to assume that left-
wing populism answers to different logics and thrives under different conditions 
compared to right-wing populism, and future research should try to understand 
which specific conditions trigger left-wing populism. Without any doubt, the 
levels of stigma of the fascist past do not contribute to shed light on left-wing 
populism’s social acceptability. Including countries such as Spain, Greece, and 
Portugal, as well as Eastern European countries, might help in explaining the 
Salonfähigkeit of left-wing populism.
The most outstanding results concern the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism. After introducing the role of fascist legacies in closing down the cul-
tural opportunity structures for right-wing populism to thrive, the old solution 
(C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_R) is replaced by two alternative solutions S + 
(C*E) => POP_R and S + (E*CNVG) => POP_R. They both bear a much more 
convincing explanatory power and contribute to explain several cases that before 
where a puzzle.
Low levels of stigma are in both cases sufficient in isolation to explain the social 
acceptability of right-wing populism (indeed, the coefficient for raw coverage is 
.773). Both solutions, moreover, can explain five deviant cases coverage: Swit-
zerland in 2003, the Netherlands in 2002 and 2012, and Austria and France 
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in 2002. The United Kingdom in 2003, however, remains unexplained, and it 
would be helpful to develop a case study about the country in future research.
From this second step of the analysis, one can conclude that when consider-
ing the levels of stigma of the fascist past, the social acceptability of populism 
can be better explained. In more detail, while the previous model produced a 
particularly unsatisfactory coefficient for the coverage of the solution which was 
supposed to explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism, it is precisely 
this aspect that the new model contributes to grasp. It seems that fascist lega-
cies mainly interact with the acceptability of right-wing populism. The fact that 
the new model provides a better explanation of the overall levels of populism’s 
social acceptability might be linked to the fact that right-wing populism is better 
explained, while the acceptability of left-wing populism is poorly explained before 
as well as after the introduction of stigma.
Looking at the typology of collective memory previously elaborated, some 
remarks can be made at this stage. Countries characterized by a narrative based 
on victimization display a high social acceptability of populism and, more particu-
larly, of right-wing populism. This is true also when other conditions seem not to 
constitute the perfect thriving ground for populism. In Austria and France, both 
characterized by collective memories based on victimization, the social accept-
ability of right-wing populism can be explained only after the introduction of the 
levels of stigma in the model. Italy seems to follow the same trend, but the social 
acceptability of right-wing populism is lower than expected. This can be linked to 
two possible explanations: either to the presence of additional conditions which 
were not considered or to the fact that Italian political parties are more populist 
in their daily communications than in their manifestos.
Countries characterized by a narrative based on cancellation also display a high 
social acceptability of populism. This remains true when other conditions seem 
not to constitute the perfect thriving ground for populism. In Switzerland and 
the Netherlands, both characterized by collective memories based on cancella-
tion, the social acceptability of right-wing populism can be explained only after 
the introduction of the levels of stigma in the model.
Sweden, characterized by a narrative based both on culpabilization and on 
cancellation, never shows a high degree of social acceptability of (any kind of) 
populism, and this might be rooted in deeper features of the country’s political 
culture or in the fact that the favourable opportunity structures for populism to 
thrive never materialized in the country. Germany, characterized by a narrative 
based on culpabilization, is a very interesting case. While the social acceptability 
of right-wing populism is always very low, things are very different when it comes 
to left-wing populism, which is socially accepted. This might be linked to the 
country’s collective memory and the process of Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit 
that took place since the end of the 1950s, and it confirms that fascist legacies 
work only for right-wing populism.
Finally, the United Kingdom is consistently more populist than expected. 
This might be linked to the different institutional setting: indeed, the final val-
ues of populism’s Salonfähigkeit might be high because the party manifestos are 
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written by parties that together receive around 90% of the vote share. However, 
there might be other reasons: for example, a comparative study that includes the 
United States and Australia might shed a light on the levels of stigma generated 
by a collective memory based on heroization.
Notes
 1 The inclusion cut-off is identical to the one used in Chapter 7 for maximum com-
parability. The same is true for the sections about right- and left-wing populism.
 2 This observation is not surprising since the coefficients for inclusion and coverage 
often are a trade-off between the two measures (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).
 3 About unique and raw coverage, see Ragin (2006).
 4 Interestingly, by observing the results obtained with the alternative operation-
alization, it emerges a different parsimonious solution: E + S + D*CNVG. This 
solution, despite being slightly more complex, is able to explain the social accept-
ability of populism with even higher precision (see Table A11.4). In particular, it 
has an inclusion coefficient of .849 and a coverage coefficient of .870. Moreover, 
the levels of stigma alone have an inclusion coefficient of .880 and a coverage 
coefficient of .703. Finally, it is important to notice that no matter the operation-
alization used for the measurement of populism in party manifestos, the results 
remain consistent and in line with the hypotheses.
 5 Going into further detail, the United Kingdom shows alarmingly low levels of 
government capability (pertaining to responsiveness) and competition (pertaining 
to accountability), and this is true not only for the 2003 elections but also for the 
other two decades considered.
 6 Concerning Austria in 2002, it is possible to observe that the levels of right-
wing populism’s social acceptability are exceptionally low (as already explained 
in Chapter 5). This might be because the FPÖ produced a party manifesto 
that shows unusually low levels of populism. For example, in the 1990s, their 
manifesto contained high levels of populism (more than 10%) and in the 2010s 
extremely high levels of populism (more than 21%). However, in 2002, their 
manifesto contained only 0.7% of populist statements. Interestingly, in 2002, the 
party was deeply divided and unable to organize an effective political strategy, a 
situation that decreased its share of the vote to 10.2%, almost two-thirds less than 
its previous share.
 7 The alternative operationalization produces very similar results. The relation of 
sufficiency between levels of stigma and acceptability of right-wing populism 
has a coefficient of .823 for inclusion and .764 for coverage. See Appendix 11 
(Table A11.5).
 8 It is important to notice that the intermediate solution is S + C*D*E*CNVG => 
POP_R (see Table A7.2). This solution is particularly in line with the expectations 
because it shows that low levels of stigma (S) or a combination of all the other 
four conditions (C*D*E*CNVG) explain the social acceptability of right-wing 
populism. Moreover, the coefficients for inclusion and coverage are almost identi-
cal to those expressed in the parsimonious solution (.859 and .804 respectively). 
The difference between intermediate and parsimonious solution consists in the 
assumptions made. The intermediate solution is built on easy counterfactuals, and 
it discards difficult ones. Counterfactuals are called easy when the assumptions 
about the outcome of logical remainders are simplifying and in line with the theo-
retical expectations (in this case, C, D, E, and CNVG are supposed to produce 
POP_R). A counterfactual is difficult when it is simplifying the solution but runs 
counter to the theoretical expectations. Because the intermediate solution might 
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not allow all simplifying assumptions to be made, it contains some conditions that 
are redundant in the sense that they do not make a difference to the outcome 
(Schneider and Rohlfing 2016).
 9 Before the introduction of levels of stigma, the solution was C*cnvg + E*CNVG => 
POP_R, with a coefficient for inclusion of .896 and a coefficient for coverage of 
.600.
 10 About the fact that both high and low levels of stigma are present in the solution, 
it is interesting to notice that the PRI value for the solution is very low: .542. This 
means that the solution is sufficient for the outcome only slightly more than it is 
sufficient for the negation of the outcome.
 11 With the alternative operationalization, the solution formula is similar: D*s + 
c*CNVG*S (see Appendix 6, Table A11.6). Once again, it is possible to notice 
that both S and s are present, and in particular the solution term D*s is consist-
ently present, this time with a coefficient of unique coverage of .260. This solu-
tion term, once again, explains the social acceptability of left-wing populism in 
Germany and the UK. Importantly, the parsimonious solution would have an 
acceptable coefficient for inclusion (.838). However, it explains only two-thirds 
of the cases (coefficient of coverage .660).
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American historian Robert Kagan wrote: “This is how fascism comes to America, 
not with jackboots and salutes . . . but with a television huckster, a phony bil-
lionaire, a textbook egomaniac tapping into popular resentments and insecuri-
ties.” Kagan is describing Donald Trump, but the portrait fits many populist 
actors across the globe.1 After a decade spent debating about the emergence of a 
populist Zeitgeist, many commentators now evoke a certain fascist Zeitgeist. While 
fascism in its historical form is unlikely to come back, other forms of power that 
formally observe democratic rules might take its place. The political situation in 
Hungary has alarming echoes with Europe’s past, but it could also foreshadow a 
disturbing future: the government led by Viktor Orbán shows that – rather than 
from classic fascism – new challenges might come from democratic illiberalism 
and populist democracy.
Fascism tout court might no longer be an acceptable ideology, and political 
parties describing themselves as neo-fascist usually remain at the margins of the 
political debate, but populism can reintroduce crypto-fascist ideas of power by 
formally adopting democratic elements. Indeed, the new far right is nationalist 
and xenophobic like the old one, but it has changed its language and style, and 
it tends to adopt a democratic and republican rhetoric. Post-fascism, rather than 
returning to a classic ‘jackboots and salutes’ style of fascism, might therefore turn 
into a new form of authoritarian, populist democracy by breaching a moral and 
political dividing line that separates it from liberal democracy.
Across the world, many are concerned with the illiberal turn of the democratic 
process. Refusing the ‘old politics’ has become a euphemism used to contest 
liberal democracy: its pluralism, minority protection, freedom of the media, and 
division of powers. Importantly, the most common way for authoritarian regimes 
to emerge is by challenging democracy from within, participating in (more or less 
regular) elections. A populist rhetoric often goes hand in glove with authoritar-
ian tendencies since it allows to create a collective identity opposed to a common 
enemy, eliminate intermediate bodies, and claim to do it ‘in the name of the 
people.’
The fact that a party like Vox could recently emerge in Spain, or that the Swe-
den Democrats and the AfD are increasingly successful in Sweden and Germany, 
indicates that even countries where certain ideas of power have remained taboo 
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for decades are now legitimizing the discourses of right-wing populist parties. In 
Croatia, revisionist views of the wartime Ustaša movement and the Nazi-allied 
Independent State of Croatia have entered Croatia’s political mainstream: “Such 
views used to be seen as the lunatic fringe; now they are part of the mainstream,” 
claims historian Rory Yeomans.2
In Europe, the very idea of democracy developed after 1945 as a reaction to 
fascism, Nazism, and World War II is at stake. It is important to celebrate the vox 
populi and to denounce the intrigues and corruption of the elite; actually, this 
is an essential part of democracy itself. Even Louis XVI allowed the population 
(including the Third Estate) to list their hopes and grievances in the Cahiers de 
doléances, thus recording criticisms of government waste and corruption. Emma-
nuel Macron recently asked for a compilation of Cahiers de doléances in response 
to the yellow vests movement. Doubtfully, however, we should welcome the 
return in contemporary Germany of the Nazi slogan Lügenpresse (‘lying press’) 
as a sign of a healthy liberal democracy.3 As historian Enzo Traverso claims, in 
Western Europe democracy was born from the Resistance and from antifascism; 
therefore, an anti-antifascist democracy would be amnesic and unfaithful to its 
own history.4
The past, by definition, cannot come back, but history tends to repeat itself, 
and right-wing populism thrives when the memory of authoritarian regimes is 
not stigmatized. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro defended the military dic-
tatorship that governed the country from 1964 to 1985. In Serbia, President 
Aleksandar Vucˇic´ – a former disciple of the Greater Serbia ideology – has repeat-
edly celebrated and called for the protection of Ratko Mladic´, a military leader 
convicted for committing crimes against humanity and genocide. It is not easy 
to establish to what extent Bolsonaro and Vucˇic´ gained consensus by expressing 
revisionist positions. However, there is no doubt that in countries where the 
stigma of the authoritarian past is strong enough, their words would have been 
unacceptable.
This study points to an element too often neglected when trying to make 
sense of populism. The most important lesson coming out of these pages is that 
memory matters. The process of memory-building is based on a conflict between 
different ideas of national identity and culture. History and memory studies con-
sider this very delicate and conflictual process, while political scientists struggle 
to incorporate it. This is, however, of crucial importance to understand the for-
mation and persistence of different political cultures and the social acceptability 
of certain ideologies. In fact, the way in which a country collectively remembers 
its past defines its new identity and national political culture by tracing a red line 
between acceptable and taboo ideas of power.
For this reason, compared to previous waves of populism that characterized 
Russia, Europe, and the Americas in the nineteenth century, when trying to make 
sense of contemporary populist discourses we should consider not only socio-
economic turbulence and political disenchantment. The collective re-elaboration 
of the past, and the levels of stigma associated with the fascist past, are crucial 
elements as well. After World War II, right-wing populist discourses have become 
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socially unacceptable in certain countries but not in others. While Germany and 
Sweden have restricted illiberal political ideas to a no-go area of the public debate, 
other countries such as Italy, Austria, and France did not stigmatize the fascist 
past; therefore, right-wing populism maintained a certain Salonfähigkeit.
What a country decides to remember is definitely intentional: the solidification 
of history into collective memories follows a very clear strategy that aims at form-
ing a certain image of the country. The conflictual process of memory-building 
takes place at the intersection of education, rituals of remembrance, and public 
debates. What emerges remains in the country’s collective memory, while the rest 
is intentionally removed, cancelled, forgotten. Collective amnesia is the other side 
of the same coin: every official narrative of the past relies on both memory and 
forgetfulness. There is nothing more political than our collective memory.
Given its relevance, the formation of collective memories is often confronta-
tional. Not only parliamentary debates, laws, disputes among historians, and offi-
cial celebrations have a remarkable impact but also school manuals, movies, TV 
shows, and street names. The transmission of memory relies on civic education 
and, in equal measure, on the cluster of ideas conveyed by popular culture. All 
of this matter and can generate the collective antibodies to resist the fascist idea 
of power – or it can leave a country again vulnerable to the same, tragic mistakes 
that led to World War II.
This topic is more relevant than ever because the volatile, short-term, socio-
economic conditions for the success of populism are all lined up, while the 
memory of the past is fading rapidly even in countries where traditionally cer-
tain ideas of power have been taboo. The Great Recession, or rather the usual 
cycle of financial capitalism that produces speculative bubbles, made inequalities 
grow while feeding citizens with insecurities based on feelings such as relative 
deprivation and loss of social status. The constant flow of migrants has been 
labelled as an ‘invasion’ or as a ‘crisis’, and many political entrepreneurs took 
advantage of the fears thus generated. After Brexit, the process of European 
integration seems to be less a political project and more an economic marriage 
that can be broken as soon as it is seen as disadvantageous, thus rewarding 
Eurosceptic actors.
The collective re-elaboration of the fascist past can provide a valuable tool 
to defuse dangerous political discourses when the memory of those events is 
based on a process of Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit. On the other hand, if 
a country prefers to cancel those memories through selective amnesia or even 
self- victimization, right-wing populism finds no obstacles and becomes socially 
acceptable. In other words, different political cultures shape the boundaries of 
the legitimate discursive space. For this reason, ideas previously associated with 
the fascist past now seem acceptable in certain countries but not in others.
By insisting on the erosion of democracy and the possible comeback of fas-
cism, we risk to miss another crucial lesson that the results presented in these 
pages offer: the memory and therefore the stigma associated with the fascist past 
are effective in explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism but not 
of left-wing populism. In Germany, for example, left-wing populism is highly 
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acceptable, while right-wing populism remained completely taboo until the 2017 
elections (and is now present mainly in the East, which did not go through a 
process of culpabilization).
In Western Europe, left-wing populism will avoid social stigma and constitute 
a credible alternative as long as it will protect the rule of law and all the informal 
norms that keep democracy alive. In other words, left-wing populism must con-
front its Communist past and adopt a type of discourse that is inclusive, respectful 
of minority rights, checks and balances, and media freedom. In Latin America, 
left-wing populism used demagogy and often took on authoritarian features, but 
its goal was to include the lower classes into the social and political system. In the 
US and Spain, Bernie Sanders and Podemos symbolize two examples of how it 
is possible to propose a new model that combines a critical interpretation of the 
capitalist system and a project for its transformation without sacrificing the basic 
principles of liberal democracy.
An elitist contempt for the choices of the people leads to a stigmatization of 
populism, every type of populism, but this attitude inevitably reinforces populism 
itself, including its authoritarian and xenophobic declinations. Populism is a thin 
ideology, and what ultimately matters is to observe in combination with which 
type of full ideology it appears. Refusing to understand this, thus collapsing dif-
ferent phenomena, makes populism a useless or even dangerous concept. For 
these reasons, blaming populism for the decay of democracy would be utterly 
misleading.
Upholding crucial aspects of liberal democracy is a precondition for any cred-
ible left-wing populist movement, but it is not the only element to consider. 
In particular, remembering and celebrating the heroic efforts of the resistance 
movements that defeated fascism and Nazism should not become an empty rit-
ual. The values that animated the resistance are not granted forever but have to 
be reaffirmed and protected. A narrative based on heroization, as we have seen, 
does not seem to be enough to produce sufficient levels of stigma of the fascist 
past. Left-wing populism must force the political elites to confront the fascist past 
in a critical way.
A collective memory of heroization has been attributed here to the United 
Kingdom, and it is supposed to be present in Eastern Europe as well (it would 
not be surprising to find out that also the United States rely on a similar narra-
tive). It is important to investigate this type of memory because it seems to entail 
rather low levels of stigma of the fascist past. The United Kingdom displays high 
levels of social acceptability for both left- and right-wing populism, and this has 
become even clearer after the public debate about Brexit. In the absence of a clear 
stigmatization of the fascist past (sometimes due to an objective lack of responsi-
bilities and guilt), pre-existent elements of the national political culture might play 
a crucial role in determining the degree of stigmatization of populism.
The most obvious application of the theory developed in this work is East-
ern Europe. Communist legacies, combined with pre- and post-communist ones 
(including fascist legacies), seem to open up the cultural opportunity structures 
for the social acceptability of right-wing populist discourses, but at the same time, 
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they block the social acceptability of left-wing populist discourses. As already 
mentioned with regard to Eastern Germany, the collective memory developed 
in the East has elements of heroization because the Soviet Union represented 
the opposition to fascism, thus being able to avoid taking responsibility for the 
crimes of the regime it replaced. This could explain why, given the absence of a 
strong stigma of the fascist past, countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Czech 
Republic show alarming authoritarian and nativist tendencies in the context of 
an institutionalized form of populist democracy. Moreover, it might be the case 
that strong anti-communist memories made left-wing populist discourses socially 
unacceptable.
In Eastern Europe, the success of right-wing populist parties does not con-
stitute a ‘silent counter-revolution’ like the populist radical right parties of the 
West but rather tap into a post-communist syndrome. These parties share cleri-
calism and opposition to ethnic minorities, as well as secondary elements such as 
irredentism, anti-corruption, and Euroscepticism. When the Iron Curtain fell, 
all the conflicting social identities that communist rule had not destroyed but 
temporarily set aside exploded, and the pre-existing religious and ethnic cleavages 
re-emerged.
The link between the legacies of authoritarian regimes and populist discourses 
can be investigated also in relation to other countries and regions: fascism in 
Europe is only one example of the many authoritarian regimes that characterized 
the twentieth century. The Communist past and the collective memories of it, for 
example, can be analyzed not only in Europe but also in Asia. In Latin America, 
on the other hand, it is possible to study the presence of right- and left-wing 
populism in relationship to different authoritarian regimes such as Chavismo in 
Venezuela and Peronismo in Argentina, or the Pinochet regime in Chile, just to 
mention a few examples.5
Southern Europe offers interesting possibilities for studying the impact of col-
lective memories on the social acceptability of populism. For example, it is nec-
essary to include in future research cases such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, 
which experienced extremely long-lasting authoritarian regimes. While for other 
West European countries the time for critical debates matured between the 1970s 
and the 1990s, now that more than 30 years have passed since the end of those 
regimes it will be possible to assign a type of mainstream narrative and potential 
secondary narratives to these three countries.
Another element for future research consists in determining the social accepta-
bility of populist discourses by analyzing not only party manifestos but also addi-
tional components of the public debate. Political discourses circulate on a variety of 
platforms, such as TV shows, radio programmes, newspapers, websites, and social 
media. Indeed, political actors still communicate their ideas and programmes to 
voters through their party manifestos, but the role of other channels is increas-
ingly important. Moreover, it would be possible to test whether different media 
cultures (and not only political cultures) are linked to different levels of pop-
ulism’s social acceptability.
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In conclusion, democracy can be considered as a theoretical utopia and each 
achievement on the path towards a more inclusive, just, and representative form 
of power should be defended rather than taken for granted. Even in Western 
Europe, democratic quality can still spread and better incorporate minorities and 
women into politics, protect the rights of the LGBTQI community, guarantee 
better income equality, and strengthen the chains of accountability and respon-
siveness that link the people to their representatives.
The tension between populism and liberal democracy is a crucial element that 
might determine the types and shapes of future political systems. Citizens can 
have many good reasons to desire a collective catharsis, and relying on political 
entrepreneurs that offer redemptive politics can feel liberating. However, history 
teaches that a political carnival often turns into a grotesque, violent farce and 
that forging enemies through a poisonous language can be the antechamber of 
political violence. This is why the future of democracy depends on our memory 
of the past.
Notes
1 Washington Post, “This is how fascism comes to America”, May 18, 2016, avail-
able online (consulted in October 2017): www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
this-is-how-fascism-comes-to-america/2016/05/17/c4e32c58-1c47-11e6-8c7b-
6931e66333e7_story.html?utm_term=.7d82807b9279.
2 Balkan Transitional Justice, “Croatia’s WWII Revisionism ‘Terrifying’, Says 
Historian”, September 28, 2016, available online (consulted in April 2019): 
https://balkaninsight.com/2016/09/28/croatia-s-wwii-revisionism-terrifying- 
says-historian-09-26-2016/.
3 The Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) 
re-popularised the term Lügenpresse in rallies across German cities since 2014.
4 Jacobin, “Fascism Old and New”, April 2, 2019, available online (consulted in 
April 2019): https://jacobinmag.com/2019/02/enzo-traverso-post-fascism- 
ideology-conservatism.
5 In studying the legacies of different authoritarian pasts in other regions of the 
world, it might be necessary to expand or reformulate the typology of collective 
memory proposed in this study. Moreover, it is possible to imagine that the social 
acceptability of different ideas of power is linked not only to the legacies of authori-
tarian regimes but also to other critical junctures, such as colonialism, revolutions, 
civil wars, and regime changes.
Appendix 1
Populism in manifestos: overview
Table A1.2 Average Percentage of Populism in Manifestos
Total Populism Right-Wing Populism Left-Wing Populism
1970s 4.30 2.09 6.52
1980s 4.28 3.08 5.47
1990s 5.10 4.55 5.65
2000s 3.80 3.98 3.63
2010s 6.62 5.68 7.57
Table A1.1 Descriptive Data About Manifestos
 Number 
Manifestos
Number 
Statements
Number 
Populist 
Statements
Percentage 
Populism
Average 
Populism by 
Manifesto
1970s 27 1,304 84 6.44 4.87
1980s 30 3,061 112 3.65 4.27
1990s 39 2,718 139 5.11 4.82
2000s 35 3,297 148 0.85 4.48
2010s 42 3,684 229 6.21 6.51
Total 173 14,064 712 1.06 1.21
Table A1.3 Average Populism in Manifestos (Weighted)
Right-Wing Populism Left-Wing Populism Total Populism
1970s 72.69 517.73 295.21
1980s 172.38 439.09 305.74
1990s 263.76 318.94 291.35
2000s 268.47 123.10 195.78
2010s 281.17 307.73 294.45
Table A1.4 Average Populism per Country
Right-Wing Populism Left-Wing Populism Total Populism
1970s 2.61 13.53 16.46
1980s 5.77 10.26 16.04
1990s 13.65 9.89 23.53
2000s 10.23 8.81 19.05
2010s 17.03 17.97 34.01
Table A1.5 Average Populism per Country (Weighted)
Right-Wing Populism Left-Wing Populism Total Populism
1970s 99.95 630.40 730.34
1980s 323.21 823.70 1145.47
1990s 791.28 595.79 1387.07
2000s 690.34 316.55 1006.89
2010s 843.50 673.24 1516.74
Appendix 2
Populism in manifestos: statistical 
significance
Table A2.1 Statistical Significance Unweighted Populism
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos
All Parties Mainstream Parties
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 8.35*** 11.35*** 9.41*** 9.36***
(2.33) (2.32) (2.09) (2.09)
1970s –0.08 –3.07 –0.65 –0.60
(1.90) (1.86) (1.87) (1.87)
1980s –1.13 –4.12* –1.03 –0.99
(1.78) (1.74) (1.81) (1.81)
1990s –2.99 0.05
(1.60) (1.73)
2000s 0.79 –2.20 0.13 0.18
(1.72) (1.67) (1.82) (1.81)
2010s 2.99 –0.05
(1.60) (1.73)
Length (cent) 0.56 0.56 –0.18 –0.18
(1.40) (1.40) (1.49) (1.49)
AIC 1,168.50 1,168.50 746.16 746.16
BIC 1,215.89 1,215.89 787.72 787.72
Log Likelihood –569.25 –569.25 –358.08 –358.08
Num. Obs. 174 174 118 118
Num. Groups: Parties 65 65 41 41
Var: Parties (Intercept) 1.83 1.83 0.80 0.80
Var: Residual 52.17 52.17 37.75 37.75
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party mani-
festos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). The observations are 
174 because the 5 Star Movement’s manifesto is coded both as left- and right-wing.
Table A2.2 Statistical Significance Weighted Populism
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos (Weighted)
All Parties Mainstream Parties
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 742.43*** 753.96*** 822.59*** 741.12***
(175.09) (174.07) (181.34) (182.34)
1970s –63.12 –74.65 –148.52 –67.05
(139.67) (136.70) (133.17) (134.69)
1980s –5.77 –17.30 –37.35 44.12
–63.12 –74.65 –148.52 –67.05
1990s –11.53 81.47
(117.99) (123.83)
2000s 59.94 48.41 –92.72 –11.25
(126.43) (122.94) (127.41) (128.34)
2010s 11.53 –81.47
(117.99) (123.83)
Length 
(cent)
–25.19 –25.19 –110.49 –110.49
(103.08) (103.08) (108.21) (108.21)
AIC 2,553.89 2,553.89 1,650.13 1,650.13
BIC 2,601.28 2,601.28 1,691.69 1,691.69
Log 
Likelihood
–1,261.95 –1,261.95 –810.07 –810.07
Num. Obs. 174 174 118 118
Num. 
Groups: 
Parties
65 65 41 41
Var: Parties 
(Intercept)
14,444.77 14,444.77 4,3751.16 43,751.16
Var: Residual 28,1201.45 28,1201.45 18,2489.18 182,489.18
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party manifes-
tos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown).
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Appendix 4
Conditions: raw and fuzzy values
Table A4.1 Values for Conditions (Raw and Fuzzy)
Country Decade Corruption Economy Convergence Account-Resp.
Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy
AT 1990s 67.03 0.51 8.25 0.26 0.55 0.20 61.80 0.64
AT 2000s 71.81 0.39 6.62 0.12 0.60 0.12 63.40 0.57
AT 2010s 71.71 0.39 11.16 0.64 0.39 0.67 63.50 0.56
CH 1990s 91.16 0.06 12.30 0.76 0.44 0.53 65.50 0.46
CH 2000s 72.69 0.36 8.33 0.27 0.67 0.05 68.40 0.27
CH 2010s 72.70 0.36 10.25 0.53 0.38 0.71 75.20 0.05
DE 1990s 86.73 0.09 8.35 0.27 0.63 0.08 56.50 0.81
DE 2000s 55.74 0.66 9.08 0.37 0.26 0.91 59.60 0.72
DE 2010s 73.56 0.34 10.30 0.54 0.47 0.44 63.50 0.56
FR 1990s 53.60 0.68 12.22 0.75 0.44 0.52 59.40 0.73
FR 2000s 36.11 0.84 9.30 0.40 0.39 0.67 59.30 0.73
FR 2010s 59.89 0.61 12.54 0.78 0.58 0.16 54.60 0.86
ITA 1990s 12.50 0.95 12.55 0.78 0.41 0.64 60.70 0.68
ITA 2010s 12.79 0.95 16.20 0.95 0.38 0.71 50.50 0.92
NL 1990s 90.66 0.06 8.46 0.29 0.22 0.95 65.10 0.49
NL 2000s 80.37 0.18 5.33 0.06 0.34 0.81 68.00 0.29
NL 2010s 79.61 0.19 10.26 0.53 0.46 0.46 68.00 0.29
SE 1990s 91.94 0.05 10.72 0.59 0.66 0.06 68.60 0.26
SE 2000s 88.76 0.07 5.23 0.06 0.40 0.67 70.40 0.17
SE 2010s 82.50 0.14 8.95 0.35 0.35 0.79 73.70 0.07
UK 1990s 77.30 0.24 13.41 0.84 0.61 0.11 48.60 0.94
UK 2000s 71.98 0.38 9.56 0.44 0.34 0.80 56.60 0.81
UK 2010s 59.13 0.61 14.56 0.90 0.36 0.75 57.60 0.78
Table A4.2 Values for Outcomes (Raw and Fuzzy)
Country Decade Right-Wing 
Populism
Left-Wing 
Populism
Total Populism
Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy
AT 1990s 2,341.72 1 523.50 0.67 2,865.22 1.00
AT 2000s 419.56 0.5 205.55 0.17 625.12 0.33
Country Decade Right-Wing 
Populism
Left-Wing 
Populism
Total Populism
Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy
AT 2010s 2,967.76 1 450.43 0.53 3,418.19 1.00
CH 1990s 1,269.66 1 800.09 0.95 2,069.75 0.97
CH 2000s 1,724.37 1 436.78 0.50 2,161.15 0.98
CH 2010s 745.85 0.93 1,143.04 1.00 1,888.89 0.95
DE 1990s 331.63 0.35 1,264.73 1.00 1,596.36 0.89
DE 2000s 177.24 0.15 309.67 0.30 486.91 0.23
DE 2010s 0.00 0.05 2546.25 1.00 2,546.25 0.99
FR 1990s 801.74 0.95 1,089.85 0.99 1,891.59 0.95
FR 2000s 1,358.75 1 296.31 0.28 1,655.06 0.91
FR 2010s 437.39 0.54 295.50 0.28 732.88 0.43
IT 1990s 1,174.21 1 6.57 0.05 1,180.78 0.73
IT 2010s 637.43 0.84 86.92 0.09 724.35 0.42
NL 1990s 120.48 0.11 108.98 0.1 229.47 0.11
NL 2000s 562.84 0.75 513.06 0.65 1,075.91 0.67
NL 2010s 631.90 0.84 183.98 0.15 815.88 0.5
SE 1990s 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
SE 2000s 73.24 0.08 0.00 0.05 73.24 0.06
SE 2010s 233.81 0.21 207.00 0.18 440.81 0.21
UK 1990s 290.81 0.29 972.61 0.99 1,263.42 0.77
UK 2000s 516.37 0.68 454.48 0.54 970.85 0.6
UK 2010s 1,093.86 0.99 472.82 0.58 1,566.68 0.89
Table A4.3 Calculation of Accountability and Responsiveness
Country Decade Responsiveness Accountability Total
GOVCAP REPRES TR_PTPP COMPET
AT 1990s 71.1 58.2 58.1 59.7 61.8
AT 2000s 66.8 64.4 59.7 62.7 63.4
AT 2010s 66.5 70.5 50.7 66.3 63.5
CH 1990s 75.7 65.6 45.7 75.0 65.5
CH 2000s 76.4 68.7 55.9 72.4 68.4
CH 2010s 78.5 73.0 80.1 69.1 75.2
DE 1990s 66.0 53.3 44.7 62.1 56.5
DE 2000s 67.9 61.6 44.8 64.0 59.6
DE 2010s 65.7 60.9 62.1 65.2 63.5
FR 1990s 67.8 50.5 60.2 59.0 59.4
FR 2000s 62.0 57.2 60.2 57.8 59.3
FR 2010s 51.0 60.2 55.4 51.7 54.6
IT 1990s 64.7 50.4 55.1 72.6 60.7
IT 2010s 50.0 48.6 39.7 63.8 50.5
NL 1990s 77.2 50.5 64.2 68.4 65.1
NL 2000s 70.8 56.0 70.7 74.7 68.0
NL 2010s 64.8 59.2 69.4 78.5 68.0
SE 1990s 74.1 63.7 71.9 64.9 68.6
(Continued)
Country Decade Responsiveness Accountability Total
GOVCAP REPRES TR_PTPP COMPET
SE 2000s 69.6 70.1 75.2 66.8 70.4
SE 2010s 73.0 68.5 81.5 71.9 73.7
UK 1990s 45.7 76.4 34.3 37.9 48.6
UK 2000s 45.3 77.1 53.6 50.2 56.6
UK 2010s 51.8 74.8 56.8 47.0 57.6
Table A4.4 Calculation of Economic Performance
Country Decade Unemployment Gini GDP Total
AT 1990s 3.3 28.11 6.6 8.25
AT 2000s 4.2 26.58 10.9 6.62
AT 2010s 4.9 29.31 0.7 11.16
CH 1990s 3.2 29.82 –3.9 12.30
CH 2000s 2.2 27.52 4.7 8.33
CH 2010s 3.4 30.09 2.7 10.25
DE 1990s 6.5 26.79 8.2 8.35
DE 2000s 8.5 27.00 8.2 9.08
DE 2010s 6.5 28.95 4.5 10.30
FR 1990s 11.1 28.54 3.0 12.22
FR 2000s 10.4 27.91 10.4 9.30
FR 2010s 8.7 28.13 –0.8 12.54
IT 1990s 9.0 31.91 3.2 12.55
IT 2010s 8.8 32.71 –7.1 16.20
NL 1990s 6.0 25.99 6.6 8.46
NL 2000s 4.0 24.03 12.1 5.33
NL 2010s 4.5 25.91 –0.4 10.26
SE 1990s 4.9 21.10 –6.2 10.72
SE 2000s 6.6 23.58 14.5 5.23
SE 2010s 8.1 25.17 6.4 8.95
UK 1990s 6.1 33.01 –1.1 13.41
UK 2000s 6.1 34.32 11.7 9.56
UK 2010s 6.6 33.85 –3.3 14.56
Table A4.3 (Continued)
Appendix 5
Distribution cases in outcomes
Figure A5.1 Distribution Acceptability of Total Populism
Figure A5.2 Distribution Acceptability of Left-Wing Populism
Figure A5.3 Distribution Acceptability of Right-Wing Populism
Figure A5.4 Distribution Cases in Conditions
Appendix 6
All solutions without stigma
Table A6.1 Solutions Total Populism
Conservative Solution for Total Populism
M1: c*E + C*D + D*cnvg => POP
      inclS  PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*E    0.876  0.807 0.477 0.097  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; 
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 C*D    0.896  0.830 0.492 0.107  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 D*cnvg 0.872  0.801 0.491 0.047  AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95; 
AT_94; FR_12
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.821  0.751 0.730
Intermediate Solution for Total Populism
M1: E + C*D + D*cnvg => POP
      inclS  PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 E     0.850  0.787 0.651 0.125  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; 
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 C*D   0.896  0.830 0.492 0.022  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 D*cnvg 0.872  0.801 0.491 0.046  AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95; 
AT_94; FR_12
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.822  0.755 0.759
(Continued)
Most Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism
M1: C + E + D*cnvg => POP
      inclS  PRI    covS  covU   cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C    0.881  0.814  0.536 0.036   AT_94; 
DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 E    0.850  0.787  0.651 0.095   NL_12,SE_94; CH_95, 
CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; 
AT_13; FR_12; FR_95, 
IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 D*cnvg 0.872  0.801  0.491 0.046   AT_02,DE_94; DE_13, 
UK_95; AT_94; FR_12
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.814  0.748  0.772
Table A6.2 Solutions Right-Wing Populism
Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism
M1: C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG + (C*D*E) => POP
M2: C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG + (D*E*CNVG) => POP
------------------
        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u  (M1)  (M2)  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D*cnvg 0.935 0.886 0.357 0.045  0.045  0.101  AT_94; 
FR_12
2 c*E*CNVG 0.845 0.775 0.346 0.064  0.119  0.064  CH_95,CH_11; 
AT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
3 C*D*E    0.907 0.865 0.440 0.023  0.096        FR_12; 
FR_95, 
IT_94, 
IT_13, 
UK_10
4 D*E*CNVG 0.885 0.845 0.426 0.010        0.083  AT_13; 
FR_95, 
IT_94, 
IT_13, 
UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.889 0.845 0.605
  M2     0.895 0.851 0.591
Table A6.1 (Continued)
Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism
M1: E*CNVG + C*D*cnvg => POP
        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 E*CNVG   0.883 0.846 0.492 0.236  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 C*D*cnvg 0.935 0.886 0.357 0.101 AT_94; FR_12
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.895 0.851 0.593
Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism
M1: C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP
       incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*cnvg 0.940 0.896 0.386 0.108 AT_94; FR_12
2 E*CNVG 0.883 0.846 0.492 0.214  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.896 0.853 0.600
Table A6.3 Solutions Left-Wing Populism
Conservative Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D + D*E + D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG => POP
        inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D    0.818 0.675 0.589 0.018  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; 
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 D*E    0.758 0.600 0.614 0.073  DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 D*cnvg  0.790 0.663 0.568 0.017  AT_02,DE_94; DE_13, 
UK_95; AT_94; FR_12
4 c*E*CNVG 0.860 0.710 0.430 0.056 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.722 0.584 0.787
Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D + D*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP
       inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D   0.818 0.675 0.589 0.018  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; 
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 D*cnvg 0.790 0.663 0.568 0.024  AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95; 
AT_94; FR_12
3 E*CNVG 0.781 0.614 0.531 0.112  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.732 0.592 0.770
(Continued)
Most Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D + E*CNVG + (C*cnvg) => POP
M2: c*D + E*CNVG + (D*cnvg) => POP
-----------------
       inclS PRI   covS  covU  (M1)  (M2)  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D   0.818 0.675 0.589 0.018 0.134 0.018  AT_02,DE_94; 
UK_03; DE_13, 
UK_95; AT_13
2 E*CNVG 0.781 0.614 0.531 0.085 0.085 0.112  CH_95,CH_11; 
AT_13; FR_95, 
IT_94,IT_13, 
UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
3 C*cnvg 0.839 0.628 0.420 0.008 0.010      AT_94; FR_12
4 D*cnvg 0.790 0.663 0.568 0.022     0.024  AT_02,DE_94; 
DE_13,UK_95; 
AT_94; FR_12
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.743 0.597 0.756
  M2    0.732 0.592 0.770
Table A6.3 (Continued)
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Appendix 8
Outcomes and stigma
Figure A8.1 Distribution of Cases in Stigma
Figure A8.2 Total Populism and Stigma
Figure A8.3 Right-Wing Populism and Stigma
Figure A8.4 Left-Wing Populism and Stigma
Appendix 9
Robustness test without 
convergence
Table A9.1 Robustness Test Without Convergence (Without Stigma)
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism
M1: C + D*E => POP
     inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C   0.881 0.814 0.536 0.105  AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95, 
FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*E  0.881 0.824 0.559 0.128  AT_13,DE_13,UK_95; FR_95, 
FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.853 0.791 0.664
Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism
M1: C => POP
      incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C    0.895 0.851 0.569 -     AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95, 
FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.895 0.851 0.569
Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D*E => POP
      incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D*E 0.886 0.764 0.488 -    AT_13,DE_13,UK_95
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.886 0.764 0.488
Table A9.2 Robustness Test Without Convergence (with Stigma)
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism
M1: C + D*s + E*S => POP_CAL5
     inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C    0.881 0.814 0.536 0.052  DE_02; AT_94,FR_02; UK_10; 
FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 D*s  0.861 0.779 0.451 0.118  DE_94,UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; 
DE_02; UK_10
3 E*S  0.894 0.834 0.518 0.077  CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_13; 
FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.854 0.796 0.762
Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism
M1: S + C*E => POP
      incl   PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 S    0.885 0.850 0.773 0.330  CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; 
CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; 
AT_13; AT_94,FR_02; 
FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 C*E  0.910 0.871 0.474 0.031  UK_10; 
FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.856 0.815 0.804
Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: D*s + c*E*S => POP
      inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 D*s  0.804 0.644 0.536 0.231  DE_94,UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; 
DE_02; UK_10
2 c*E*S 0.843 0.684 0.432 0.127  CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.796 0.658 0.663
Appendix 10
Alternative operationalization (A.O.)
Table A10.1 Variables Used for the Alternative Operationalization (A.O.)
Dimensions 
of Populism
Aspects Questions in the Codebook
People-
centrism
Closeness to the 
people
Does the speaker claim to belong/be close 
to/know/speak for/care for/agree with/
perform everyday actions like/represent/
embody the people?
Stating a 
monolithic 
people
Does the speaker describe the people as 
homogeneous, sharing common feelings, 
desires, or opinions?
Stressing the 
virtues of the 
people
Does the speaker describe the people in a 
positive way (moral, credible, competent, no 
lack of understanding, etc.)?
Praising the 
people’s 
achievements
Does the speaker stress positive actions 
and positive past and future impacts of 
the people (responsible for a positive 
development/situation, not being 
responsible for a mistake, etc.)?
Claiming power 
for the people
Does the speaker argue that the people should 
have/gain/not lose power? Does the speaker 
give the people the competence to act or 
decide on a specific political issue? Does the 
speaker demand institutional reforms for 
more participation of the people in politics?
Anti-elitism Exclusion of the 
elites from the 
people
Does the speaker describe the elites as not 
belonging to/not being close to/not 
knowing the needs of/not caring about/
not speaking on behalf of/not empowering/
deceiving the people?
Blaming the 
elites
Does the speaker argue that the elites are a 
burden/threat? Does the speaker argue 
that the elites are accountable for negative 
developments/situations?
Denouncing the 
elites
Does the speaker argue that the elites are 
responsible for wrong/stupid actions or 
immoral/criminal/ behaviour? Does the 
speaker argue that the elites are planning/
scheming something?
(Continued)
Dimensions 
of Populism
Aspects Questions in the Codebook
Denying power 
to the elites
Does the speaker argue that the elites should 
have/lose/not have more power? Does the 
speaker deny to the elites the competence to 
act or decide on a specific political issue?
Note: three additional aspects have been included in the measurement compared to the other 
operationalization. Notably, the three variables: ‘blaming the elites,’ ‘denouncing the elites,’ and 
‘claiming less power to the elites.’ Since this operationalization is based on the co-occurrence of 
the pillars, there were no reasons to exclude them from the measurement of populism.
Table A10.2 Measurement Populism in Manifestos (A.O.)
Country Decade Party-Year Total 
Statements
Populist 
Statements
Percentage Weighted 
Populism
AT 1970 SPÖ_1975 37 2 0 0
AT 1970 ÖVP_1975 27 1 0 0
AT 1970 FPÖ_1975 15 0 0 0
AT 1980 ÖVP_1983 35 4 11.42857 543.0857
AT 1980 SPÖ_1983 97 15 0 0
AT 1980 FPÖ_1983 46 3 0 0
AT 1990 FPÖ_1994 104 17 16.34615 2,133.173
AT 1990 GRÜNE_1994 31 4 12.90323 160.129
AT 1990 SPÖ_1994 98 7 0 0
AT 1990 ÖVP_1994 110 10 0 0
AT 1990 LIF_1994 22 1 0 0
AT 2000 SPÖ_2002 105 13 12.38095 1,152.171
AT 2000 GRÜNE_2002 52 4 7.692308 233.8462
AT 2000 FPÖ_2002 139 7 5.035971 231.6547
AT 2000 ÖVP_2002 170 6 0 0
AT 2010 TS_2013 144 39 27.08333 558.675
AT 2010 GRÜNE_2013 241 27 11.20332 417.4357
AT 2010 NEOS_2013 79 6 7.594937 75.34177
AT 2010 SPÖ_2013 60 2 0 0
AT 2010 ÖVP_2013 92 11 0 0
AT 2010 FPÖ_2013 19 4 0 0
CH 1970 LdU_1975 16 3 18.75 168.75
CH 1970 CVP_1975 106 0 0 0
CH 1970 FDP_1975 19 0 0 0
CH 1970 SVP_1975 14 0 0 0
CH 1970 SP_1975 18 1 0 0
CH 1980 CVP_1983 25 0 0 0
CH 1980 FDP_1983 30 0 0 0
CH 1980 SVP_1983 42 0 0 0
CH 1980 SP_1983  17  0  0   0
CH 1990 FDP_1995 26 3 11.53846 1,002.231
CH 1990 GPS_1995 53 4 7.54717 79.24528
CH 1990 CVP_1995 33 4 0 0
CH 1990 SVP_1995 73 5 0 0
CH 1990 SP_1995 43 5 0 0
CH 2000 SVP_2003 169 47 27.81065 3,861.231
Country Decade Party-Year Total 
Statements
Populist 
Statements
Percentage Weighted 
Populism
CH 2000 FDP_2003 47 9 19.14894 861.3191
CH 2000 SP_2003 121 5 4.132231 462.1488
CH 2000 CVP_2003 23 0 0 0
CH 2000 GPS_2003 32 2 0 0
CH 2010 SVP_2011 48 15 31.25 914.375
CH 2010 SP_2011 31 5 16.12903 1,809.677
CH 2010 GPS_2011 91 5 5.494505 143.0769
CH 2010 BDP_2011 3 0 0 0
CH 2010 CVP_2011 42 2 0 0
CH 2010 FDP_2011 49 2 0 0
CH 2010 GLP_2011 14 0 0 0
DE 1970 CDU_1972 31 3 0 0
DE 1970 FDP_1972 2 0 0 0
DE 1970 SPD_1972 56 3 0 0
DE 1980 SPD_1983 65 20 30.76923 1,998.154
DE 1980 CDU_1983 36 3 0 0
DE 1980 FDP_1983 45 2 0 0
DE 1980 Grüne_1983 25 2 0 0
DE 1990 Grüne_1994 149 26 17.44966 382.1477
DE 1990 CDU_1994 42 1 0 0
DE 1990 FDP_1994 191 7 0 0
DE 1990 SPD_1994 54 6 0 0
DE 2000 SPD_2002 112 6 5.357143 412.5
DE 2000 FDP_2002 115 5 4.347826 67.56522
DE 2000 CDU_2002 91 3 3.296703 184.7802
DE 2000 Grüne_2002 129 2 0 0
DE 2010 Grüne_2013 54 22 40.74074 821.3333
DE 2010 Linke_2013 120 34 28.33333 1,169.6
DE 2010 SPD_2013 135 33 24.44444 1,382.089
DE 2010 CDU_2013 37 0 0 0
FR 1970 PS_1973 228 35 15.35088 2,718.948
FR 1970 UMP_1973 95 15 15.78947 476.8421
FR 1980 PCF_1981 69 13 18.84058 1,210.696
FR 1980 UMP_1981 74 11 14.86486 561.8919
FR 1980 PS_1981 43 1 0 0
FR 1990 PCF_1997 71 5 7.042254 261.6338
FR 1990 LO_1995 28 0 0 0
FR 1990 PS_1997 72 10 0 0
FR 1990 UMP_1993 130 8 0 0
FR 1990 FN_1997 17 0 0 0
FR 1990 UDF_1997 23 1 0 0
FR 2000 UDF_2002 117 17 14.52991 187.7265
FR 2000 FN_2002 164 22 13.41463 1,337.573
FR 2000 LO_2002 33 0 0 0
FR 2000 PS_2002 76 6 0 0
FR 2000 EELV_2002 60 1 0 0
FR 2000 UMP_2002 35 1 0 0
FR 2010 EELV_2012 149 20 13.42282 183.2215
FR 2010 MoDem_2012 78 8 10.25641 102.6667
FR 2010 FN_2012 116 3 2.586207 273.1293
Table A10.2 (Continued)
(Continued)
Country Decade Party-Year Total 
Statements
Populist 
Statements
Percentage Weighted 
Populism
FR 2010 PS_2012 94 2 0 0
FR 2010 UMP_2012 40 1 0 0
ITA 1970 PCI_1972 20 3 15 1,178.85
ITA 1970 PSI_1972 5 2 0 0
ITA 1970 MSI-DN_1983 364 51 14.01099 104.8022
ITA 1980 PCI_1983 515 24 4.660194 236.8777
ITA 1980 PSI_1983 274 7 2.554745 49.51095
ITA 1980 PRI_1983 486 11 2.263374 11.54321
ITA 1980 DC_1983 102 4 0 0
ITA 1980 MSI-DN_1994 121 18 14.87603 340.6463
ITA 1990 MSI-DN_1994 53 7 13.20755 458.0377
ITA 1990 FI_1994 118 13 11.01695 1,110.508
ITA 1990 LN_1994 112 10 8.928571 142.5
ITA 1990 PRC_1994 85 3 3.529412 72.6
ITA 1990 PPI_1994 26 2 0 0
ITA 1990 M5S_2013 38 7 18.42105 330.1053
ITA 2010 M5S_2013 38 7 18.42105 330.1053
ITA 2010 PD_2013 45 5 11.11111 677.3333
ITA 2010 PDL_2013 68 5 7.352941 428.8235
ITA 2010 SC_2013 38 5 0 0
NL 1970 ARP_1971 104 15 14.42308 306
NL 1970 PvdA_1971 61 2 3.278689 492.2951
NL 1970 VVD_1971 98 0 0 0
NL 1970 KVP_1971 40 0 0 0
NL 1980 PvdA_1982 87 11 12.64368 1,191.54
NL 1980 VVD_1982 63 2 0 0
NL 1980 CDA_1982 8 0 0 0
NL 1990 VVD_1994 83 12 14.45783 722.8916
NL 1990 D66_1994 128 17 13.28125 370.5469
NL 1990 PvdA_1994 7 0 0 0
NL 1990 CDA_1994 9 0 0 0
NL 2000 GL_2002 156 44 28.20513 681.1538
NL 2000 LPF_2002 25 5 20 1,496
NL 2000 CDA_2002 87 9 10.34483 603.931
NL 2000 SP_2002 91 9 9.89011 256.7473
NL 2000 D66_2002 137 11 8.029197 57.32847
NL 2000 PvdA_2002 110 8 7.272727 219.6364
NL 2000 VVD_2002 84 3 3.571429 187
NL 2010 PVV_2012 116 20 17.24138 922.931
NL 2010 PvdA_2012 308 23 7.467532 425.9481
NL 2010 SP_2012 134 9 6.716418 322.3881
NL 2010 CDA_2012 109 5 4.587156 109.1743
NL 2010 VVD_2012 162 7 4.320988 448.2593
NL 2010 D66_2012 222 5 2.252252 28.82883
SE 1970 C_1973 33 1 0 0
SE 1970 FP_1973 32 0 0 0
SE 1970 M_1973 5 0 0 0
SE 1970 S_1973 5 0 0 0
SE 1970 V_1973 12 1 0 0
SE 1980 C_1982 53 0 0 0
SE 1980 FP_1982 15 0 0 0
Country Decade Party-Year Total 
Statements
Populist 
Statements
Percentage Weighted 
Populism
SE 1980 M_1982 17 0 0 0
SE 1980 S_1982 16 0 0 0
SE 1980 V_1982 33 1 0 0
SE 1990 C_1994 23 0 0 0
SE 1990 FP_1994 38 0 0 0
SE 1990 MP_1994 32 2 0 0
SE 1990 M_1994 32 2 0 0
SE 1990 S_1994 34 0 0 0
SE 1990 V_1994 28 2 0 0
SE 2000 C_2002 25 0 0 0
SE 2000 FP_2002 37 0 0 0
SE 2000 KD_2002 82 2 0 0
SE 2000 M_2002 61 1 0 0
SE 2000 S_2002 37 0 0 0
SE 2000 V_2002 75 2 0 0
SE 2010 SD_2014 52 3 5.769231 282.8077
SE 2010 C_2014 7 0 0 0
SE 2010 FP_2014 11 0 0 0
SE 2010 MP_2014 9 1 0 0
SE 2010 S_2014 58 3 0 0
SE 2010 V_2014 76 5 0 0
SE 2010 M_2014 175 1 0 0
UK 1970 Liberal  
Democrats_ 
1974
58 6 10.34483 397.5517
UK 1970 Con_1974 88 9 10.22727 475.9773
UK 1970 Labour_1974 79 7 8.860759 1,319.899
UK 1980 SDP/Alliance_ 
1983
127 12 9.448819 478.1102
UK 1980 Labour_1983 169 15 8.87574 1,200.355
UK 1980 Con_1983 83 4 4.819277 796.9157
UK 1990 Labour_1992 53 4 7.54717 1,038.491
UK 1990 Liberal  
Democrats_ 
1992
147 10 6.802721 387.483
UK 1990 Con_1992 219 7 3.196347 508.9224
UK 2000 Con_2001 159 23 14.46541 1,696.648
UK 2000 Liberal  
Democrats_ 
2001
255 23 9.019608 363.1294
UK 2000 Labour_2001 86 7 0 0
UK 2010 Liberal  
Democrats_ 
2010
83 12 14.45783 332.5301
UK 2010 Con_2010 133 19 14.28571 1,598.714
UK 2010 Labour_2010 104 5 0 0
Table A10.2 (Continued)
Table A10.3 Populism by Country-Decade Raw and Weighted (A.O.)
Country Decade Right-Wing 
Populism
Left-Wing 
Populism
Total Populism
Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy
AT 1990s 2293.30 1.0 0.00 0.1 2293.30 0.9
AT 2000s 231.65 0.2 1,386.02 1.0 1,617.67 0.8
AT 2010s 634.02 0.6 417.44 0.7 1,051.45 0.7
CH 1990s 1,002.23 0.8 79.25 0.1 1,081.48 0.7
CH 2000s 4,722.55 1.0 462.15 0.8 5184.70 1.0
CH 2010s 914.38 0.7 1,952.75 1.0 2867.13 1.0
DE 1990s 0.00 0.1 382.15 0.7 382.15 0.2
DE 2000s 252.35 0.2 412.50 0.7 664.85 0.5
DE 2010s 0.00 0.1 3,373.02 1.0 3,373.02 1.0
FR 1990s 0.00 0.1 261.63 0.5 261.63 0.1
FR 2000s 1,525.30 0.9 0.00 0.1 1,525.30 0.8
FR 2010s 375.80 0.3 183.22 0.3 559.02 0.4
IT 1990s 2,051.69 1.0 72.60 0.1 2,124.29 0.9
IT 2010s 758.93 0.7 NA 1.0 1,766.37 0.9
NL 1990s 722.89 0.6 1,007.44 0.7 1,093.44 0.7
NL 2000s 2,286.93 1.0 370.55 1.0 3,501.80 1.0
NL 2010s 1,509.19 0.9 1,214.87 0.9 2,257.53 0.9
SE 1990s 0.00 0.1 748.34 0.1 0.00 0.1
SE 2000s 0.00 0.1 0.00 0.1 0.00 0.1
SE 2010s 282.81 0.2 0.00 0.1 282.81 0.2
UK 1990s 508.92 0.5 0.00 1.0 1,934.90 0.9
UK 2000s 1,696.65 0.9 1,425.97 0.6 2,059.78 0.9
UK 2010s 1,598.71 0.9 363.13 0.6 1,931.24 0.9
Figure A10.1 Populism in Manifestos (A.O.)
Figure A10.2 Populism in Manifestos Weighted (A.O.)
Figure A10.4 Populism in Countries Weighted (A.O.)
Figure A10.3 Populism in Countries (A.O.)
Table A11.1 Solutions Total Populism Without Stigma (A.O.)
Conservative Solutions for Total Populism
M1: C*D + c*E + D*CNVG + c*d*cnvg => POP
        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D    0.881 0.824 0.463 0.026  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; 
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13, 
UK_10
2 c*E    0.871 0.792 0.453 0.073  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95, 
CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; 
AT_13
3 D*CNVG  0.914 0.869 0.493 0.052  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02, 
FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13, 
UK_10
4 c*d*cnvg 0.820 0.720 0.337 0.027 CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.831 0.775 0.727
Intermediate Solution for Total Populism
M1: E + C*D + d*cnvg + D*CNVG => POP
        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 E     0.831 0.766 0.610 0.097  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; 
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13;  
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94, 
IT_13,UK_10
2 C*D    0.881 0.824 0.463 0.013  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; 
FR_12; FR_95,IT_94, 
IT_13,UK_10
3 d*cnvg  0.833 0.747 0.369 0.033  CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
4 D*CNVG  0.914 0.869 0.493 0.043  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02, 
FR_02; FR_95,IT_94, 
IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.820 0.765 0.756
Appendix 11
Solutions, robustness tests, and 
statistical significance (A.O.)
Table A11.2 Solutions Right-Wing Populism Without Stigma (A.O)
Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism
M1: C*D + D*CNVG + c*E*CNVG => POP
       inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D    0.778 0.669 0.475 0.091  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG  0.825 0.750 0.517 0.061  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 c*E*CNVG 0.863 0.748 0.376 0.076  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.813 0.727 0.684
Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism
M1: C*D + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP
       inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D    0.778 0.669 0.475 0.091  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG  0.825 0.750 0.517 0.051  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 E*CNVG  0.870 0.794 0.515 0.078  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.813 0.728 0.686
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism
M1: C + E + d*cnvg + D*CNVG => POP
        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C     0.886 0.838 0.516 0.029  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 E     0.831 0.766 0.610 0.086  NL_12,SE_94; CH_95, 
CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; 
AT_13; FR_12; FR_95, 
IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 d*cnvg  0.833 0.747 0.369 0.027 CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
4 D*CNVG  0.914 0.869 0.493 0.043  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02, 
FR_02; FR_95,IT_94, 
IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.822 0.769 0.773
Source: Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non- 
membership, crossover point, and full membership): 0–665–2294. To determine the configura-
tions of the truth table considered as sufficient for the outcome, the inclusion cut is .85. The 
same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.
(Continued)
Table A11.3 Solutions Left-Wing Populism Without Stigma (A.O.)
Conservative Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D + D*CNVG + c*E*CNVG => POP
        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D    0.824 0.711 0.535 0.167  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; 
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 D*CNVG  0.746 0.608 0.485 0.116  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02, 
FR_02; FR_95,IT_94, 
IT_13,UK_10
3 c*E*CNVG 0.830 0.687 0.375 0.054  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.740 0.636 0.706
Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP
        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D    0.824 0.711 0.535 0.167  AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; 
DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 D*CNVG  0.746 0.608 0.485 0.029  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02, 
FR_02; FR_95,IT_94, 
IT_13,UK_10
3 E*CNVG  0.757 0.616 0.465 0.056  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.741 0.637 0.708
Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism
M1: C + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5
      inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C    0.797 0.699 0.539 0.126  AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG 0.825 0.750 0.517 0.051  UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 E*CNVG 0.870 0.794 0.515 0.050  CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; 
FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.819 0.742 0.721
Source: Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non- 
membership, crossover point, and full membership): 0–374–1697. To determine the configura-
tions of the truth table that are considered as sufficient for the outcome, the inclusion cut is .78. 
The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.
Table A11.2 (Continued)
Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D + E*CNVG + (C*CNVG) => POP
M2: c*D + E*CNVG + (D*CNVG) => POP
-----------------
       incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u (M1)  (M2)  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D   0.824 0.711 0.535 0.167 0.205 0.167  AT_02,DE_94; 
UK_03; DE_13, 
UK_95; AT_13
2 E*CNVG 0.757 0.616 0.465 0.032 0.032 0.056  CH_95,CH_11; 
AT_13; FR_95, 
IT_94,IT_13, 
UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
3 C*CNVG 0.784 0.645 0.408 0.000 0.022        DE_02,FR_02; 
FR_95,IT_94, 
IT_13,UK_10
4 D*CNVG 0.746 0.608 0.485 0.007       0.029  UK_03; AT_13; 
DE_02,FR_02;  
FR_95,IT_94, 
IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.749 0.646 0.701
  M2    0.741 0.637 0.708
Source: Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non- 
membership, crossover point, and full membership): 0–262–749. To determine the configura-
tions of the truth table that are considered as sufficient for the outcome, the inclusion cut is .8. 
The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.
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Table A11.6 Solutions Left-Wing Populism with Stigma (A.O.)
Conservative Solutions for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*d*CNVG*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + 
(c*D*e*s) => POP
M2: c*d*CNVG*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + 
(D*e*CNVG*s) => POP
-----------------
         incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u (M1)  (M2)  cases
----------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*d*CNVG*S 0.822 0.707 0.350 0.056 0.056 0.056  NL_94,NL_02; 
CH_95,CH_11
2 c*D*cnvg*s 0.820 0.703 0.362 0.049 0.049 0.128  DE_94; DE_13, 
UK_95
3 C*D*CNVG*s 0.918 0.822 0.307 0.029 0.055 0.029 DE_02; UK_10
4 c*E*CNVG*S 0.828 0.668 0.313 0.017 0.017 0.017  CH_95,CH_11; 
AT_13
----------------------------------------------------------------
5 c*D*e*s   0.846 0.709 0.377 0.000 0.014     DE_94; UK_03
6 D*e*CNVG*s 0.878 0.761 0.323 0.000     0.014 UK_03; DE_02
----------------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.849 0.773 0.636
  M2       0.849 0.773 0.636
Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: D*s + c*CNVG*S => POP
         incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
----------------------------------------------------------------
1 D*s      0.843 0.742 0.508 0.260  DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; 
DE_02; UK_10
2 c*CNVG*S   0.834 0.729 0.399 0.151  NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11; 
AT_13
----------------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.838 0.763 0.660
Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism
M1: D*s + c*CNVG*S => POP
         incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
----------------------------------------------------------------
1 D*s      0.843 0.742 0.508 0.260  DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; 
DE_02; UK_10
2 c*CNVG*S  0.834 0.729 0.399 0.151  NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11; 
AT_13
----------------------------------------------------------------
  M1      0.838 0.763 0.660
Table A11.7 Robustness Test Without “Convergence” (A.O.) Without Stigma
Parsimonious Solutions for Total Populism
M1: D + E => POP
     inclS PRI   covS  covU
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 D    0.821 0.758 0.665 0.140
2 E    0.831 0.766 0.610 0.085
-------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.800 0.740 0.750
      cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 D     AT_02,DE_94,UK_03; AT_13,DE_13,UK_95; AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; 
FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 E     CH_95,CH_11,NL_12,SE_94; AT_13,DE_13,UK_95; FR_95, 
FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism
M1: C + d*E => POP
     inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 C    0.797 0.699 0.539 0.263  AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95, 
FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 d*E   0.797 0.658 0.384 0.108  CH_95,CH_11,NL_12,SE_94
-------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.770 0.666 0.647
Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D + (C*s + c*e*S) => POP
M2: c*D + (C*s + d*e*S) => POP
M3: c*D + (D*s + c*e*S) => POP
M4: c*D + (D*s + d*e*S) => POP
-----------------------------
     inclS PRI   covS  covU  (M1)  (M2)  (M3)  (M4)  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D  0.824 0.711 0.535 0.031 0.146 0.159 0.031 0.043  DE_94,UK_03; 
AT_02; DE_13, 
UK_95; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------
2 C*s  0.898 0.800 0.358 0.000 0.048 0.045          DE_02; UK_10
3 D*s  0.843 0.742 0.508 0.007        0.055 0.051  DE_94,UK_03; 
DE_13,UK_95; 
DE_02; UK_10
4 c*e*S 0.830 0.738 0.439 0.015 0.111      0.122      CH_03,NL_94, 
NL_02; AT_02
5 d*e*S 0.809 0.705 0.402 0.007     0.103     0.114  CH_03,NL_94, 
NL_02
-------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1   0.841 0.770 0.706
  M2   0.828 0.752 0.698
  M3   0.831 0.758 0.713
  M4   0.819 0.741 0.705
Table A11.8 Robustness Test Without “Convergence” (A.O.) with Stigma
Parsimonious Solutions for Total Populism
M1: C + S + D*E => POP
     inclS PRI   covS  covU
------------------------------
1 C  0.886 0.838 0.516 0.012
2 S  0.880 0.844 0.703 0.194
3 D*E 0.865 0.799 0.525 0.070
------------------------------
 M1  0.877 0.841 0.843
    cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C    DE_02; AT_94,FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 S    CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13; 
AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
3 D*E DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism
M1: C + S => POP
    inclS PRI   covS  covU
------------------------------
1 C  0.797 0.699 0.539 0.049
2 S  0.823 0.760 0.764 0.275
------------------------------
 M1   0.793 0.723 0.814
    cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C     DE_02; AT_94,FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 S    CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13; 
AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism
M1: c*D => POP
    inclS PRI   covS  covU cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D 0.824 0.711 0.535 -    AT_02,DE_94,UK_03; 
AT_13,DE_13,UK_95
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1 0.824 0.711 0.535
Table A11.9 Statistical Significance Unweighted Populism (A.O.)
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos
All Parties Mainstream Parties
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 6.28* 9.84*** 6.84*** 8.26***
(2.57) (2.56) (2.07) (2.08)
1970s 0.15 –3.41 0.13 –1.29
(1.91) (1.87) (1.75) (1.76)
1980s 0.46 –3.10 1.52 0.10
(1.78) (1.76) (1.70) (1.70)
1990s –3.56* –1.42
(1.62) (1.62)
2000s 2.08 –1.48 2.15 0.74
(1.72) (1.68) (1.69) (1.69)
2010s 3.56* 1.42
(1.62) (1.62)
Length (cent) 2.35 2.35 1.04 1.04
(1.42) (1.42) (1.40) (1.40)
AIC 1,175.98 1,175.98 734.37 734.37
BIC 1,223.36 1,223.36 775.93 775.93
Log Likelihood –572.99 –572.99 –352.19 –352.19
Num. Obs. 174 174 118 118
Num. Groups: 
Parties
65 65 41 41
Var: Parties 
(Intercept)
6.01 6.01 2.53 2.53
Var: Residual 51.59 51.59 32.44 32.44
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party mani-
festos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). The observations are 
174 because the 5 Star Movement’s manifesto is coded both as left- and right-wing.
Table A11.10 Statistical Significance Weighted Populism (A.O.)
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos (weighted)
All Parties Mainstream Parties
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 627.56*** 709.90*** 684.51*** 754.66***
(155.77) (154.49) (147.45) (147.92)
1970s –48.84 –131.17 –89.52 –159.66
(131.76) (128.56) (122.85) (123.39)
1980s 42.76 –39.57 56.13 –14.01
(123.50) (120.78) (119.11) (119.17)
1990s –82.33 –70.14
(111.17) (113.83)
2000s 169.58 87.25 80.53 10.39
(Continued)
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos (weighted)
All Parties Mainstream Parties
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(119.66) (116.13) (118.57) (118.70)
2010s 82.33 70.14
(111.17) (113.83)
Length (cent) 91.46 91.46 –41.70 –41.70
(96.57) (96.57) (98.63) (98.63)
AIC 2,531.65 2,531.65 1,627.78 1,627.78
BIC 2,579.04 2,579.04 1,669.34 1,669.34
Log 
Likelihood
–1,250.83 –1,250.83 –798.89 –798.89
Num. Obs. 174 174 118 118
Num. 
Groups: 
Parties
65 65 41 41
Var: Parties 
(Intercept)
1,851.03 1,851.02 14,320.56 14,320.56
Var: Residual 253,744.57 253,744.58 159,640.72 159,640.72
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party manifes-
tos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown).
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